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This dissertation presents an alternative account of analyticity, as well as 
arguments for that account.  Although an analysis and interpretation of previous acc nts 
of analyticity are presented, the focus is on the analysis of, and the arguments for a 
solution to, the philosophical problem of the existence of analyticities.  The consideration 
of classical and contemporary texts provides a context for the alternative account of 
analyticity presented, and the analysis of the arguments against previous accnts of 
analyticity serve to demonstrate both the need for an alternative account and the means 
by which it avoids the problems inherent in the previous accounts.   
The dissertation begins with an initial argument for the philosophical significance 
of analyticity, as many have questioned its role.  This is followed by an exposition and 
analysis of the origins and variations of the analytic/synthetic distinction in the writings 
of Locke, Leibniz, Hume, and Kant.  As the conventionalist account of analyticity has 
had a considerable number of adherents, and as it has been the focus of much of the 
criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction, the dissertation includes a presentation of 
the two primary forms of these conventionalist accounts.  This sets the stage for an in-
depth analysis of Quine’s arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction.  With the 
responses to these arguments serving to clear the deck, the alternative account of 
analyticity is presented along with the status and implications of analyticity, concluding 
with the arguments for the notion of analyticity offered in this account. 
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Chapter 1: The Philosophical Significance of Analyticity 
 
I. Introduction 
The concept of analyticity has had a long history in philosophy, and it has played 
a major role in the positions of many philosophers.  Hume seems to have grasped the 
concept with his distinction between matters of fact and relations of ideas, but it is in 
Kant’s Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason that we find the first stated 
presentation of a distinction between, as Kant called them, analytic and synthetic 
judgments.  And, since then, the analytic/synthetic distinction has been an important 
distinction in philosophy.  Kant’s analytic/synthetic distinction plays a key role in his 
critical philosophy, and an investigation into the thinking that lies behind the distinction 
shows it to be interconnected in many ways to several key components of Kant’s 
philosophy.   Thus, the analytic/synthetic distinction would merit serious philosophical 
attention were it only for its role in Kant’s philosophy. 
However, as even a cursory glance at the history of 20th century (and now the 
beginning of 21st century) philosophy will clearly show, the distinction continues to be of 
considerable philosophical interest, if only for the arguments that have been marshaled 
against it.  Additionally, the distinction seems closely related to several significant 
philosophical projects in philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and 
even meta-ethics.  The relationships among analyticity and necessity and the  priori 
have also received considerable attention, and would seem to hold ongoing interest for 
many philosophers. 
The benefits of (and hence the motivation for) a distinction between analytic and 
synthetic propositions go beyond the role such a distinction might play in various 
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philosophical theories (like the grounding of our a priori knowledge of mathematics and 
logic in the analytic nature of the claims of math and logic).  In fact, to focus n these 
projects is to obscure the fact that a primary motivation for the distinction is t account 
for our basic pre-philosophical intuitions of a significant and readily acknowledged 
difference between statements like “George is a bachelor” and “All bachelors are 
married”.  The distinction would provide a straightforward account for our intuitions 
regarding what Georges Rey calls “the analytic data” (Rey 1993, 83).  This includes both 
the “first-order (non-metalinguistic)” intuitions regarding sentences such as “Cats are 
felines”, “To murder someone is to kill them”, as well as the meta-linguistic intuitions 
that Katz (Katz 1972) claims also need to be accounted for.  The latter would include our 
intuitions that some expressions are synonymous and that we at least appear to recognize 
and refer to expressions that “mean the same thing”.   Such analytic data motivate the 
analytic/synthetic distinction and provide “some prima facie reason for thinking that, 
unlike “witches”, a theory of the analytic is not merely about what people happen to call 
‘analytic’” (Rey 1993, 83). 
It may seem odd that anyone would need to argue for the philosophical 
significance of the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions (or, 
alternatively, for the existence of analytic propositions, since few question the existence 
of synthetic propositions).  Certainly, this long-standing distinction has had a storied and 
significant role in analytic philosophy.  Even before Kant made it of primary importance 
by casting the question of how there can be synthetic a priori truths as the central issue of 
his transcendental epistemology, Hume and Leibniz had both granted the distinction a 
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prominent role in their understanding of both metaphysics and the nature and kinds of 
knowledge. 
And, more recently, the very controversy over the distinction since Quine's 
seemingly wholesale rejection of it would, if anything, make the distinction more 
significant.  But, of course, this would all depend on the nature of the distinction and the 
roles that one claims it can play.  In fact, since Quine's famous article, "Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism" (Quine 1961), the prevailing view has been that, even if there is a distinction 
to be made between analytic and synthetic propositions (though many who hold this view 
would say "sentences" rather than "propositions"), it is of little importance. 
Thus, those who would again claim that the distinction is of central importance in 
a theory of meaning and casts light on a range of philosophical issues find themselves 
needing to argue for both the distinction and its philosophical significance.  Arguments 
for the distinction itself will be presented later, while this chapter will focus on the 
challenge of arguing for the philosophical significance of the distinction and the role that 
it plays.  
 
II.  Why Some Question the Significance of the Distinction 
 
Probably the single most damaging blow to the estimation of the significance of 
the analytic/synthetic distinction is that it is no longer seen as playing the key role it was 
once claimed to play in explaining both how some truths could be necessary and how we 
could know them a priori.  This was the role that was claimed for analyticities by the 
positivists.  However, this, admittedly significant, role was thought to be only p ssible 
for analytic propositions given an account of analyticity as "truth by convention", and this 
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account has been soundly criticized.  Still, it would serve us well to be clear on what it
purported to offer.  If we had a legitimate account of analyticity according to which all 
analytic truths were true by linguistic convention, then this would appear to explain how 
such truths could be knowable a priori.  All that is required is that we be aware of the 
conventions (which we ourselves stipulate) which make the claims true, and this does not 
require any a posteriori experience of how the world (independent of us) is, then it seems 
easy to understand how we can know these truths a priori.  And, as was key for the 
positivists, this account does not require any "rational insight" or other special ower of 
the mind.  This was important for the positivists, since their account of analyticity was 
intended to explain our ability to have a priori knowledge.  Furthermore, it was thought, 
this account of analyticity also explains why these a priori claims are necessary, since 
they are not contingent upon any fact of the world, but rather are true simply due to our 
linguistic conventions, and thus would be true in all possible worlds in which our words 
have the meanings we imbue them with. 
However, given the collapse of the account of analyticity as "truth by 
convention", it seems difficult to see how analyticity can possibly play the central role it 
was held to play by the positivists.  Still, while not playing the same explanatory role as 
was once thought, it is my position that a proper understanding of the nature of 
analyticity is closely connected to any explanation of how we can have a priori 
knowledge of analytic truths and why they are necessary.  This position will be flesh d 
out later, as for now we will briefly mention a second reason for dismissing analyticity 
and the analytic/synthetic distinction. 
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Another reason that is at least apparently held by many philosophers, and one that is 
not often made explicit, is that only "trivial" claims are analytic.  This notion is present in 
Quine's distinction between "the first class of analytic statements, the logical truths" 
(which he accepts) and "the second class, which depends on the notion of synonymy" 
(which he rejects) (Quine 1961, 24).  And, we see this idea present in Fodor and Lepore's 
reference to "consequential" analytic truths, and they apparently think only these would 
be "philosophically interesting" (Fodor and Lepore 2006, 128). 
 
 
III.  Why the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction is Significant 
 
 
A. Explains Our Pre-Theoretic Semantic and Linguistic Intuitions 
 
As noted previously, one reason the analytic/synthetic distinction is significant is 
that it would provide an explanation of our pre-theoretic intuitions.  A prima facie case 
for analyticity can be found in the fact that we at least appear to be able to make the 
distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions and to teach this distinction to 
others.  That we even tend to be able to recognize the same propositions as analytic is a 
fact that requires an explanation and shifts the burden onto those who reject the 
analytic/synthetic distinction to provide a suitable explanation.  If there were nothing to 
the distinction at all, then why would we all seem to come up with the same examples, 
and why would these examples even tempt us into thinking they were analytic?  Georges 
Rey calls this convergence (i.e., “the patterns and projections in people’s judgments”) 
“the analytic data” (Rey 1993, 83), and he argues that it provides a prima facie case for 
analyticity.  In addition to these appeals to our ordinary intuitions of analyticity, there are 
more formal, linguistic studies that also provide evidence of such convergence.  Katz 
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(Katz 1972) points out that these studies show subjects to be in significant agreement 
about analytic relations. 
 
 
B. Role in an Overall Theory of Meaning 
 
  It is not a minor feature in a theory of meaning to distinguish two fundamentally 
different kinds of propositions, and, as this is precisely what the analytic/synthetic 
distinction allows us to do, it plays a rather significant role in an overall theory of 
meaning.  Further, understanding the precise nature of this distinction has further 
implications for our theory of meaning and the various positions that have been taken on 
issues in semantics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and 
epistemology.  Although this is more or less a promissory note at this point, we will b in 
a better position to assess the significance of analyticity in terms of its r le in a theory of 
meaning after we have presented our account of the nature of analyticity.  And even th n, 
we will only be able to sketch an outline of a broader theory of meaning, but hopefully 
this will be sufficient to indicate the significant role analyticity has in the theory.  As a 
hint of this role, the next section introduces the relationship between analyticity and sense 
meaning, which is a central component to the broader theory of meaning. 
  
C. Relationship to Sense Meaning 
 
One of the basic facts about meaning, and thus one of the pieces of data to be 
explained by a theory of meaning, is that some sentences are meaningful and some are 
not.  Lycan lists among the data that "our philosophical study of language begins with": 
"Some strings of marks or noises are meaningful sentences" (Lycan 2002, 4).  Thus, it is 
a basic meaning fact that users of a language can recognize that some sentences (as well 
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as smaller expressions than complete sentences) are meaningful or not meaingful 
(sometimes called "nonsensical") in that language.  And, it is also important to note that 
we can both generate and recognize an indefinitely large number of meaningful 
sentences, which is also a fact that a theory of meaning needs to explain. 
While much more goes into determining the full meaning of a sentence, a key 
component for determining whether a sentence is meaningful is the "sense meaning" of 
each of the constituents of the sentence.  The sense meaning of an expression is 
determined by the set of expressions it can be meaningfully predicated of and that can be 
meaningfully predicated of it.  This notion of meaningful predication is an intuitive one, 
since we can all recognize that it is meaningful to predicate "tall" of a building or a 
person, but not meaningful to predicate it of the square root of three or a baseball game.  
It should be noted that sense meaning is only one component of the full meaning of an 
expression and that the sense meaning does not exhaust the meaning of an expression.  
So, although "short" (in the physical as opposed to the temporal sense) and "tall" have the 
same sense meaning, they clearly differ in their meaning, and do not have the same truth 
conditions.  For now, we need to just be clear that the sense meaning of an expression 
determines what it may be meaningfully related to and thus can be used to determine the 
meaningfulness of expressions, but is not sufficient to determine the truth-value of 
sentences. 
Analyticity is key to understanding sense meaning as all of the sense relations are 
analytic, being simply the logical implications of the predication relation between 
meanings.  Since the values of the basic predication relation are solely a function of the 
relation between meanings, these values are analytic, and as all other sense elations may 
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be derived from the predication relation, they are also analytic.  For example, it is due to 
the relations between the meanings tall and building that tall is predicable of building 
(note: I will use italics to indicate propositions and meanings rather than the words used 
to express these).  And, such a relation holds whether there are any buildings or even 
anything that is tall, for it is a relation between meanings. 
The relationship of analyticity to sense meaning has further implications for 
various issues of metaphysics.  As just one example, consider how at least some 
philosophers think it constrains the possible positions regarding identity across possible 
worlds.  Adams argues that "there are necessary conditions of intra- and transworld 
identity which follow (analytically, indeed) from the concept or property of being a 
person and which entail that no individual that is in fact a person could under any 
circumstances be a musical performance" (Adams 1979, 25).  Much more could be said 
about the concept of a type as an equivalence class of meaning relations that constrin the 
meaningful predications that underlie the intuitions that Adams implicitly draws upon to 
reject as nonsense the claim (technically, it should be construed as a form of pseud -
claim, but that would be a further digression) that a person is a musical performance.  
But, this should suffice to show the implications of analyticities for questions of identity 
and, thus, hopefully, their philosophical significance.  For a fuller treatment of sense 
meaning (as well as sense logic), see the entries for Sommers (Sommers 1959, Sommers 
1963a, Sommers, 1965). 
 
D. Relationship to Philosophy of Mathematics and Philosophy of Logic 
 
Analyticity is also key to understanding the nature of logic and mathematics, 
since all the truths of logic and mathematics are analytic.  Both of these systems involve 
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nothing other than the logical implications of the relations of meanings.  And, further, it 
is this fact that explains the necessity of the propositions of these systems.  (P & Q)  P 
is true because of the logical relations of the meanings & and , and 2 + 2 = 4 is true 
because of the logical relations of the meanings 2, + , = , and 4.  And, both of these 
propositions are true in all possible worlds because they are truths about the relations 
between these meanings.  Thus, as Fodor and Lepore say, "If, in particular, it were to turn 
out that the logical and/or mathematical truths are analytic, we would understand why 
they are necessary" (Fodor and Lepore 2006, 114).  And, although they put it 
sarcastically, "It would be ever so nice to understand why the logical and/or mathematical 
truths are necessary" (Fodor and Lepore 2006, 114).  Despite Fodor and Lepore's 
sarcasm, a good case can be made not only that there are analyticities, but that the truths 
of logic and mathematics are analytic.  And, since they are true in all possible worlds 
because they are analytic, we do have an explanation of the necessity of these tru s.  One 
can only trust that Fodor and Lepore would find these analytic truths "consequential". 
 
E.  Relationship of Analyticity to Necessity and A Priori Knowledge 
 
In the previous section, a case was made for claiming that analyticity provides an 
explanation of (at least some) necessary truths - these truths are necessary b cause they 
are analytic, i.e., because their truth is a function of the logical relations of the meanings 
involved in the propositions.  Since both these meanings and their logical relations are 
not contingent upon the state of the world, they obtain in all possible worlds, and thus 
truths dependent solely upon them are necessary truths.  So, all analytic truths are 
necessary.  But surely this is simply the old positivist conflation of the concepts of 
necessity and analyticity, it might be objected.  No, it is not. First, this is not an utright 
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identification of the concepts of necessity and analyticity, for the implication that all 
analytic truths are necessary had to be deduced from the conception of analyticity s the 
logical relations of meanings. Second, nothing as of yet follows about whether all 
necessary truths are analytic.  
 
A further distinction between this account of analyticity and that offered by the 
positivists can be seen by examining the relationship between analyticity and a priori 
knowledge.  The positivists claimed that analyticity as truth by convention provided a 
ground for a priori knowledge such that we could explain  priori knowledge simply by 
our knowledge of our own linguistic conventions.  But no such appeal to linguistic 
conventions is made in my account of analyticity.  Instead, analyticities are viewed as 
independent of language use and are solely determined by the logical relations of 
meanings.  The result is that there are analytic truths of which we have never heard and 
never conceived much less formulated words to express.  Our linguistic conventions only 
determine which words and expressions we associate with which meanings, and far from
making any propositions analytically true, these conventions must themselves b  known 
a posteriori via our exposure to the linguistic practices of language users.  And, even in 
the case in which a single individual stipulates how she will use a word, the association 
of the word with a meaning in the past is hardly a guarantee of future commitment to 
such usage.  So even the proposition that I use an expression to mean something, that is, I 
associate the expression with a particular meaning, is not itself analytic, is not necessary, 
and must be known a posteriori, as it is a claim about my ongoing behavior, which may 
change in ways even I cannot entirely foresee. 
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So, if this account of analyticity does not even pretend to offer a "free ride" to a 
priori  knowledge, what is the relationship of analyticity to a priori knowledge?  
According to this account, there are some basic facts that relate analyticity to our ability 
to have a priori knowledge of (at least some) analytic truths.  First, there are meanings 
and these meanings have logical relations to each other.  Second, the truth value of som  
propositions is determined simply by the predication relations the proposition claims to 
hold between the meanings of which the proposition is composed, and it is these 
propositions that are analytic.  Beyond this account, it seems also to be the case that we 
can comprehend these meanings, their relations, and thus determine for ourselves the 
truth values of at least some of these analytic propositions (I say "at least some", since 
there may well be analytic propositions that are either too complex, too long, or cannotbe 
comprehended by us for some other reason).  And, finally, this ability to determine the 
truth values of these analytic propositions does not appear to require any a posteriori 
observations as evidence for these propositions and thus may be properly deemed a priori 
knowledge.  It is in this sense that analyticity may help explain our ability to have a 
priori  knowledge.  
 
It should be noted that none of this is to say that analyticity fully explains our 
ability to have a priori knowledge, since this account presupposes our ability to 
comprehend meanings, their relations, and the truth values of analytic propositions.  This 
differs greatly from the positivist program which claimed analyticity as truth by 
convention did not require such mental capabilities.  Thus, while a proper understanding 
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of the analytic/synthetic distinction and the nature of analyticity does not provide the 
explanation for a priori knowledge that the positivists claimed it did, it is a significant 
component of an explanation of how such knowledge is possible, since what we are able 
to comprehend via "rational insight" or some such mental capability are the logical 
relations of meanings which enables us to determine the truth values of analytic 
propositions and thereby have a priori knowledge.  This relationship of analyticity to a 
priori  knowledge and the role it plays in an overall explanation of our ability to have a 
priori  knowledge would certainly seem to be philosophically significant, since, as Fodor 
and Lepore so charmingly put it, "if there is an a/s distinction, we could explain why the 
necessary truths, or at least some of the necessary truths, are knowable a priori" and "It 
would be ever so nice to understand how a priori knowledge is possible" (Fodor and 
Lepore 2006, 114). 
 
 
F. Role of Analyticity in Philosophical Arguments 
 
Finally, to further cement the philosophical significance of the analytic/snthetic 
distinction, consider the role it plays in philosophical arguments.  Even those who reject 
the distinction presuppose the philosophical significance of the distinction, by grantin  
that if there was such a distinction it would have implications for their arguments.  For 
example, one of the chief arguments that Fodor and Lepore present against semantic 
molecularism is that it inevitably entails acceptance of the analytic/s nthetic distinction 
(Fodor and Lepore 1992).  The only force this argument has comes from their belief that 
such a distinction is untenable (although Fodor has granted there are analyticities, so he 
must consider these all to be of the "trivial" kind, and further, that semantic mole ularism 
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must rely on the "consequential" kind of analyticities).  It is obvious that Fodor and 
Lepore's argument is completely undermined if there is an account of analyticity that 
shows there are analyticities.  Such an account of analyticity is presented in Chapter 6.  
Here, we have been concerned with showing that analyticities are hardly"trivial", given 
their considerable significance for a range of philosophical issues.   
All the reasons cited make a compelling case for the philosophical significance of 
the claim that there is a legitimate analytic/synthetic distinctio  or that there are analytic 
truths (since almost all agree that there are synthetic truths).  So, Fodor and Lepore are 
surely correct when they say that "[i]t would be ever so nice if there wer a viable 
analytic/synthetic distinction" (Fodor and Lepore 2006, 114).
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This chapter presents the historical background that is most relevant to the concepts 
and issues related to the analytic/synthetic distinction.  As noted in the introduction, the 
long-standing distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions has had a storied 
and significant role in analytic philosophy.  Even before Kant made it of primary 
importance by casting the question of how there can be synthetic a priori truths as the 
central issue of his transcendental epistemology, Hume and Leibniz had both granted the 
distinction a prominent role in their understanding of both metaphysics and the nature 
and kinds of knowledge.  And, although Kant provides the clearest exposition of the 
distinction, and it is his formulation of it that has had the greatest influence on subsequent 
philosophers, we will see that an accurate assessment of the history of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction must give due consideration to the writings of Locke, 
Leibniz, and Hume. 
This chapter will present a brief account of some of the major modern 
philosophers’ views relating to the analytic/synthetic distinction.  Though hints of the 
distinction are to be found in even the ancients, it is in this time period when the 
distinction comes to the fore.  Thus, we will begin our excursion through the history of 
the analytic/synthetic distinction with Locke, and conclude it with Kant, leaving more 
contemporary philosophers for the next chapter.  Though instructive and philosophically 
interesting in its own right, an examination of the views on, and versions of, the 
 15 
distinction offered by the modern philosophers Locke, Leibniz, Hume, and Kant will 
hopefully provide not merely some historical background but also some insight into the 
intuitions that underlie the distinction that may still inform us today.   
As an overview, the chapter includes an examination and discussion of: (1) 
Locke’s view “Of Trifling Propositions”, (2) Leibniz’s distinction between “Truths of 
Reasoning” and “Truths of Fact”, (3) Hume’s distinction between “Relations of Ideas” 
and “Matters of Fact” in both A Treatise of Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding, and finally, (4) Kant’s presentation of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
 
II.  Locke’s View “Of Trifling Propositions” 
 
The received opinion of the modern philosophers is that they are readily sorted 
into two basic philosophical camps: the (British) Empiricists and the (Continental) 
Rationalists.  Kant is the notable exception, as although he is typically seen as attempting 
to respond to the problems he saw in both of these distinctly identifiable, mostly 
homogenous, schools of thought, he is also quite commonly classified as a Rationalist.  
The Rationalists (besides Kant, if he is to be included in this group) consist of Descartes, 
Spinoza, and Leibniz, and the Empiricists consist of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, with 
the latter trio also commonly seen as a sequence of increasingly more systematic – and 
increasingly more skeptical – philosophers, each extending the investigation of the 
implications of the empiricist tradition.   
However, while this received opinion has much to recommend it, the general 
categories can obscure key differences between the members within each school of 
thought as well as similarities between members of different camps.  This is especially 
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true of Locke’s views as they relate to the distinction between analytic nd synthetic 
propositions.  Given the general disagreement between Rationalists and Empiricists, we 
might expect Locke and Kant to have divergent opinions, and also expect that, to the 
extent that he contributes to the development of the distinction, Locke’s views would be 
the intellectual beginnings of the views of contemporary empiricists.  However, as Katz 
notes, “The true story of analyticity is surprising in many ways.  Contrary to received 
opinion, it was the empiricist Locke rather than the rationalist Kant who had the bet er 
informal account of this type of a priori proposition” (Katz 1992, 11).  We shall set aside 
the question of who had the better account of analyticity and focus on how the actual 
history runs counter to received opinion in this section. 
First of all, the actual history diverges from the more commonly accepted 
interpretations since Kant is often given the lion’s share of the credit for formulating the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, and perhaps only a few Locke scholars are fully aware of 
the contribution that Locke made to the topic.  So, even to acknowledge Locke’s 
contribution will probably be a little unexpected to many philosophers.  And secondly, 
Locke’s contribution is surprising since, by most interpretations, his account sounds 
much like that of a rationalist (certainly by contemporary standards, and even by the 
traditional account of the emphasis of rationalists on “rational insight” or “the lig t of 
reason” or “bare intuition”).  We shall be in a better position to assess just how much 
Locke contributed to the conception of analyticity after we have examined some of the 
particulars of his views relating to the subject, so let us now turn to these. 
The easiest and perhaps most obvious entry point to this topic is Locke’s 
discussion “Of Trifling Propositions” (Book IV, Chapter VIII of Locke’s “Essay”).  In 
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this section, Locke makes clear that he recognizes a class of propositions that “bring no 
increase to our knowledge” even though they are “universal”, “certainly true”, and of 
which we may be “infallibly certain” (Locke 1952, 345).  The first general category of 
these “trifling” propositions is “identical” propositions, “when we affirm thesaid term of 
itself” (Locke 1952, 345).  Locke claims that anyone “may make a million of 
propositions of whose truth he may be infallibly certain, d yet not know one thing in 
the world thereby” (emphasis added).  The latter additional note strongly hints of a 
distinction between these trifling propositions (which would at least seem to fit m st 
philosopher’s notion of analytic propositions – or at least those who accept that there are 
analytic propositions) and propositions that do contain information about “things in the 
world” (and would thus seem to fit the notion of synthetic propositions).  As examples of 
these, Locke cites “a soul is a soul” and “a centaur is a centaur”, along with several 
others. 
The second general category of trifling propositions that Locke identifies is “when 
a part of the complex idea is predicated of the whole; a part of the definition of the word 
defined” (Locke 1952, 346), and although the first part of the quote is italicized in this 
printing, for our purposes it is the reference to definitions that more clearly conne ts 
Locke’s conception of this class of trifling propositions with more contemporary notions 
of analyticity.  For Locke, such claims as “a palfrey is an ambling horse” a e “only about 
the signification of words” (Locke 1952, 346 – 347), and this would square quite nicely 
with the contemporary conception of analyticity as grounded in linguistic conventions 
(for more on that topic, see the next chapter).  Finally, and providing more evidence of 
Locke’s empiricist leanings, Locke claims that “General propositions concerning 
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substances are often trifling”, and says such propositions, “if they are certain, are for the 
most part trifling; and if they are instructive, are uncertain, and such as wecan have no 
knowledge of their real truth” (Locke 1952, 347).  If we ignore whether “uncertain” 
claims can still provide “knowledge” (which would seem to say more about one’s criteria 
for bestowing the honorific title of “knowledge” than any actual diminution of confidece 
in the evidence one has for such claims), this position might be acceptable to a 
contemporary empiricist who cleaves analytic (but uninformative) truths from synthetic 
and informative (but uncertain) truths.   
However, before we conclude that Locke is the intellectual ancestor of logical 
positivism, we should note the ways in which Locke’s views differ from theirs.  To state 
just two of the more fundamental of these differences, a good case can be made for 
interpreting Locke as: (1) embracing a priori insight, and (2) accepting synthetic a priori 
truths, though the latter is more subject to debate, as we shall see. 
The first fundamental difference between Locke and the logical positivists s that, 
although Locke refers to definitions and “verbal” propositions, for him, all knowledge is 
“the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas” (Locke 1952, 307), and 
this perception requires the intuitive power of the mind.  This intuitive knowledge, which 
is, for Locke, the foundation of all our knowledge – “It is on this intuition that depends 
all the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge” (Locke 1952, 309), is thus grounded 
in the same kind of a priori insight that rationalists have traditionally appealed to.  
BonJour, noting the historical lineage of this appeal to what he calls “a priori 
justification”, groups Locke with other notable rationalists: “the vast majority of 
historical philosophers, from Plato on down to Leibniz and Locke” (BonJour 1998, 2).  
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And, it is key that, even while appearing to acknowledge the analytic nature of some 
truths, Locke views the ground of even these “trifling” propositions to be in the a priori 
intuitive powers of the mind, and not the linguistic conventions themselves (for more on 
the attempt to ground the necessity of analytic truths in linguistic conventions, see the 
next chapter). 
As noted above, the second fundamental difference between Locke and 
contemporary empiricists is his acceptance of synthetic a priori truths.  Many 
philosophers would accept this interpretation.  Arthur Pap, for instance, claims that 
“Locke anticipated Kant’s claim that the propositions of mathematics are ynthetic a 
priori  truths” (Pap 1958, 59).  It should be noted that some Locke scholars (most notably, 
Lex Newman) reject this interpretation of Locke.  Newman argues forcefully that it is “a 
mistake to see Locke’s trifling/instructive distinction as an anticipation of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction” since “[a] proposition may be analytic in the sense of idea-
containment truth without being trifling in Locke’s sense” (Newman 2007, 338).  
However, even this interpretive dispute does not counter the basic claim that Locke 
differs markedly on this issue.  For, although Newman’s “Analyticity Interpretation”, 
would reject the classification “synthetic” (due to a “broad notion of containment”, by 
which all knowledge essentially involves “containment”), it still casts Locke as accepting 
truths that, while analytic, are both grounded in rational a priori insight and “instructive” 
(in that they can provide us with knowledge about “the world without”).  So, even if not 
deemed “synthetic” by Newman’s interpretation, this is a kind of knowledge which no 
logical positivist would have countenanced.  As Arthur Pap puts it, “it is clear that 
modern empiricists cannot count the “empiricist” Locke among their ancestors”, and to 
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support this claim, Pap cites a key example of the kind of knowledge that Locke accepts 
but which “modern” (which Pap uses to refer to 20th century) empiricists reject: “Locke 
seems to have held that the axioms of Newtonian mechanics have the same sort of self-
evidence as the axioms of Euclidean geometry” (Pap 1958, 58). 
Having established that the role of Locke in the history of analyticity is at least 
surprising in some ways, let us conclude our discussion of Locke by a brief consideration 
of the connection between the views of Locke and Kant on the subject of analytic and 
synthetic propositions.  To the extent that Locke can be seen as proposing a conception of 
analyticity, it is, as others have noted, a conception based on idea or concept-
containment, and this conception seems to be very close to Kant’s.  As Pap notes, “Kant’ 
conception of an analytic judgment as a judgment whose predicate is contained in the 
subject was clearly anticipated by Locke” (Pap 1958, 59).  Katz echoes this view of 
Kant’s account, seeing it not only as derivative of, but also less satisfactory than, Locke’s 
account: “Kant's account of analyticity, which received opinion tells us is the 
consummate formulation of this notion in modern philosophy, is actually a step 
backwards.  What is valid in his account is not novel, and what is novel is not valid.  Kant 
repeats Locke's account of concept-containment analyticity, but introduces certain alien 
features” (Katz 1992, 12). 
 
III.  Leibniz’s Distinction Between “Truths of Reasoning” and “Truths of Fact” 
 
If Kant’s account of analyticity as containment is apparently anticipated in 
Locke’s writings, the basis for Kant’s other criterion of analyticity, the law of non-
contradiction, is obviously present in Leibniz’s philosophical works.  As will be clear
later, Leibniz also utilizes the concept of containment, though its precise role in those of 
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his views relating to a distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions is far less 
obvious, and has even led to considerable misunderstanding regarding Leibniz’s 
positions. 
At first glance it might seem obvious that Leibniz accepted a distinction between 
analytic and synthetic propositions, given his distinction between “Truths of Reasoning” 
and “Truths of Fact”.  In paragraph 33 of The Monadology, after having delineated the 
“two great principles” upon which our reasoning is based (the principle of Contradiction 
and the principle of Sufficient Reason) Leibniz states this distinction: 
There are also two kinds of Truths: those of Reasoning and those of Fact.  The 
Truths of Reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is impossible.  Those of 
Fact, however, are contingent, and their opposite is possible.  When a truth is 
necessary, the reason can be found by analysis in resolving it into simpler ideas 
and into simpler truths until we reach those which are primary. (Leibniz 1968, 
258). 
 
Although the exact wording might be different, this statement could be accepted by a 
logical empiricist of the 20th century.  And so, it would seem we can identify Leibniz’s 
“Truths of Reasoning” with analytic propositions, which are necessary and the ground (or 
“reason”) “can be found by analysis”.  Logical empiricists would also accept “identical 
propositions” as examples of “Truths of Reasoning”/analyticity offered by Leibniz.  And, 
they would agree with Leibniz’s classification of the truths of mathematics s analytic, 
and would further acknowledge his references to the role of “Definitions, Axioms, and 
Postulates” (Leibniz 1968, 258) in these truths. 
 Leibniz also appears to accept the parallel distinctions of a priori/a posteriori 
knowledge and necessary/contingent truths, and like the contemporary empiricists, views 
these as converging with the analytic/synthetic distinction.  That is, Leibniz claims that 
“Truths of Reasoning” are both necessary and knowable a priori, while “Truths of Fact” 
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are contingent and only knowable a posteriori.  It is clear that Leibniz thinks truths of 
reasoning are knowable a priori, and, for Leibniz a truth of fact is, as Copleston puts it, 
such that “[w]e cannot deduce it from any a priori self-evident truth: we know its truth a 
posteriori” (Copleston 1960, 274). 
 However, there is a complication in Leibniz’s views such that we cannot so 
simply identify his “Truths of Reasoning” with analytic propositions and his “Truths of 
Fact” with synthetic propositions.  For, Leibniz thinks that not only are “Truths of 
Reasoning” analytic, but so are the “Truths of Fact”: “for Leibniz contingent propositions 
or truths of fact are analytic in a sense … If we are using his language, therefore, we 
cannot simply equate truths of reason with analytic and truths of fact with synthetic 
propositions” (Copleston 1960, 274). 
 But why does Leibniz consider truths of fact to also be analytic?  Or, perhaps, this 
question should be put more cautiously as why do some commentators think it is 
reasonable to characterize Leibniz as classifying truths of fact as analytic?  This caution 
might seem appropriate if only because Leibniz never uses the words “analytic” or 
“synthetic”, but also because the chain of reasoning that leads to this interpretaion 
requires some less than obvious links.  And, at least some of these links would seem to 
require some interpretative argumentation themselves. Given this, we are well advised to 
proceed carefully in making this chain of reasoning explicit. 
It would seem that one important link in the chain of reasoning that would make 
this interpretation of Leibniz’s position plausible is the notion that, for Leibniz, a 
analytic truth is one that can be demonstrated to be true “by analysis” of the cncepts 
involved in the claim.  And, this link would also seem to be based on a position regarding 
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Leibniz’s understanding of the logical form of propositions: “For Leibniz every 
proposition possesses the subject-predicate form or can be analysed into a proposition or 
set of propositions of this form” (Copleston 1960, 273).  With this, we can then formulate 
what we might call the Containment Criterion of Analyticity: a proposition is aalytic if 
and only if the predicate is contained in the subject.  Thus, a key link for the 
interpretation that Leibniz considers truths of fact to be analytic appears to be the claim 
that Leibniz endorses this criterion of analyticity.  Thus, let us examine the vidence that 
is given for this link in the interpretation. 
Copleston provides a concise and insightful presentation of Leibniz in the 
chapters on Leibniz in his A History of Philosophy, and he is quite sensitive to the 
nuances of interpreting Leinbiz on the topic of the analytic/synthetic distinction.  And, 
more specifically, he even cautions against too quickly equating Leibniz’s distinction 
between truths of reason and truths of fact with the analytic/synthetic distinction.  
However, Copleston appears to implicitly rely on the claim that Leibniz endorses the 
Containment Criterion of Analyticity when he reasons as follows: 
Now, for Leibniz contingent propositions or truths of fact are analytic in a sense 
which will be explained presently.  If we are using his language, therefore, we 
cannot simply equate truths of reason with analytic and truths of fact with 
synthetic propositions.  But since what he calls ‘truths of reason’ can be shown by 
us to be analytic, that is, since in the case of truths of reason we can show that the 
predicate is contained in the subject while in the case of truths of fact we are 
unable to demonstrate that the predicate is contained in the subject, we can to that 
extent say that Leibniz’s ‘truths of reason’ are analytic and his ‘truths of fact’ 
synthetic propositions. (Copleston 1960, 274 – 275) 
 
The only explanation of the sense of analyticity that Copleston attributes to Libniz that 
can be found in this passage appears to be the use of the phrase “the predicate is 
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contained in the subject”, and that, according to this criterion, truths of reason are 
analytic while truths of fact are synthetic. 
 There is, however, another issue that makes things even more complicated.  It 
arises with Copleston’s use of the phrases “can be shown”, “we can show”, and “we are 
unable to demonstrate” in the preceding passage, and it has to do with the precise 
statement of the Containment Criterion of Analyticity.  Apparently, some have 
interpreted Leibniz’s version to include the notion of demonstration such that we should 
get the revised Demonstration of Containment Criterion of Analyticity: a proposition is 
analytic if and only if the predicate can be shown to be contained in the subject.  While 
there is textual evidence to support the view that Leibniz does indeed claim that we can
show that the predicate is contained in the subject in truths of reason, while we cannot 
demonstrate this for truths of fact, it takes more than this to establish that Leibniz 
endorses this criterion of analyticity.  We must keep in mind that Leibniz may claim a 
property to be true of the truths of reason without implying that he believes it to be 
definitive of that class of propositions or that the property makes them analytic.  Bu , let 
us look more closely at this revised criterion of analyticity. 
 One of the claims that is made regarding this criterion is that it is “relative to 
human knowledge” (Copleston 1960, 281) – though it should be noted that although 
Copleston notes this “natural conclusion”, he does not endorse it himself.  This would 
seem to be evident in the Monadology in paragraphs 32 and 33.  There, Leibniz claims 
that, although the principle of Sufficient Reason warrants that every fact “has a sufficient 
reason why it should be thus and not otherwise”, “[m]ost frequently … these reasons 
cannot be known by us” (Leibniz 1968, 258).  However, for necessary truths (which are 
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the truths of reason), “the reason can be found” (Leibniz 1968, 258).  Thus, Leibniz 
distinguishes truths of reason as those for which humans can “find the reason”, and it is 
not too great an interpretive step to infer that by this Leibniz implies that for these truths 
humans can demonstrate that the predicate is contained in the subject. 
 However, for Leibniz, the inability to demonstrate the containment for truths of 
fact appears to be only a limitation of humans, since he claims “every body responds to 
all that happens in the universe, so that he who saw all could read in each one what is 
happening everywhere, and even what has happened and what will happen” (Leibniz 
1968, 265).  And, clearly, Leibniz believes that God does have such knowledge.  And, 
given this, some might conclude that Leibniz does embrace the Demonstration of 
Containment Criterion of Analyticity, and further, sees this as relative to our abilities.  
Thus, according to this interpretation, truths of reason are analytic since we humans can 
demonstrate that they contain their predicates in their subjects – Copleston refers to th se 
as being “finitely analytic” (Copleston 1960, 277), and truths of fact are not analytic ( nd 
thus are synthetic) since we are unable to show their predicates are contained i  their 
subjects. 
 However, there are some difficulties with this interpretation.  First, it would 
construe Leibniz as conflating epistemological (or even psychological) and 
metaphysical/logical conceptions of analyticity, since, by “containment”, Leibniz would 
at least appear to be offering a logical criterion, but, by including the demonstration 
requirement, he introduces an epistemological criterion.  And, this conception has 
problems, since by making it relative to human knowledge, it would seem that it would 
be relative to each individual human’s abilities, since whether something was cap ble of 
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demonstration would seem to be relative to the intellectual abilities of each individual.  
Even worse, the abilities of an individual vary over time, and so we have the at least 
awkward implication that analyticity is relative to a given individual at a given time.  
However, let us set such concerns aside and instead focus on the key link that 
Leibniz endorses the Containment Criterion of Analyticity in any version.  The reasoning 
seemed to be that, since containment plays a key role for Leibniz, it was a natural 
candidate for a criterion for analyticity (and, this is made more plausible, sinc  Locke 
may be construed as accepting a containment conception of analyticity and Leibniz was 
familiar with Locke’s works).  But, since Leibniz appears to believe that the predicate is 
contained in the subject for all true propositions, this did not distinguish truths of reason 
from truths of fact, and this is problematic, since the truths of reason appear to have all 
the marks of the analytic, and the kinds of propositions Leibniz cites under each category 
(necessary truths of mathematics and logic are truths of reason, while contingent ruths 
about particular individuals are truths of fact) would naturally fit a more cntemporary 
classification of analytic and synthetic propositions.  Thus, an amendment was needed to 
separate the truths of reason from the truths of fact, and this was found in the 
demonstrability criterion.  We have just considered one set of problems this engenders, so 
let us revisit the concept of containment in Leibniz, since this may put us in a better 
position to judge whether he relies on it to distinguish anything that we might 
countenance as analytic and synthetic propositions. 
A central origin of the problems that arise from Leibniz’s claims about 
containment is article 13 of the Discourse on Metaphysics.  There, he states: “As the 
individual concept of each person includes once for all everything which can ever happen 
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to him, in it can be seen, a priori the evidences or the reality of each event, and why one 
happened sooner than the other” (Leibniz 1968, 19).  In explaining this claim, Leibniz 
adds: “in considering [the concept of an individual] one will be able to see everything 
which can truly be said concerning the individual, just as we are able to see in the nature 
of a circle all the properties which can be derived from it” (Leibniz 1968, 19 – 20).  
Leibniz claims that, although certain and knowable a priori, the events that ensue from 
the concept of an individual “are nevertheless contingent” (Leibniz 1968, 19).  He 
recognizes that this appears to threaten the distinction between contingent and necessary 
propositions, but he answers by offering a distinction “between that which is certain and 
that which is necessary” (Leibniz 1968, 20).  And, finally, “[i]n order to meet the 
objection completely”, he states: 
the connection or sequence is of two kinds; the one, absolutely necessary, whose 
contrary implies contradictions, occurs in the eternal verities like the truths of 
geometry; the other is necessary only ex hypothesi, and so to speak by accident, 
and in itself it is contingent since the contrary is not implied.  This latter sequence 
is not founded upon ideas wholly pure and upon the pure understanding of God, 
but upon his free decrees and upon the processes of the universe” (Leibniz 1968, 
20). 
 
In these passages we can see both the problem caused by Leibniz’s concept of 
containment and his proffered solution to that problem. 
First, although it is not clear precisely what is meant by this conception of 
containment, it certainly is not limited to a narrow notion of logical containment 
exemplified by claims like “An equilateral rectangle is a rectangle”.  In fact, if it is still 
best understood as a kind of logical entailment, it is not limited to the logical implications 
that can be derived from a concept alone, but would seem to include all the logical 
implications that can be derived from a concept even when additional propositions are 
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added to the proofs.  Specifically, these may include propositions about God, his decrees, 
and the universe, since Leibniz claims that contingent claims are founded “upon his free 
decrees and upon the processes of the universe” (Leibniz 1968, 20). 
Second, we should note that, in distinguishing necessary and contingent truths, 
Leibniz does not appeal to a difference in what humans can show or demonstrate 
regarding these two kinds of “connection or sequence”.  Rather, regarding human 
knowledge, Leibniz notes the similarity between these two kinds of truths, claiming that 
for concepts of individual substances (for which the truths would be contingent), “one 
will be able to see” the implications of their concepts “just as we are able to se ” the 
implications of general concepts like that of a circle (for which the truths would be 
necessary).  This implies Leibniz does not acknowledge any difference in our ability to 
recognize or “demonstrate” the containment involved in these two kinds of truths, and 
thus this passage is extremely problematic for the interpretation of Leibniz as endorsing 
the Demonstration of Containment Criterion of Analyticity. 
But lastly, and far more important, we see the true criterion Leibniz uses to 
distinguish truths of reason and truths of fact.  Truths of reason are “absolutely 
necessary” since their “contrary implies contradictions” (Leibniz 1968, 20), and this is 
the best statement of a criterion of analyticity to be found in Leibniz: a propositi n i  
analytic iff its contrary implies a contradiction.  And, what had also seemed to be a 
criterion for analyticity, "containment", is not sufficient to distinguish analytic truths 
from synthetic ones, since, for Leibniz, ultimately, all truths are such that their predicates 
are "contained in" their subjects, even the "contingent" truths of fact. 
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Though of course much more could be said of Leibniz’s views on these and 
related matters, we shall end our discussion of Leibniz by noting that, as with Locke, 
Leibniz’s views anticipate those of Kant.  In fact, as we shall see, Kant seems to utilize 
both a notion of containment, which is present in both Locke and Leibniz, and Leibniz’s 
criterion of a contrary implying a contradiction, in his conception of analyticity.  
 
IV.  Hume’s Distinction Between “Relations of Ideas” and “Matters of Fact” 
 
The clearest statement of Hume’s distinction between “Relations of Ideas” and 
Matters of Fact”, which Antony Flew calls “Hume’s Fork” (Flew 1997), is presented in 
Part 1 of Section 4, “Sceptical Doubts Concerning the Operations of the Understanding”, 
of Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and it will serve us well to 
repeat the first two paragraphs of this key passage here in our examination of the 
relationship between Hume’s views and the analytic/synthetic distinction: 
All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into 
two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact.  Of the first kind are the 
sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirm tion 
which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain.  That the square of the 
hypotenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, s a proposition, which 
expresses a relation between these figures.  That three times five is equal to the 
half of thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers.  Propositions of this 
kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on 
what is any where existent in the universe.  Though there never were a circle or 
triangle in nature, the truths, demonstrated by Euclid, would for ever retain their 
certainty and evidence. 
 
Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not 
ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, 
of a like nature with the foregoing.  The contrary of every matter of fact is still 
possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind 
with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality.  That 
the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no 
more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise.  We should in vain, 
therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood.  Were it demonstratively fals, it 
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would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. 
(Hume 1999, 108). 
 
Many have noted this central passage and the standard interpretation of Hume is that 
Hume’s Fork simply is the analytic/synthetic distinction, with Hume’s “relations of 
ideas” corresponding to analytic propositions, and his “matters of fact” corresp nding to 
synthetic ones.  However, even though this interpretation is quite common, and even with 
the obvious importance of Hume’s distinction to his philosophical positions and 
arguments, in Peter Millican’s “Critical Survey of the Literature on Hume and the First 
Enquiry”, he notes that “[t]hough fundamental to his philosophy, there has been relatively 
little detailed discussion of Hume's distinction between 'relations of ideas' and 'matters of 
fact'” (Millican 2002, 427).  And, though we will not have time in this brief section for 
such a detailed discussion, we can note some of the relevant considerations regarding 
Hume’s distinction. 
 First, there is an interpretive question of the relative priority of Hume’s Tr atise 
and his first Enquiry, and, if there are any differences in the positions presented in these 
two works, which is to be taken as definitive of Hume’s thoughts.  Many have diminished 
the status of the first Enquiry, considering it merely a watered-down, abbreviated, 
popularized version of the Treatise, as Flew notes in the introductory remarks of the first 
chapter of his seminal contribution to Hume scholarship regarding the first Enquiry, 
Hume’s Philosophy of Belief: A Study of His First Inquiry: “This first Inquiry seems to 
be regarded generally as a rewritten, cut down, and popularized version of Book I of the
Treatise of Human Nature.  It is taken as if it were an abridged and cheapened second 
edition, which is to be read only as a handy introduction to the original, or for a few 
afterthoughts and re-statements” (Flew 1997, 1).  This attitude would suggest that if he 
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Treatise differs from the Enquiry on a point, we should disregard the position presented 
in the Enquiry, or at least give prominence to the view presented in the Treatise. 
However, others have argued that the Enquiry actually represents Hume's more 
mature philosophy, and that while it is considerably shorter, it is not merely an 
abbreviation or truncation of the Treatise.  And thus, any alterations are not merely
stylistic or for the sake of a chance at greater acceptance and popularity, but rather most 
likely represent a serious change in, and arguably a deepening of, Hume’s und r tanding 
of the issue and his philosophical thoughts.  To buttress this view of the Enquiry, we can 
refer to Hume’s own stated position regarding the relationship of the Enquiry to the 
Treatise, and note, as Flew does, that Hume “insisted … in public as previously in 
private, that it superseded that first work” (Flew 1997, 1).  And, for more support, we can 
turn to Millican, who also notes Hume’s own statements and requests to justify his 
contention that “the traditional view of the two works – according to which the Treatise 
gives the more faithful picture of his central philosophical position, and the Enquiry 
merely a more palatable selection – seems to me highly implausible” (Millican 2002, 40).  
As Millican points out, “Hume in his later life disowned the Treatise and requested … 
that an ‘Advertisement’ should be attached to the volume containing his two Enquiries 
…, stating that these works should ‘alone be regarded as containing his philosophical 
sentiments and principles’” (Millican 2002, 40). 
However, with the previous concern regarding the priority of these two works, we 
have neglected to yet consider whether there is even any disagreement betwen them.  
Thus, even granting the status of the first Enquiry, and also granting that it clearly 
appears that Hume does advocate a distinction that closely parallels the analytic-synthetic 
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distinction in that work, we can still raise the question whether the Treatise includes a 
similar distinction and also, if it does not itself offer such a distinction, whether it stakes 
out a position in any way contrary to the distinction presented in the first Enquiry. 
Some would argue that not only does the Treatise not conflict with Hume’s Fork 
as presented in the first Enquiry, it actually also offers the same distinction.  And, while 
certainly not as clearly presented as in the Enquiry, there are passages in the Tr atise that 
suggest a similar distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact.  The first 
passage to be noted is in section 1.3.1, “Of knowledge”, where Hume claims there are 
“seven different kinds of philosophical relations” and also claims these “may be divid d 
into two classes; into such as depend entirely upon the ideas, which we compare together, 
and such as may be chang’d without any change in the ideas” (Hume 2001, 50).  And, in 
1.3.7, “Of the nature of the idea of belief”, Hume refers to the conclusions of “reasonings 
from causes or effects” as “concerning matter of fact; that is, concernig the existence of 
objects or of their qualities” (Hume 2001, 65), and he also refers to “propositions … that
are prov’d by intuition or demonstration”, contrasting them with “matters of fact”, the 
former being such that their contrary is inconceivable, whereas with the latter “this 
absolute necessity cannot take place, and the imagination is free to conceive both sides of 
the question” (Hume 2001, 66).  And, again in 1.3.11, “Of the probability of chances”, 
Hume refers to a division of “human reason” into “knowledge” and “probability”, with 
“the first to be that evidence, which arises from the comparison of ideas” (Hume 2001, 
86). 
In Book II of the Treatise, Hume again alludes to a distinction suggesting the 
analytic-synthetic distinction, when he claims: “Truth is of two kinds, consisting either in 
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the discovery of the proportions of ideas, consider’d as such, or in the conformity of our 
ideas of objects to their real existence” (Hume 2001, 287).  However, as Flew points out, 
“it is in Book III that the expression comes nearest to that finally achieved in the first 
Inquiry, and it is here too that the notion is most explicitly employed as the basis and 
framework of a whole discussion” (Flew 1997, 54).  Flew is referring to the critical 
section of Hume’s moral philosophy, 3.1.1, “Moral distinctions not deriv’d from reason”, 
where Hume argues that if moral distinctions were “derived from reason” that “the 
character of virtuous and vicious either must lie in some relations of objects, or must be a 
matter of fact, which is discover’d by our reasoning” (Hume 2001, 298).  Hume considers 
this “evident”, since “the operations of human understanding divide themselves into two 
kinds, the comparing of ideas and the inferring of matter of fact” (Hume 2001, 298).  In 
the same section, Hume adds that “no matter of fact is capable of being demonstrated” 
(Hume 2001, 298). 
Flew’s assessment seems accurate regarding the three books of the Treatise, 
however, in the Abstract, written after the first two Books of the Treatise, Hume appears 
to offer an even closer approximation to the distinction as presented in the E quiry.  
Here, Hume refers to “demonstrations” and “matters of fact”, with the former being 
“founded merely on the comparison of ideas” (Hume 2001, 410).  And, Hume here 
makes the notion of the contrary of a proposition implying a contradiction the criterion 
for a “demonstration”: “wherever a demonstration takes place, the contrary is impossible, 
and implies a contradiction” (Hume 2001, 410).  And, in a key passage that neatly 
summarizes this criterion for the distinction, Hume states: 
When a demonstration convinces me of any proposition, it not only makes me 
conceive the proposition, but also makes me sensible, that ‘tis impossible to 
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conceive any thing contrary.  What is demonstratively false implies a 
contradiction; and what implies a contradiction cannot be conceived.  But with 
regard to any matter of fact, however strong the proof may be from experience, I 
can always conceive the contrary (Hume 2001, 411). 
 
So, these passages, while perhaps not entirely convincing, can be referenced to 
make a fairly persuasive case that Hume is making a distinction similar to the analytic-
synthetic distinction even in the Treatise.  But, both Norton and Owen would caution us 
not to leap too quickly to this conclusion.  In the Editor’s Introduction to the Treatise, 
David Fate Norton comments on the distinction Hume makes in section 1.3.1 and his 
discussion of the “seven different kinds of philosophical relation”, saying that “The 
precise distinction Hume means to make may be difficult to characterize, but for a start it 
is clear that the difference between the two types of relation does not, as some have 
supposed, reduce to the difference between a set of four logical, and another set of thre  
factual or contingent, relations … and hence we clearly need another description of the 
distinction Hume means to draw” (Norton 2001, I24 – I25).  David Owen concurs with 
this assessment, claiming “one must resist the temptation to see Hume’s distinction 
between these two sorts of relations as approximating to the analytic/synthetic distinction, 
or the necessary/contingent distinction” (Owen 1999, 84).  Both Norton and Owen base 
their rejection of the assimilation of Hume’s seven relations to the analytic/synthetic 
distinction on the fact that Hume groups the relation of “degrees in any quality” with the 
(supposedly) intuitive/demonstrative/certain/necessary/logical/analytic set of relations.  
But, as Owen points out, this would include comparisons between shades or hues of red, 
“a decidedly factual or contingent matter” (Norton 2001, I25). 
So, there is an interpretive challenge to casting the entire Treatise as being in 
complete agreement with the Humean Fork used in the Inquiry.  While not intended as a 
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complete resolution to this subtle issue of interpretation (if only because our discussion 
here is far too limited to do it justice), we might note first that even Norton’s and Owen’s 
cautionary note does not extend to the Enquiry, and is clearly limited to the Treatise.  
And thus, given our initial backing for viewing the first Enquiry as at least as definitive a 
representative of Hume’s philosophical position as the Treatise, we would still be on 
reasonably solid ground to maintain that Hume makes a distinction similar to the 
analytic/synthetic distinction.  And second, Norton’s and Owen’s comments might even 
be more narrowly limited to just section 1.3.1 of the Tr atise and the rather specific set of 
“philosophical relations” Hume presents there.  For, as early afterwards as 1.3.7 we find 
Hume seemingly leaving the distinction between these relations behind (or at least not 
invoking it) and instead invoking a distinction between “propositions that are prov’d by 
intuition or demonstration” and “matters of fact” and speaking from that point on, in both 
the Treatise and the Abstract in a manner quite readily viewed as consistent with the first 
Enquiry. 
Now that we seem to at least have reason to consider Hume’s Fork to be closely 
related to the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions, we might pause 
briefly to also note its importance.  Georges Dicker puts this rather nicely when he states:
“This division … is fundamental both to Hume’s empiricism and to the twentieth-century 
empiricism that it inspired” (Dicker 1998, 35).  We can see part of that inspiration in 
Hume’s classification of mathematical truths as “relations of ideas”, a classification 
shared by positivists and logical empiricists, who also see this as the means for 
explaining how such truths can be knowable a priori (see the next chapter for more on 
this point).  But before we give Hume too much credit (or blame) for the views of the 
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logical positivists, we should examine more closely the nature of the distinction he 
makes. 
First, we should note again the criterion Hume ultimately relies upon for 
distinguishing propositions comprising the relations of ideas from those stating matters of 
fact.  For Hume, the first class of propositions is necessary truths and these are knowable 
a priori.  However, this stems from the more basic fact that the contrary of such a 
proposition implies a contradiction.  It is because of the logical status and implications of 
such propositions that they have these other properties (in spite of the seemingly 
psychological references to “conceivability”, Hume does not actually rely on any facts of 
psychology to make the distinction).  Flew notes the logical character of Hume’s 
criterion:  
Hume’s Fork in its final form belongs indisputably not to psychology but to logic.  
It obtains between kinds of propositions not sorts of perceptions.  The differentiae 
are that whereas one kind can be known a priori and cannot be denied without 
self-contradiction; the other kind can be denied without self-contradiction and can 
be known only a posteriori (Flew 1997, 54). 
 
As noted previously, this is the same criterion of analyticity that Leibniz util es, and, as 
we shall soon see, one of the criteria employed by Kant. 
Now we are in a better position to examine the relation between Hume’s 
distinction and the views of the positivists and the logical empiricists on the 
analytic/synthetic distinction.  Millican comments that many have seen these as 
fundamentally the same: and they conclude that Hume is thus rightly seen as the 
intellectual ancestor of the positivists: 
Most have instead taken Hume's Fork to correspond to the analytic-synthetic 
distinction as understood by the logical positivists such as Ayer, according to 
whom 'a proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions 
of the symbols it contains [or in Humean language, the nature of the ideas], and 
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synthetic when its validity is determined by the facts of experience (Millican 
2002, 428). 
 
However, Hume nowhere places such an emphasis on the definitions of words nor states 
that he considers these to be the foundation for the truth of the propositions involving 
relations of ideas.  We will have more to say of this appeal to linguistic conventions i  
the next chapter, but for now, we can note that there seems to be scant evidence for the 
claim that Hume held that linguistic convention was the ultimate foundation for analytic 
propositions. 
 The argument against interpreting Hume in this fashion is buttressed by a further
consideration.  Not merely the logical criterion he cites, but the corresponding 
epistemological status of propositions involving relations of ideas runs contrary to a 
central goal of the logical positivists, that of explaining knowledge of analytic truths 
without appeal to any rationalist notion of a priori insight.  For, Hume appears to follow 
Locke in claiming that we can “just see” these truths, as they are “discoverable by the 
mere operation of thought” (Hume 1999, 108).  Thus, not only does Hume’s distinction 
not rest on linguistic convention (which, would, after all, seem to be a “matter of fact”),
but he could quite plausibly be interpreted as basing analytic truths on the very a priori 
insight that the positivists were so keen to avoid.  This is not too surprising, since, even 
the empiricists of Hume’s era did not question that reason was able to supply us with 
truths.   
What Hume rejects of rationalism is the claim that reason alone can supply us 
with truths “concerning matter of fact; that is, concerning the existence of objects or of 
their qualities” (Hume 2001, 65), and in this regard, he is an intellectual ancestor to both 
logical empiricism and positivism.  Laurence BonJour, in discussing the prior histical 
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dominance of the rationalist view and the key rationalist element in Locke and Leibniz 
(as well as Descartes, Spinoza, and, more surprisingly, Berkeley) of accepting a priori 
justification, notes that: 
It is thus not until Hume that we find a major philosopher who clearly repudiates 
the rationalist capacity for insight into necessary truths pertaining to reality, 
insisting that a priori justification concerns only "relations of our ideas" as 
opposed to "matters of fact". (BonJour 1998, 17) 
 
This is an important point to note, but for our purposes in delineating Hume's position on 
the analytic/synthetic distinction, it is equally important to note that Hume does accept 
the rationalist a priori justification of analytic propositions, or "relations of ideas". 
 
V. Kant’s View of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction 
 
This section of the paper will focus on sections IV and V of the Introduction to the 
Critique of Pure Reason, as these contain Kant’s focused attention on the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, but even a cursory search of the text provides one with 
additional passages that offer insights into Kant’s concept of analyticity or the synthetic 
or the distinction between them.  I assume the reader is somewhat familiar with these 
sections of the Critique of Pure Reason, but I also highlight what I consider the key 
passages of the text1.   
In section IV, “The Distinction Between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments”, of the 
Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant first presents the analytic/synthetic 
distinction: 
In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought …, this 
relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject 
                                                      
1 All references to the Critique of Pure Reason are taken from Norman Kemp Smith’s translation (St.
Martin’s Press, 1965).  I shall refer to this text as CPR, and when citing page numbers will refer to the 
pagination of the English translation. 
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A, as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies outside the 
concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it. In the one case I 
entitle the judgment analytic, in the other synthetic. (CPR, 48) 
 
In this initial statement, Kant identifies containment or “belonging to” as the ess ntial 
feature of the distinction.  As a criterion for distinguishing kinds of judgments, this 
conceptual containment has an intuitive appeal, and it does not seem difficult to come up 
with examples to illustrate the distinction using this criterion.  “Tall dogs are dogs” 
would certainly seem to be analytic in virtue of the fact that the subject “tall dogs” 
contains the predicate “dogs”.  And, conversely, “Dogs are tall” seems just as obviously 
synthetic according to the criterion, since the predicate “tall” is not contained in the 
subject “dogs”. 
 In continuing his exposition of the distinction in this same passage, Kant adds that 
“Analytic judgments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the 
predicate with the subject is thought through identity; those in which this connection is 
thought without identity should be entitled synthetic” (CPR, 48).  At first glance, this is a 
puzzling statement, and might even be interpreted as claiming that all analytic judgments 
are judgments of identity (i.e., where the predicate is claimed to be identical wi h the 
subject).  This would be much more restrictive than the initial criterion of containment, 
and if only for that reason, seems an implausible interpretation.  What seems more 
reasonable is that Kant is referring (albeit rather indirectly) to a form of proof utilized by 
Leibniz (who also used the concept of containment), in which a proposition is analyzed 
into its components until an identity is reached.  And, it should be noted that “A 
proposition expresses an identity, in Leibniz's terminology, if the predicate is expl citly 
either identical with or included in the subject” (Beaney 2003), and so, in this sense, if a 
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predicate is “thought through identity”, then it need not be identical to the subject, but 
merely contained in it. 
 Additionally, Kant notes that analytic judgments do not add anything to our 
knowledge of the subject, but merely “explicate” it, by making more explicit “those 
constituent concepts that have all along been thought in it” (CPR 48).  Conversely, 
synthetic judgments do “add to the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been 
in any wise thought in it, and which no analysis could possibly extract from it; and they 
may therefore be entitled ampliative” (CPR 48). 
 Besides providing examples of both kinds of judgments (analytic: “All bodies are 
extended”, synthetic: “All bodies are heavy”), Kant also states that entire classes of 
judgments are synthetic.  He claims that: (1) “Judgments of experience, as such, are one 
and all synthetic” (CPR, 49), (2) “All mathematical judgments, without exception, are 
synthetic” (CPR, 52) (though he later qualifies this claim), and (3) in arguing against the 
possibility of an ontological proof of the existence of a god, that “all existential 
propositions are synthetic” (CPR 504). 
 Kant makes several short comments throughout the Critique that either echo the 
thoughts presented in this initial characterization of the distinction or suggest additional 
points.  For analytic judgments, “I do not require to go beyond the concept” (CPR, 48), 
but rather “I have merely to analyse the concept, that is, to become conscious to myself f 
the manifold which I always think in that concept” (CPR, 49).  Kant also notes that 
“through analytic judgments our knowledge is not in any way extended” (CPR, 49) and 
that “An analytic proposition carries the understanding no further …  it is concerned only 
with what is already thought in the concept ... The understanding [in its analytic 
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employment] is concerned only to know what lies in the concept (CPR, 274).  
Additionally, “analytic propositions … can be produced by mere analysis of concepts” 
(CPR, 580). 
 However, one comment of Kant’s (also in his argument against the ontological 
proof) deserves more than a passing comment.  Kant claims that analytic judgments 
(although he here refers to them as “propositions”) “cannot be rejected without 
contradiction” (CPR, 504), and that this is “a feature which is found only in analytic 
propositions, and is indeed precisely what constitutes their analytic character” (CPR, 
504).  Additionally, in a footnote, Kant appears to equate “the principle of analysis” with 
“the law of contradiction” (CPR 503n).  Although this connection is not explicitly clear 
in the Critique, it is in the Prologomena, where he even has a section titled “The Common 
Principle of All Analytical Judgments is the Law of Contradiction”, in which he state : 
All analytical judgments depend wholly on the law of Contradiction, and are in 
their nature a priori cognitions, whether the concepts that supply them with 
matter be empirical or not.  For the predicate of an affirmative analytical 
judgment is already contained in the concept of the subject, of which it cannot be 
denied without contradiction (Kant 1955, 15). 
 
 Thus far, we have focused on Kant’s concept of analyticity, and, following Kant, 
we have allowed synthetic judgments to be defined as those that are not analytic.  
However, Kant does provide a positive account of synthetic judgments.  The first hint of 
this account is given when Kant notes that “in synthetic judgments I must have besides 
the concept of the subject something else (X), upon which the understanding may rely, if 
it is to know that a predicate, not contained in this concept, nevertheless belongs to it” 
(CPR 49).  For synthetic a posteriori judgments, this X is empirical intuition, and for 
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synthetic a priori judgments, it is pure intuition, and Kant claims that “all thought must, 
directly or indirectly … relate ultimately to intuitions” (CPR 65). 
 The idea that Kant believes that intuition plays a role in synthetic judgments is 
reinforced by his argument that “7 + 5 = 12” is synthetic.  He states that we must “call in
the aid of the intuition” (CPR 53) to arrive at the sum of 7 and 5 and thus to see that it 
equals 12.  Similarly, Kant argues that the “fundamental propositions of pure geometry” 
(CPR, 53) are synthetic, and claims that “Intuition, therefore, must here be called in; only 
by its aid is the synthesis possible” (CPR, 53).  The “synthesis” that Kant here ref rs to is 
an act of synthesis, and so, as Sebastian Gardner puts it: 
The term ‘synthetic’ as applied to judgments has, therefore, the double sense of 
connecting a predicate with a concept in which it is not contained, and of 
presupposing a corresponding act of synthesis or putting together on the part of 
the subject … The two senses are connected because only an act of synthesis can 
make a non-analytic judgment possible” (Gardner 1999, 55). 
 
 Moreover, Kant sees the use of intuition in an act of synthesis as both necessary 
and sufficient for determining a judgment to be synthetic.  He clearly sees it as necessary, 
for in a letter to Reinhold (in which Kant complains of Eberhard’s lack of understanding 
of Kant’s principle) Kant states his principle of synthetic judgment as: “All synthetic 
judgments of theoretical knowledge are only possible through the relation of a given 
concept to an intuition” (Allison 1973, 164).  That Kant also sees it as sufficient can be 
seen in the fact that in arguing that judgments of arithmetic are not analytic, he implicitly 
assumes that it is sufficient to show that they involve a use of intuition.  He reasons that 
since they do, they cannot be analytic.  Note how this shifts the focus from analytic 
judgments to synthetic ones, as they become primary, and analytic judgments seco dary.  
Allison agrees with this assessment, and he notes that what he calls “the second versi ” 
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of the analytic/synthetic distinction, “is greatly superior to the first because in it the 
notion of a synthetic judgment, the real focus of Kant’s concern” (Allison 1983, 75) is 
given the central role. 
This use of intuition is the key distinguishing factor, as Kant claims that all 
judgments, even analytic ones, rely on an act of synthesis, though he believes the kind of 
synthesis involved is different.  But then one could say that this is true of synthetic a 
posteriori judgments and synthetic a priori ones, i.e., they each rely on a different kind of 
synthesis.  However, Kant would say they are similar in that both use a form of intuition - 
just different intuitions.  And thus, what truly distinguishes analytic and synthetic 
judgments is not that one involves an act of synthesis, but rather that one (analytic 
judgments) is a mere relating of concepts to each other, whereas the other (synthetic 
judgments) includes intuitions.  The role of intuitions in synthetic judgments would seem 
to entail that the distinction between concepts and intuitions is of fundamental importance 
for Kant, as it is at the root of the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments.   
Similarly, though from a different perspective, the distinction between judgments 
that extend our knowledge and those that do not is also fundamental, and that “through 
analytic judgments our knowledge is not in any way extended” (CPR, 49).  So, Kant 
supplies us with a separate criterion for synthetic judgments, whether they ex end our 
knowledge.  However, it is important to note that Kant believes that these criteria 
coalesce in his analytic/synthetic distinction.  That is, for Kant, the very same judgments 
that use a form of intuition are the same ones that extend our knowledge. This ties back 
into Kant's distinction between concepts and intuitions, as he believes that concepts alone 
never extend our knowledge ("mere analysis of concepts"), but only intuitions. 
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This is why it is crucial for Kant to argue that those claims he considers synthetic 
involve intuitions and not merely concepts (e.g., Kant argues that space and time are 
intuitions, not concepts). If we look at Kant’s examples we see that he claims that the 
judgments of arithmetic are synthetic.  And so he argues that arithmetic judgments both 
involve the use of intuition (i.e., in the act of making such judgments, we must "call in 
the aid of intuition") and extend our knowledge. 
Recall that Kant is responding to both the rationalists (most notably, Leibniz) and 
the empiricists (most notably, Hume).  Regarding the analytic/synthetic distinction, 
Kant's argument against the rationalists is that analytic judgments do not extend our 
knowledge (or, equivalently, since he considers the distinction exhaustive of the 
possibilities - i.e., all judgments are either analytic or synthetic, only synthetic judgments 
extend our knowledge).  This claim of Kant's can now be brought into greater focus, as it 
is merely the claim (given Kant's conception of the distinction) that judgments that 
involve only concepts, and not any intuitions, do not extend our knowledge (or, again, 
only judgments that involve the use of intuitions extend our knowledge).  This claim 
seems sound, and certainly the empiricists would agree with it. 
However, Kant must also argue the other side of the equation against the 
empiricists, that is, that all synthetic judgments extend our knowledge (or, once again, 
that all judgments that involve the use of intuition extend our knowledge).  That this is 
the case for empirical intuitions is not at issue, and so Kant focuses on showing that we
may have synthetic knowledge based on pure intuitions.  From Kant's perspective, the 
empiricists would seem to have been closer to the truth on this matter, as they recognized 
the key element of extending knowledge.  But, according to Kant, the empiricists were 
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mistaken in that they believed only synthetic a posteriori judgments, that is, judgments 
that involved sensible/empirical intuitions, did so. 
Even though Kant’s arguments for synthetic a priori knowledge have been 
challenged ever since their presentation, his distinction between analytic and synthetic 
judgments was widely adopted.  It was seen as a clarifying account of the intuitions 
regarding the different kinds of judgments, and essentially taken for granted until the 20th 
century.  And, now that we have seen the foundation and characterization of the 
distinction in Kant’s thought as well as that of the related distinctions made by Locke, 
Leibniz, and Hume, we will next turn our attention to the most prominent contemporary 
views on the analytic/synthetic distinction. 
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This chapter will present the conventionalist account of analyticity.  The view that 
analytic truths are “true by convention” had been the standard account of analyticity for 
much of the twentieth century (dominating the first 50 years, and although waning since 
then, it still had adherents into the 1970’s), but has now been rejected by most 
philosophers.  While we must be careful not to reject the notion of analyticity in general, 
the arguments against the conventionalist account do seem conclusive.  Still, as powerful 
as the objections to the conventionalist account are, they do not show that another, 
alternative account of analyticity might prove to allow for a viable distinctio  between 
analytic and synthetic propositions.  However, an alternative account shall have to wait 
until later chapters, while we focus in this chapter on first understanding what the 
conventionalist account consists of and why it had seemed so attractive, and then turn to 
the problems with conventionalist accounts. 
When one thinks of the analytic/synthetic distinction and those who championed 
it in the 20th century, one typically thinks of the logical positivists.  This much is not 
problematic, since many of those identified as logical positivists did both argue for the 
distinction and view it as providing an explanation of a priori knowledge, and in 
particular, our a priori knowledge of logical and mathematical truths. Further, many held 
that both the nature of analyticity and its explanatory power were derived from their 
account of analyticities as “true by convention”.  As Thomas Uebel notes, “they all 
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agreed broadly that the ways of representing the world were largely determined by 
convention” (Uebel 2008). 
However, as Uebel is keen to point out, the picture of the positivists as all being in 
lock-step agreement, such that their views can be reduced to one single position or 
argument, is simplistic and inaccurate.  Even regarding the analytic/synthetic distinction, 
the logical positivists held a variety of views for a variety of reasons, and although in 
seeming agreement regarding the conventional nature of analyticity, “[a] multitude of 
ideas hide behind this invocation of conventionality” (Uebel 2008).  While not doing 
justice to this “multitude of ideas”, I will at least note some differences in the positions 
taken on the analytic/synthetic distinction, and there are reasons for at least tt mpting to 
distinguish two versions of conventionalism regarding the basis of analyticity: (1) 
linguistic conventionalism and (2) pragmatic conventionalism.  The first of theseis more 
well-known, but as should become clear, at least a few who would embrace a spirit of 
conventionalism reject a strictly linguistic conventionalism as the ground of analyticity.  
However, as should also become clear, the boundary between these two versions is ofte 
blurred, and ultimately, there may not be much practical difference between them. 
 
II.  Linguistic Conventionalism 
 
 
A. A. J. Ayer 
 
In Chapter IV (“The A Priori”) of Language, Truth, and Logic (Ayer 1952), A.J. 
Ayer argues for “the empiricist contention that there are no “truths of reason” which refer 
to matters of fact” (Ayer 1952, 73).  Ayer acknowledges the challenge that the 
propositions of logic and mathematics present to this position, since it at least appears 
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that they represent counterexamples, being apparently both necessary (and thus to be 
“truths of reason”) and informative (i.e., to be about the world, and thus refer to “matters 
of fact”).  Thus, he believes the empiricist faces a dilemma: either deny that these 
propositions are necessary or claim they have no factual content.  After dismissing Mill’s 
alternative (that of denying that such propositions are necessary and claiming they are 
merely extremely well-confirmed inductive generalizations - in that, for example, so far, 
every time we have counted two things and two more things we have come up with four 
things), Ayer grants that such propositions are necessary, but claims that they re only 
necessary because they are analytic. 
Thus far in his account, Ayer is not committed to linguistic conventionalism (or 
any conventionalism for that matter), but, in his defense of the claim that logical and 
mathematical truths are analytic, he apparently relies on linguistic conventions as the 
ground of their analyticity.  He claims that they are necessary “because we never allow 
them to be anything else”, and “the reason for this is that we cannot abandon them 
without contradicting ourselves, without sinning against the rules which govern the use of 
language” (Ayer 1952, 77).  And he criticizes Kant’s “psychological criterion” (Ayer 
1952, 78) of analyticity, offering instead the definition “that a proposition is analytic 
when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains” (Ayer 
1952, 78). 
Although clearly conflating epistemological issues more properly seen as r levant 
to determining whether a claim may be knowable a priori (e.g., “one need not resort to 
observation”) with determinations of analyticity, Ayer concludes that “analytic 
propositions are devoid of factual content” (Ayer 1952, 79).  But, as Ayer recognizes, this 
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forces him to confront the other horn of the dilemma which he claims the empiricist face  
(and with which he began his account of our a priori knowledge of logic and 
mathematics): given the analyticity of the truths of logic and mathematics, “he must 
explain how a proposition which is empty of all factual content can be true and useful and 
surprising” (Ayer 1952, 73). 
Ayer responds to this challenge by claiming that although they are devoid of 
factual content, “there is a sense in which analytic propositions do give us new 
knowledge.  They call attention to linguistic usages, of which we might otherwise not be 
conscious” (Ayer 1952, 79 – 80).  In other passages, Ayer echoes this view as well and 
also indicates an emphasis on linguistic convention: “they do enlighten us by illustrating 
the way in which we use certain symbols” (Ayer 1952, 79), “calling attention to the
implications of a certain linguistic usage” (Ayer 1952, 79), “thereby indicating the 
convention which governs our usage of the words” (Ayer 1952, 79), “the rules which 
govern our usage” (Ayer 1952, 80), “simply record our determination to use words in a 
certain fashion” (Ayer 1952, 84). 
Ayer’s frequent references to the “linguistic conventions” in which the analytic 
truths are “recorded” seems to be the only basis for his claim that it is the fac  that the 
truths of logic and mathematics are analytic that makes them knowable a priori.  This 
move is apparent in his conclusion: 
We see, then, that there is nothing mysterious about the apodeictic certainty of 
logic and mathematics.  Our knowledge that no observation can ever confute the 
proposition “7 + 5 = 12” depends simply on the fact that the symbolic expression 
“7 + 5” is synonymous with “12”, just as our knowledge that every oculist is an 
eye-doctor depends on the fact that the symbol “eye-doctor” is synonymous with 
“oculist”.  And the same explanation holds good for every other a priori truth 
(Ayer 1952, 85). 
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Ayer makes it clear that the ultimate basis for our a p iori knowledge of the analytic 
truths of logic and mathematics (and, he should add, ordinary ones like “Every oculist is 
an eye-doctor” – unless Ayer considers this a “truth of logic”) is the linguistic 
conventions governing the usage of “symbolic expressions”.  Although he does not make 
this explicit, he must (in order for his argument to be valid) also assume that we have a 
priori  knowledge of these linguistic conventions, but this issue will be deferred until 
later. 
 
B. Hans Hahn 
 
Although Ayer is more frequently cited as a proponent of linguistic convention as 
the basis of analyticity (and as a prototypical positivist in general), Hans Hahn actually 
more explicitly embraces this account in his article, “Logic, Mathematics nd Knowledge 
of Nature” (Hahn 1959).  Like Ayer, Hahn is also motivated by the desire to show that 
“there is no a priori knowledge about matters of fact” (Hahn 1959, 152).  And, also like 
Ayer, Hahn focuses on the propositions of logic and mathematics, and they both agree 
that Mill’s claim that such propositions are “mere facts of experience” (Hahn 1959, 152) 
is untenable.  So, with that much already established, all that is needed is to demonstrate 
Hahn’s similar reliance on linguistic convention. 
Hahn makes things even easier for us, claiming that logic treats “only of ourway 
of speaking about objects; logic is first generated by language”, and that a logical truth 
“merely expresses a convention concerning the way we wish to talk” (Hahn 1959, 152).  




C. Carl Hempel 
 
 In his article, “On the Nature of Mathematical Truth” (Hempel 1972), Carl 
Hempel follows a path similar to that of both Ayer and Hahn in his attempt to address the 
same problem they addressed - the challenge of mathematical truths to empiricis .  As 
they both did years earlier, he first rejects Mill’s solution to the problem, arguing that the 
truths of mathematics cannot be merely well-confirmed empirical generalizations based 
on past experiences, since this would make them susceptible of disconfirmation, which he 
believes they clearly are not. 
Although not as obviously embracing linguistic conventionalism as Hahn, the 
following passages at least strongly hint at Hempel’s acceptance of a similar linguistic 
foundation for analyticity.  Hempel’s reason for thinking mathematical truths are not 
susceptible of disconfirmation is a good place to start: “this is so because the symbols “3 
+ 2” and “5” denote the same number: they are synonymous by virtue of the fact that the 
symbols “2”, “3”, “5”, and “+” are defined (or tacitly understood) in such a way that the 
above identity holds as a consequence of the meaning attached to the concepts involved 
in it” (Hempel 1972, 36).  This is a mixed passage, since it references apparently non-
linguistic elements, in that the symbols are said to “denote the same number” (which 
would be a way in which language reaches out to the world, or at least beyond the mere 
circle of words to abstract objects, in this case, numbers) and that this “holds as a 
consequence of the meaning attached to the concepts”, which again indicates something 
beyond the mere words or symbols.  But, on the other hand, reference is made to how the 
symbols are “defined (or tacitly understood)”, which suggests a linguistic 
conventionalism similar to both Ayer’s and Hahn’s. 
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It may be simply a locution of Hempel’s to refer to “the meaning attached to the
terms” (Hempel 1972, 36), as, through the course of the article, he repeatedly cites the 
role of “definition” and “stipulation”, noting that mathematical truths are “true simply by 
virtue of definitions or of similar stipulations which determine the meaning of the key 
terms involved” (Hempel 1972, 36).  This passage is especially noteworthy, given that, 
here, Hempel claims the definitions or “similar stipulations” determine the meaning.  
Hempel, extending his account of the analytic nature of mathematical truths to logical
truths, then includes an example of a logical truth, and he claims that “identity is a 
transitive relation by virtue of its definition or by virtue of the basic postulates governing 
it” (Hempel 1972, 37).  But, just as we might find the phrase “by virtue of its definition” 
to further cement our categorization of Hempel’s account as a form of linguistic 
conventionalism, we should be alert to his reference to “postulates”. 
Matters of interpretation might seem to be settled when Hempel next explicitly 
states that “the validity of mathematics … derives from the s ipulations which 
determine the meaning of the mathematical concepts … the propositions of mathematics 
are therefore essentially “true by definition”” (Hempel 1972, 37).  However, he 
immediately qualifies this statement (and his use of quotation marks should have alre dy 
made the reader aware that he might be using the phrase in a qualified way) by s ing 
“This latter statement, however, is obviously oversimplified and needs restatement and a 
more careful justification” (Hempel 1972, 37 – 38).  Hempel clarifies his qualification, by 
claiming that mathematical truths are not derived solely from definitions, but also require 
“non-definitional propositions” (Hempel 1972, 38), which are the postulates of 
mathematics. 
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For others, these postulates have been viewed as “implicit definitions”, but 
Hempel rejects this position as “misleading”, and claims that in a mathematical system 
with such postulates, the truth of propositions in that system “flows not merely from the 
definitions of the concepts involved, but also from the postulates that govern these 
various concepts” (Hempel 1972, 39).  The details of Hempel’s account of the postulates 
of Peano’s axiom system of mathematics are not our focus here, so we need only note 
that Hempel’s reason for emphasizing the role of postulates and for qualifying the claim 
that, in such a system, the propositions of mathematics are “true by definition”, is that 
Peano’s postulates require an interpretation.  And, since logicism and the attempt to 
reduce mathematics to logic is also not our primary interest, we can also simply focus on 
Hempel’s acceptance of the claim that, given appropriate definitions, which “render 
precise and explicit the customary meaning of the concepts of arithmetic” (Hempel 1972, 
46), Peano’s postulates are true (with the addition of Russell’s axiom of infinity). 
Next, with these qualifications explicated, Hempel can claim that, since 
mathematics (limited thus far to arithmetic) “can be derived from logic” (Hempel 1972, 
47), “the propositions of the system of mathematics as here delimited are true by virtue of 
the definitions of the mathematical concepts involved, or that they make explicit certain 
characteristics with which we have endowed our mathematical concepts by definition” 
(Hempel 1972, 47).  Thus, for Hempel, since the propositions of mathematics have the 
same analytic status, they “have, therefore, the same unquestionable certainty which is 
typical of such propositions as “All bachelors are unmarried” (Hempel 1972, 47). 
Finally, responding to the same concern that Ayer had that at least many analytic 
truths at least appear to be informative, Hempel offers a similar reply.  These analytic 
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truths simply make explicit the content that is already contained in whatever concepts we 
are using: “Mathematical as well as logical reasoning is a conceptual technique of 
making explicit what is implicitly contained in a set of premises” (Hempel 1972, 48).  So, 
although such content may be “psychologically new”, it is not “theoretically new” 
(Hempel 1972, 49). 
With the qualifications addressed, and noting the differences between arithmetic 
and other branches of mathematics (with only the former being capable of being giv  
formal definitions “in terms of purely logical concepts” (Hempel 1972, 50)), Hempel can 
at last conclude unreservedly that the postulates (and thus all the propositions) of 
arithmetic are “unconditionally true by virtue of these definitions” (Hempel 1972, 50).  
And thus, though his treatment of the analytic nature of mathematics is arguably more 
nuanced than Ayer’s and Hahn’s, Hempel would also appear to embrace a form of 
linguistic conventionalism. 
Lest we think of the linguistic conventionalism account of analyticity as a long-
forgotten doctrine of the positivism of the 1930’s and 1940’s, we should note it has had 
more recent adherents.  We shall, however, return to these after first covering (following 
a more or less chronological order) C.I. Lewis’s pragmatic conventionalism. 
 
III.  Pragmatic Conventionalism: C. I. Lewis 
 
Let us now turn to pragmatic conventionalism as represented by C. I. Lewis.  In 
his delineation of the various criteria that have been used for a priori knowledge, Moser 
attributes to the pragmatist position the claim that “[a] true proposition can be k own a 
priori  if and only if it describes only a human intention to employ a certain scheme of 
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classification for the ordering of human experience” (Moser 1987, 7-8).  And, in his 
summary of C.I. Lewis’s article, “A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori”, he claims 
“C. I. Lewis presents a pragmatic conception of the a priori, according to which a priori 
knowledge is knowledge of one’s intent to employ a certain (conceptual) scheme of 
classification for the organizing of experience” (Moser 1987, 9 – 10).   
While this may sound similar to linguistic conventionalism, there are at least two 
points of difference worth noting.  First, we should note that Lewis is not talking simply 
about the way words happen to be used, for he emphasizes our intentions, and the role of 
the mind in choosing to organize its experiences in one way rather than another: “The a 
priori  represents an attitude in some sense freely taken, a stipulation of the mind itself” 
(Lewis 1987, 15).  Lewis repeatedly stresses “the uncompelled initiative of mind”
(Lewis, 1987, 16) in his account of our ability to have  priori knowledge (which goes 
hand in hand with his account of analyticity, at least in his early article), claiming it is our 
choosing to employ a classification scheme that creates analytic truths.  Speaking of the 
laws of logic, Lewis claims they “make explicit our general modes of classification” 
(Lewis 1987, 16), and that, to take one example of such a law, the law of excluded 
middle “formulates our decision” and “declares our purpose” (Lewis 1987, 16) 
(emphasis added) to sort our experience into two categories (rather than three ormor , as 
we might have chosen to do).  Further, he claims this decision is based “on pragmatic 
grounds of conformity to human bent and intellectual convenience” (Lewis 1987, 17). 
Second, Lewis is also not talking about our decision merely to use words in a 
certain way, but rather our decision to use a particular classification scheme.  For Lewis, 
“all bachelors are male” is true not because of the linguistic conventions regarding the 
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use of the words “bachelor” and “male”. But rather, the proposition expressed by these 
words is true because we have, for our own pragmatic reasons, intentionally adopted a 
classification scheme such that we will organize all our experiences of things into the 
male and not-male categories and we have also adopted the classification scheme
whereby anything that is not-male we will exclude from the category of bachelors and 
instead assign it to the not-bachelor category.  In a brief paragraph on definitions in “A 
Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori”, Lewis hints of an acceptance of linguistic 
conventionalism by acknowledging propositions that are “true by definition”.  However, 
he still emphasizes the “categorical attitudes of mind” by claiming: “Mind makes 
classifications and determines meanings; in so doing it creates the a priori truth of 
analytic judgements” (Lewis 1987, 17). 
Lewis’s rejection of the linguistic conventionalist account of analyticity is made 
most explicit in Chapter VI of An Analysis of Knowledge & Valuation, “Linguistic 
Meaning and Sense Meaning” (Lewis 1946).  He begins that chapter by noting that “[t]he 
original determinations of analytic truth, and the final court of appeal with respect to it, 
cannot lie in linguistic usage, because meanings are not the creatures of language but re 
antecedent, and the relations of meanings are not determined by our syntactic 
conventions but are determinative of the significance which our syntactic usages my 
have” (Lewis 1946, 131).  And again, in a slightly later passage (and one quoted by 
BonJour in noting Lewis’s rejection of linguistic conventionalism), Lewis say: 
The manner in which any truth is to be told by means of language, depends on 
conventional linguistic usage.  But the truth or falsity of what is expressed, is 
independent of any particular linguistic conventions affecting the expression of it.  
If the conventions were otherwise, the manner of telling would be different, but 
what is to be told, and the truth or falsity of it, would remain the same.  That is 




Lewis’s article, “A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori”, follows a pattern 
similar to that of Ayer, Hahn, and Hempel (or, rather, their articles follow Leis’s 
pattern, since Lewis’s was published first), in that he also addresses our a prio i 
knowledge of mathematics.  Lewis also rejects Mill’s position (“Mill was quite 
mistaken”) and instead claims that the truths of mathematics are analytic and a priori 
because “they are compatible with anything which happens or could conceivably happen
in nature”, and “[t]hey would be true in any possible world” (Lewis 1987, 18).  Lewis 
uses Mill’s own example to illustrate his point about the truths of mathematics being 
independent of experience.  Let us suppose that every time we attempt to add two things 
with two other things we always come up with five (Mill's original example supposed 
that a demon introduced the fifth).  Lewis claims that "In such a world we should be 
obliged to become a little clearer than is usual about the distinction between arithmetic 
and physics, that is all" (Lewis 1987, 18).  Lewis sums up the reason for this as well: 
It is because we shall always separate out that part of the phenomenon not in 
conformity with arithmetic and designate it by some other category - physical 
change, chemical reaction, optical illusion - that arithmetic is a priori. (Lewis, 
1987, 18 - 19) 
 
Lewis would have been clearer if he had said "that part of the phenomenon that appears 
to be not in conformity with arithmetic", for no phenomenon can actually fail to be in 
conformity with arithmetic.  In fact, that is Lewis' point, as he states elsewhere. 
Lewis next addresses what he calls “the a priori element in science and in natural 
law” (Lewis 1987, 19).  He emphasizes the role that classification plays in the 
development of a conceptual framework without which we could not even make sense of 
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our experience to formulate scientific laws: “We cannot even interrogate experience 
without a network of categories and definitive concepts” (Lewis 1987, 22). 
Although this is far too brief an account to do justice to the richness of Lewis’s 
conceptualistic pragmatism, it should serve our purposes to introduce the notion of a 
pragmatic conventionalism distinct from the linguistic conventionalism that was far more 
common.  We can see that, although Lewis rejects the linguistic conventionalists’ 
attempts to ground analyticity in the mere usage of words, his pragmatic approach to 
analyticity is still properly understood as a form of conventionalism, as it makes the truth 
of analytic claims dependent upon human intentions and decisions, which are similarly 
conventional in nature.  Thus, while eschewing as a foundation for analyticity the 
intention to use words according to a particular convention, Lewis attempts to base 
analytic truths on our pragmatically chosen classification schemes, which share the same 
essential features as stipulative definitions, and are judged by much the same pragmatic 
criteria.  We shall have the opportunity to revisit Lewis’s views in our assessment of how 
they fare against the criticisms that have been leveled against conventionalist accounts of 
analyticity. 
 
IV.  More Recent Conventionalism 
 
Before we end this section on conventionalism, we should note that support for 
conventionalism did not end with Lewis and Hempel.  Considerably later, and even after 
Quine’s sustained attack on analyticity , other philosophers still advocated a 
conventionalist account of analyticity, and even one that views linguistic stipulation as 
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key to this account.  For example, Wesley Salmon cites “linguistic stipulation” as the 
foundation for analyticity: 
After some exposure to formal logic one can see without much difficulty how 
linguistic stipulation can yield analytic statements that hold in any possible world.  
It is easy to see that “Snow is white or snow is not white” is true simply because 
of the meanings we attach to “or” and “not”. (Salmon 1967, 39) 
 
And, in his article “The a Priori and the Analytic”, Anthony Quinton also argues for the 
conventionalist view: 
A statement is a necessary truth because of the meaning of the words of which it 
is composed.  The meaning that words have is assigned to them by convention.  
Therefore it is linguistic convention that makes a form of words express a 
necessary truth. (Quinton 1972, 97) 
 
As becomes clear in the continuation of this same passage, Quinton’s view bears some 
similarities to Lewis’s pragmatic account, at least to the extent that he lso notes the role 
of “human decision” and the attitudinal stance of refusing “to let any falsification occur”: 
This Hobbesian view makes necessity unmysterious by treating it, not as 
something objectively discoverable in the nature of things, but as a matter of 
human decision.  The impossibility of falsification that is characteristic of 
necessary truths is not a brute ontological fact; it is brought about by our refusal 
from the start to let any falsification occur. (Quinton 1972, 97) 
 
Now that we have examined the two versions of conventionalism, we will now turn to an 
examination of the problems with conventionalist accounts of analyticity. 
 
V. Problems with Conventionalism 
 
 
Quine presented criticisms of linguistic conventionalism in his 1936 article, 
“Truth by Convention”, and although his arguments did not prove to be extremely 
influential at the time, they are now recognized as pointing out an inherent and 
devastating flaw in linguistic conventionalism.  In the article, Quine begins by 
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considering logicism, the attempt to reduce mathematics to logic, and in particular the 
role that definitions were thought to play in such a reduction.  But while logicism may 
provide part of the motivation for the linguistic conventionalist, Quine rightly recognizes 
their ultimate aim as the elimination of “any a priori principles at all which are 
independent of convention” (Quine 1976, 87).  And so, Quine (temporarily) grants the 
logicist position, and turns to the more fundamental question of whether “all those logical
principles to which mathematics is supposed to reduce are likewise true by convention” 
(Quine 1976, 87). 
Quine argues that the attempt to show that logical truths are also conventional 
cannot be based on (ordinary) definitions, since these “are available for transformi g 
truths, not for founding them” (Quine 1976, 88), but must rely on some other form of 
convention.  Thus, he considers the role that has been claimed for postulates, also known 
as “implicit definitions”, which are claimed to have the capability of “generating truths 
rather than merely transforming them” (Quine 1976, 88).  However, while Quine grants
that the use of such postulates may “determine meaning for the initially meaningless 
marks ‘if’, ‘then’, ‘~’, and the rest”, and allow us to create many true logical statements, 
and we may even utilize “supplementary conventions” (Quine 1976, 91) for statements 
that “involve some non-logical expressions”, “the number of such statements is ifinite” 
(Quine 1976, 91), and so there is no hope of generating all logical truths by any simple 
listing of postulates for each such statement.  Thus, he considers the possibility of a f nite 
set of rules that are capable of generating an infinite set of true statements.   
In the course of Quine’s discussion, this method is apparently successful, and thus 
all of logic and mathematics would appear to be true by convention.  Quine next 
 61 
considers the possibility that “the method can even be carried beyond mathematics, into 
the so-called empirical sciences” (Quine 1976, 100).  And, in a move foreshadowing his 
later views in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, Quine claims that there is no fundamental 
distinction between the “empirical” sciences and logic and mathematics, and th t all that 
is needed to proceed with the same method is a similar set of postulates for the 
“empirical” primitives.  In this fashion, these postulates would allow us to make the 
truths of science into conventional truths as well. 
However, Quine claims that in the application of the method to logic itself, “a 
difficulty remains to be faced” (Quine 1976, 103), and “the difficulty is that if logc is to 
proceed mediately from conventions, logic is needed for inferring logic from the 
conventions” (Quine 1976, 104).  This presupposition of the very truths of logic, for 
which the linguistic conventions were intended to provide the foundation, vitiates the 
entire linguistic conventionalist program.  In his discussion of “The Linguistic 
Explanation of Apriori Knowledge”, Soames echoes this problem: “However, in order t 
derive this apriori knowledge from our linguistic knowledge, one has to appeal to an 
antecedent knowledge of logic itself” (Soames 2003, 265).  Though this single objection 
would certainly seem to be decisive against the position, in his book In Defense of Pure 
Reason, BonJour provides a range of criticisms against linguistic conventionalism, so we 
will turn to these next. 
BonJour addresses the conventionalist account in both section 2.5, “The Idea of 
Implicit Definition” and section 2.6, “The Appeal to Linguistic Convention”, seeing 
implicit definition as “basically a special case of the appeal to linguistic convention” 
(BonJour 1998, 50).  As usually presented, and as Salmon’s view implies (though 
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perhaps not quite what the pragmatic account espouses), the conventionalist position is 
that analytic statements are true because of conventions that have been adopted regarding 
the usage of words and expressions, i.e., “because of the meanings we attach to” words. 
However, although this view has been commonly held, as BonJour and Harman 
both note, it is not clear how a linguistic convention can, by itself, make a statement 
analytic.  BonJour claims “how such conventions are supposed to account for the truth or, 
especially, the epistemic justification of a priori justifiable propositions or even 
statements is anything but obvious” (BonJour 1998, 51) (here, I will set aside BonJour’s 
concern for the epistemological issue of providing justification for a p iori propositions).  
BonJour cites several objections (including that it seems completely implausible 
to believe that we have made an explicit convention for the infinite set of analytic 
propositions – and that to rely on logical implications is to yet have analytic truths that 
are not accounted for by linguistic convention).  But, arguably the most central objecti n 
to the conventionalist account of analyticity, and the one I shall focus on here, is that it 
simply does not account for how the analytic propositions are true.  To put this more 
pointedly, it fails to account for what makes the propositions true.  BonJour includes 
this as one of his criticisms, and to me it seems the most central problem for the 
conventionalist account of analyticity. 
As somewhat of a tangential point, it might be that a focus on the epistemological 
issues explains why this point has been under-appreciated.  Since, if we are asking how 
could we know that a claim is true without any appeal to the way the world is, then an 
appeal to our knowledge of the meanings of words (which at least appears to be 
appropriately “internal” – though this point itself could be challenged if we view the fact 
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that words have the associated meanings they do in light of public, empirically verifiabl  
conventions adopted by communities of language users – though the conventionalist has 
a possible response in that the individual can still claim to know what she means by the 
words she uses) offers a tempting candidate for the grounds for such knowledge.  But, 
this overlooks the more basic question of what makes such claims true.  We might think 
it plausible that we can explain how we know them to be true because we have some kind 
of direct, internal, non-a posteriori access to the meanings of the words we use, but we 
cannot explain how they are true because we know them to be true.  They first have to be 
true for us to be able to know them at all. 
 Returning to the primary objection to the conventionalist account of analyticity, 
this argument against conventionalism runs as follows.  While it is certainly rue that 
words have the meanings they do by convention, it does not follow that the propositions 
expressed by sentences using those words are true solely in virtue of these conventions.  
This can be seen rather straightforwardly, since if this were all that were necessary to 
make a proposition true, then all sentences would be analytic (and, even more oddly, 
analytically true), since all sentences are composed of words that have their mean ngs due 
to these same linguistic conventions.  The sentence “Bachelors are male” includes the 
words “bachelors”, “are”, and “male”, each of which has the meaning it does in virtue of 
the linguistic conventions that have been adopted regarding their use in the English 
language.  But, if the fact that the words in this sentence have their meanings due to these 
conventions were all it takes to make the proposition expressed by this sentence 
analytically true, then the sentence “Bachelors are tall” would also be analytically true, 
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since the words in this sentence have had their meanings established by the same sort of 
linguistic conventions. 
A natural response at this point is to note that the difference between the two 
sentences is due to the fact that the meanings of the words “bachelors” and “male” are 
such that “Bachelors are male” must be true, but this is not the case for the meanings of 
“bachelors” and “tall” and the sentence “Bachelors are tall”.  However, this is not a move 
the conventionalist can make, for the distinction between the two sentences and the 
meanings of their constituent words relies on more than just the linguistic conventions 
that imbue these words with meanings.  What distinguishes the two sentences is the 
different relations between the meanings associated with these words.  It is the relation 
between the meanings bachelors (again adopting the convention that meanings will be 
indicated by the use of italics) and male (and are) that makes the proposition (i.e. 
bachelors are male) expressed by “Bachelors are male” true.  And the reason that 
“Bachelors are tall” is not analytic is because bachelors and tall do not have the kind of 
relation to each other that would by that relation alone be sufficient to make the 
proposition bachelors are tall true. 
BonJour notes that the kind of linguistic convention involved in the words 
composing the sentence “Bachelors are male” “merely reflects the prior and independent 
a priori insight” (BonJour 1998, 54), and he quotes Butchvarov as follows: 
one could gladly admit that the sort of rules [thus suggested] are indeed present in 
language, explicitly or implicitly, and then one would point out that the obvious 
reason such rules are adopted is the necessary truth of the corresponding 
propositions.  For example, one would admit that there is the rule “Don’t say of 
anything that it is both red and green all over!” but would point out that the reason 
the rule is accepted is the necessary truth of the proposition “Nothing is both red 
and green all over”; one would admit that there is the rule “Don’t contradict 
yourself!” but would point out that the rule is accepted only because of the 
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necessary truth of the principle of noncontradiction. (Butchvarov 1970, 126 – 
127) 
 
BonJour’s focus at this point is to note that if Butchvarov is correct, then linguistic 
conventions “cannot provide the sort of deflationary explanation of a priori knowledge 
and justification that the moderate empiricist is seeking” (BonJour 1998, 54).   However, 
even setting aside BonJour’s concerns for the epistemic role of explaining  priori 
knowledge, the challenge to the conventionalist account of analyticity is clear. 
The problem for the conventionalist stems from a failure to understand the nature 
and role of linguistic conventions, so let us examine it in a little more detail here. The 
situation with respect to linguistic conventions seems to be the following.  We adopt 
conventions to associate expressions in a natural language like English with meanings in 
what, to simplify things, we may call the “Language of Meanings”.  For example, it is a 
convention of ours that "bachelor" is associated with (and here we might say "mens", 
but, though a natural enough thing to say, also seems somehow odd) bachelor.  However, 
it is not by convention that bachelor means what it means (and this may also seem odd, 
since we are used to saying that words have meaning - if so, perhaps it would be less 
confusing to say bachelor is the meaning that it is).  But by this account, the truth of 
"Bachelors are male" is based on, or grounded in, the truth of the proposition bachelors 
are male.  And, the truth of this proposition is not in virtue of any convention, linguistic 
or otherwise, but rather is determined by the logical relations between the meanings of 
which the proposition is composed. 
Our final question in this section is to determine whether these considerations 
undermine the pragmatic conventionalism outlined earlier.  And, it seems obvious that 
this objection does apply to Lewis’s pragmatic conventionalism just as much as any more 
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straightforwardly linguistic conventionalist account of analyticity.  For, just as we can ask 
why we adopt the linguistic conventions that we do, and see the only plausible answer in 
the “prior and independent a priori insight” into the relations between the underlying 
meanings, we can also ask why we adopt the attitudinal stances we do.  Why do we 
refuse to allow any evidence to count against the claim that “Bachelors are male”, except 
that we recognize the independent logical relation between the meanings associated with 
these words?  And thus, in both cases, it is not the convention or attitudinal stance that 
makes the sentence true, but rather the independent logical relations of the constituent 
elements of the proposition expressed by the sentence. 
While this objection should be sufficient for us to reject Lewis’ pragmatic 
conventionalist account of analyticity, we may also note in passing some other objections 
that might be made to this account.  First, as with linguistic conventionalism, there is a 
problem in accounting for the infinite number of analytic claims (e.g., therear  an 
infinite number of tautologies that consist of a conditional with a consequent that 
includes the antecedent as one of its disjuncts: P  (  v Q), P  (P v (Q v R)), P  (P v 
(Q v (R v S))), … ).  How could it be that they are all analytic because we decide, in each 
case, to hold them true no matter what?  It is impossible for us to deliberately adopt such 
a stance for each analytic claim, and yet if this is the source of analyticity, then we cannot 
account for their status.  Second, the pragmatist account is not faithful to "the feel of 
things".  Although this may seem rather vague, consider that the pragmatist is sking us 
to use as a criterion the attitudinal stance an individual takes towards a sentence.  So, it 
seems fair to include in our assessment of the account whether this is faithfulto how we 
in fact feel towards purportedly analytic claims.  Do we feel like we are deliberately 
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choosing to hold these sentences true?  On the contrary, at least with respect to many 
claims we are disposed to label “analytic” it feels more like we are compelled to hold 
them true.  Moreover, this feeling of compulsion seems to stem from a desire to avoid 
contradiction.  But, if our attitudes determine whether the claim is analytic or not, they 
should also determine whether there is any contradiction, and so, we should not feel any 
“external” sense of contradiction that needs to be avoided, as our internal attitudes are 
what determine the presence of absence of contradiction, and we would always be 
capable of simply changing our attitude so that there is no contradiction.  Third, the 
account presupposes a prior acceptance of logical truths, and thus cannot be used to 
account for all analytic truths.  The account presupposes the truths of logic in that it uses 
notions such as “potentially conflicting evidence”, but how do we even recognize that 
something is even potentially in conflict with our claim?  We have to already have an 
understanding of logical contradiction for us to recognize the possibility that something 
might "count against" our claim for us to adopt the attitude of not allowing anything to 
count against it.  Fourth, and finally, the pragmatist account still seems (like all 
conventionalist accounts) to at best account for how we could know something is true, 
rather than for what makes the claim true.  Along this line, we might think we can know 
that a sentence is true simply because we have adopted the requisite attitudinal s ance, 
which has the same effect as adopting the linguistic convention to use the words in the 
sentence in such a way “to make the sentence true”.  But, we have seen there are good 
reasons for thinking this description of the relation of the meanings of the words to the 
truth of the sentence to be incorrect.  We can steadfastly hold that a sentence is true no 
matter what, but this is tantamount to adopting a linguistic convention regarding the 
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words in the sentence, and we have seen that such a linguistic convention does not “make 
the sentence true”.  Rather, this merely indicates our decision to associate words with 
meanings that, quite independently of our conventions (or attitudinal stances), are such 
that the proposition expressed by the sentence is true.  And, even the claim that we can 
know which claims are true using this account of analyticity can be challenged.  For, how 
do we know which claims to stubbornly hold onto no matter what?  What criteria do we 
use to identify them and distinguish them from those we will give up?  Do we not, 
ultimately, have to provide some other criterion for determining which claims are 
analytic?  And if so, it is this criterion, and not linguistic convention or attitudinal stance, 
which allows us to know which claims are analytic. 
 
VI.  Limitations of the Problems with Conventionalism With Regard to Analyticity 
 
The problems with a conventionalist account of analyticity are quite serious, and 
the criticisms of any such account appear to be devastating.  And, from my personal 
perspective, linguistic conventionalism involves a serious misunderstanding of the natur  
of analyticity, the role of language, the status of linguistic conventions, and the 
relationship between language and meaning.  However, with that said, none of the 
problems with conventionalism are inherent in analyticity itself, but rather, only affect an 
account of analyticity that relies on conventions.  Thus, while devastating for such 
accounts, they have no impact whatsoever on an alternative account that does not attempt 
to found analyticity on conventions.  Later, we will examine such an alternative account 
of analyticity, and at that point we will be in a better position to see how it avoids the 
problems that plague conventionalist accounts. 
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This concludes our examination of conventionalist accounts of analyticity and the 
major problems inherent in such accounts.  In the next chapter we will begin our 
examination of other arguments against analyticity, beginning with those presented by 
Quine in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (Quine 1953). 
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Chapter 4: Arguments Against Analyticity, Part I 
 
 
I. Quine’s Problems with Meaning: Part 1 – Two Dogmas 
 
Although, as noted above, Quine presented criticisms of the conventionalist account 
of analyticity as early as 1936, in “Truth By Convention”, those criticisms were cl arly 
restricted to the attempt to base analyticity on linguistic conventions (and its role in the 
attempt to reduce mathematics to logic), and did not imply a rejection of the concept f 
analyticity itself.  And, in fact, in a key passage in “Truth By Convention”, Quine appears 
to embrace the analytic/synthetic distinction, conceding that “this contrast ret ins reality 
as a contrast between more and less firmly accepted statements” (Quine 1976, 102).  
Granted, this does not sound too far removed from the later Quinean depiction of  a “web 
of belief”, with no firm distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, but only a 
difference of degree of willingness to cling to or reject a statement in the light of 
“recalcitrant experience” (Quine 1953, 43).  However, Quine goes further, and grants th t 
“There are statements which we choose to surrender last, if at all” (Quine 1976, 102), 
which still emphasizes his view that it is a choice (based on pragmatic grounds) as to 
which statements to modify or reject.  However, in the same sentence, Quine appears to 
go even one crucial step further, and acknowledges that “there are some [statements] 
which we will not surrender at all” (Quine 1976, 102).  Further, Quine claims that “these 
statements are destined to be maintained independently of our observations of the world” 
(Quine 1976, 102).  The first of these last two claims could have been made by C. I. 
Lewis, since it seems to accept his notion that it is an attitudinal stance of ours not to 
“surrender” such statements.  And, the last claim would be embraced by both Lewis and a 
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positivist like Ayer.  So, it would seem that Quine’s early work did not involve a 
rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction per se, but only the linguistic 
conventionalism which has already been noted to have serious problems.  For Quine’s 
criticisms of the distinction itself, we will need to turn to his arguments in “Two Dogmas 
of Empiricism” and Word and Object.  We will take these in order, beginning with the 
arguments presented in “Two Dogmas”. 
 
A. Quine’s “No Acceptable Explanation” Argument  
 
The first argument we will examine is Quine’s argument against the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, based on the claim that there has been no acceptable 
explanation of the notion of analyticity.  This argument is presented in the first fou  
sections of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, and has sometimes been referred to as “The 
Circularity Argument” (cf, Chapter 16 of Soames’ Philosophical Analysis in the 
Twentieth Century, Volume 1).  As I think will become clear, Quine’s main claim is that 
analyticity has not been given a satisfactory explanation, and the charge of circularity is 
actually just one way in which the various attempts to explain analyticity have failed.  
Despite the attention Quine’s “Two Dogmas” has received, and the undeniable influence 
it has had, the actual arguments it presents are not always clearly understoo .  In fact, it is 
almost taken as an article of faith (a “dogma”, if you will) that Quine demonstrated in 
“Two Dogmas” that there is no legitimate distinction between analytic and synthetic 
statements, although many would be hard pressed to say just how the argument that is 
supposed to have established this goes.  Thus, it will be worth our while to devote some 
time to a fairly close sketch of this argument. 
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Section 1 begins with some brief historical background and the first attempted 
account of analyticity that Quine addresses: “analytic statements define  as statements 
whose denials are self-contradictory” (Quine 1953, 20).  In his response to this proposed 
definition of analyticity, Quine presents the essence of his criticism of all the accounts he 
considers (and, he apparently thinks any account will have the same problem): “But this 
definition has small explanatory value; for the notion of self-contradictoriness, in the 
broad sense needed for this definition of analyticity, stands in exactly the same need of 
clarification as does the notion of analyticity itself” (Quine 1953, 20). 
Quine shall repeat this theme multiple times, for other proposed definitions and 
accounts of analyticity, but first he considers Kant’s second criterion of analyticity, that 
of conceptual containment.  For this account, Quine simply echoes two common 
criticisms: (1) it is limited to claims that may be put in a subject-predicate form, and (2) 
the notion of containment is metaphorical, and overly vague.  However, Quine proceeds 
to construe Kant’s intent to be to subscribe to a conception of analyticity in terms of 
meaning, whereby “a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings and 
independently of fact” (Quine 1953, 21). 
After three paragraphs discussing the distinctions between meaning and naming (for 
singular terms), and meaning and extension (for general terms, or predicates), Quine 
briefly considers the “Aristotelian notion of essence” (Quine 1953, 22).  Although 
Morton G. White sees a close connection between the “dualisms” of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction and the distinction between essential and accidental 
properties (White 1970), Quine claims there is “an important difference between this 
attitude and the doctrine of meaning” (Quine 1953, 22).  Taking the example of the 
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(purportedly) essential property of rationality and the (clearly) accidental property of 
two-leggedness, he argues that while the Aristotelian essentialist will claim there is a 
fundamental difference between the relations of these two properties to the individual 
man, the modern-day empiricist (the target of Quine’s criticisms of analyticity) cannot 
make such a claim.  Quine concludes that “from the point of view of the doctrine of 
meaning it makes no sense to say of the actual individual, who is at once a man and a 
biped, that his rationality is essential and his two-leggedness accidental or vice versa” 
(Quine 1953, 22).  This much appears to be correct, for the proponent of “the doctrine of 
meaning” is not claiming that it is “essential” (analytic) of the individual entity that it is 
either rational or two-legged.  Rather, the analytic claims in this example are about the 
relations between the various meanings involved, and not the individual.  However, while 
Quine is right to note a difference between the two distinctions of essential/accidental 
properties and analytic/synthetic claims, it does not follow that a proponent of the 
doctrine of meaning cannot also hold to the distinction between essential and accident l 
properties.  In fact, one might see a rather close connection between the analytic/synthetic 
distinction and a form of sortal essentialism.  Further, while Quine’s main point is that 
the Aristotelian essentialist is not talking about the relations of meanings to other 
meanings, but the relation between properties and things, it does not follow that the 
proponent of the doctrine of meaning may not also distinguish these relations.  To take 
Quine’s example, one might say that while the individual is both a man and a biped, the 
individual could lose the property of two-leggedness and yet retain their identity, they 
could not lose the property of rationality and remain the same individual, even though the 
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relations between the meaning of ‘man’ and rationality and the meaning of ‘biped’ and 
two-leggedness are both analytic. 
Quine next turns to the question “what sort of things are meanings?”.  Although 
seemingly disconnected at this time, and with no specific target cited for his c iticism, 
Quine again refers to a confusion between meaning and reference, as if to imply that 
anyone who accepts the doctrine of meaning must be mistakenly thinking that all 
meaning is reference, and that this is the only reason for having a “felt need for meant 
entities” (Quine 1953, 22).  He hastily leaps to the so-called “short step” of “recognizing 
as the primary business of the theory of meaning simply the synonymy of linguistic forms 
and the analyticity of statements; meanings themselves, as obscure intermediary entities, 
may well be abandoned” (Quine 1953, 22).  That there might be more to meaning than 
the two functions cited by Quine will be dealt with later, but for now, we can at least note 
the gap in Quine’s argument from the recognition of a difference between meaning and 
reference to the dismissal of meanings altogether. 
Having (to his satisfaction at least) dismissed both essences and meanings, Quine 
makes a key move in his overall argument against the analytic/synthetic distin tion.  He 
distinguishes between two classes of (generally accepted as) analytic clims, and this 
passage is central enough to warrant including it here in its entirety: 
Those of the first class, which may be called ogically true, are typified by: 
(1) No unmarried man is married. 
The relevant feature of this example is that it not merely is true as it stands, but 
remains true under any and all reinterpretations of ‘man’ and ‘married’.  If we
suppose a prior inventory of logical particles, comprising ‘no’, ‘un-‘, ‘not’, ‘if’, 
‘then’, ‘and’, etc., then in general a logical truth is a statement which is true and 
remains true under all reinterpretations of its components other than the logical 
particles. 
But there is also a second class of analytic statements, typified by: 
(2) No bachelor is married. 
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The characteristic of such a statement is that it can be turned into a logical truth by 
putting synonyms for synonyms; thus (2) can be turned into (1) by putting 
'unmarried man' for its synonym 'bachelor'. (Quine 1953, 22 – 23) 
 
There is actually more than one reason why this passage merits close scrutiny.  The first 
of these reasons we shall deal with presently. 
 First of all, this distinction is key for Quine since he acknowledges the first class 
of “logical truths” as legitimate analytic statements, while ultimately rejecting the second 
class.  Second, his reason for rejecting the second class is his primary reason for rejecting 
the notion of analyticity in general.  This reason becomes apparent as Quine contues in 
this passage:  
We still lack a proper characterization of this second class of analytic statements, 
and therewith of analyticity generally, inasmuch as we have had in the above 
description to lean on a notion of 'synonymy' which is no less in need of 
clarification than analyticity itself. (Quine 1953, 23) 
 
So, just as Quine deemed the notion of self-contradictoriness to be inadequately clarified, 
and thus insufficient to explain the concept of analyticity, he also rejects the notion of 
synonymy for the same reason. 
 Quine briefly considers Carnap’s “state-descriptions”, which consist of an 
“exhaustive assignment of truth values to the atomic, or noncompound, statements” 
(Quine 1953, 23) of a language.  Under this account, a claim that was true under every 
state description would be analytic.  However, as Quine points out, this account of 
analyticity cannot help us with regard to the second class of analytic claims, since if 
‘John is a bachelor’ and ‘John is married” are treated as atomic statements, th  it would 
allow a state description in which both are assigned the value “true”.  It is only our 
knowledge of the relationship between the meanings of ‘bachelor’ and ‘married’ that 
prevents this, and if we appeal to this kind of relationship in limiting the possible state 
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descriptions, we will be relying on a notion of meaning that Quine considers as much in 
need of clarification as analyticity itself.  So Quine concludes, “the criterion of analyticity 
in terms of state-descriptions serves only for languages devoid of extra-logic l synonym-
pairs, such as ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’” (Quine 1953, 23).  And thus Quine turns 
to the next candidate for a basis of analyticity, definitions. 
 Definitions have often been appealed to as the basis of analytic truths, and Quine, 
recognizing the temptation to think they are a serious contender for such a role, devotes
an entire section to them.  However, given our previous discussion of the problems with 
linguistic conventionalism, of which the appeal to definitions is a primary case, we 
should not be surprised if both Quine rejects such an account, and that we find his case 
rather convincing.  However, although Quine had previously successfully criticized 
linguistic conventionalism in his article “Truth By Convention”, he does not simply re-
state that criticism in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”.  In Truth By Convention”, his 
argument was that linguistic conventions cannot provide the foundation of logical truths 
because they rely on the very logical truths they would be attempting to be the basis of.  
But in section 2 of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, “Definition”, Quine’s target is instead 
the notion that definition can serve as an account of the analyticity of the second class of 
analytic statements, not as a basis of logical (or mathematical) truths. 
 Quine rejects definitions as providing an explanation of synonymy (and thereby 
of analyticity in general), since, as he claims, definitions do not create or provide the 
basis of synonymy, but rather, rest on the “antecedent facts” of “pre-existing 
synonymies” (Quine 1953, 24-25).  For Quine, the standard dictionary definitions amount 
to “reports upon usage” (Quine 1953, 25), which reflect the lexicographer’s belief that a 
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relation of synonymy exists between the definiens and the definiendum.  His report on his 
belief in a relation of synonymy, Quine argues, cannot be the basis for the synonym.  As 
Quine puts it: “Certainly the "definition" which is the lexicographer's repo t of an 
observed synonymy cannot be taken as the ground of synonymy” (Quine 1953, 24). 
 Having thus dealt with standard definitions, Quine briefly considers “a variant 
type of definitional activity”, “explication”, in which “the purpose is not merely to 
paraphrase the definiendum into an outright synonym, but actually to improve upon the 
definiendum by refining or supplementing its meaning” (Quine 1953, 25).  However, 
Quine claims explication, while not relying on a direct synonymy of the term b ing 
explicated, “does rest nevertheless on other pre-existing synonymies” (Quine 1953, 25), 
and thus also cannot serve as the original basis for synonymy in general. 
 Finally, Quine turns to “an extreme sort of definition which does not hark back to 
prior synonymies at all; namely, the explicitly conventional introduction of novel 
notations for purposes of sheer abbreviation” (Quine 1953, 25 – 26).  Quine’s views on 
such stipulative definitions are problematic, and following all their implications will take 
us beyond this section.  Thus, since neither Quine’s position on stipulative definitions, 
nor our discussion of them is directly connected to Quine’s central “No Acceptable 
Explanation” argument, or even Quine’s discussion of other kinds of definitions, we shall 
defer our examination of Quine’s comments on stipulative definitions until the next 
chapter. 
Having dealt with definitions, Quine next takes up the suggestion that “the 
synonymy of two linguistic forms consists simply in their interchangeability in all 
contexts without change of truth value” (Quine 1953, 27).  Quine first notes that 
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“bachelor” and “unmarried man” (his prime example of a candidate for synonymy) are 
not “everywhere interchangeable salva veritate” (Quine 1953, 28).  Providing examples 
of phrases like “bachelor of arts” and uses within quotations, he concedes that these may 
be avoided by limiting our criterion of interchangeability salva veritate to only whole 
words and not mere fragments of words. 
Even restricting our criterion further to purely cognitive synonymy, which does not 
encompass “complete identity in psychological associations or poetic quality” (Quine 
1953, 28), Quine still claims that this concept of cognitive synonymy must be explained 
without presupposing analyticity.  Quine presents an argument that purports to show that 
“such interchangeability is a sufficient condition for cognitive synonymy” (Quine 1953, 
29), but finds that the argument relies on the adverb “necessarily”, and to suppose that 
this adverb is sufficiently understood “is to suppose that we have already made 
satisfactory sense of 'analytic'” (Quine 1953, 29).  But, this explanation would be circular.  
For, in attempting to explain synonymy, we appealed to interchangeability salva veritate, 
but in showing that this was a sufficient condition for cognitive synonymy, we had to 
appeal to a conception of necessity that presupposed analyticity.  And, this presupposition 
is circular since we were attempting to explain analyticity in terms of synonymy. 
Quine examines the possibility of an extensional language, a language without 
“debatable devices such as contrary-to-fact conditionals or modal adverbs like 
‘necessarily’” (Quine 1953, 30).  However, he finds that in such a language 
“interchangeability salva veritate is no assurance of cognitive synonymy of the desired 
type” (Quine 1953, 30), since many expressions (e.g., “creature with a heart” and 
“creature with kidneys”) agree in their extension, but it is clear to us that they are not 
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cognitively synonymous.  The apparent failure to explain analyticity in terms of 
synonymy prompts Quine to abandon this approach and return to analyticity itself. 
Quine next considers artificial languages and the semantical rules such as those 
provided by Carnap.  These rules explicitly delineate which statements of the language 
are analytic. However, Quine claims these can only explain what it is for a statement to 
be analytic for a given language, and not analyticity in general.  And, repeating his 
previous criticism of rejecting an explanation of analyticity if it relies upon a concept as 
much in need of explanation as analyticity itself, Quine claims “Still there is really no 
progress.  Instead of appealing to an unexplained word 'analytic', we are now appealing to 
an unexplained phrase 'semantical rule'” and, without an account of what constitutes uch 
rules, “[s]emantical rules are distinguishable … only by the fact of appearing on a page 
under the heading ‘Semantical Rules’; and this heading is itself meaningless” (Quine 
1953, 34).  Thus, Quine’s criticism is the same here as it was for previous accounts, 
which, according to Quine, rely on concepts “as much in need of clarification” (Quine 
1953, 34) as the concept they are intended to explain. 
While Quine recognizes that he has not examined all the possible accounts of 
analyticity, he does believe he has canvassed a sufficient number and range of the most
commonly proposed accounts, and that similar arguments will apply to any possible 
account of analyticity: “Not all the explanations of analyticity known to Carnap and his 
readers have been covered explicitly in the above considerations, but the extension to 
other forms is not hard to see” (Quine 1953, 36).  Thus, finding all the proposed 
explanations wanting, Quine concludes: “a boundary between analytic and synthetic 
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statements simply has not been drawn”, and “[t]hat there is a distinction to be drawn at all 
is an unempirical dogma of empiricism, a metaphysical article of faith” (Quine 1953, 37). 
B. Quine’s “Difficulty in Applying the Distinction” Argument  
 
Quine’s “No Acceptable Explanation” argument is clearly the central argument of 
“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, and the one most philosophers focus on (though as noted 
before, it often is called his “Circularity” argument), but it is not his only argument 
against the analytic/synthetic distinction in the article.  Although presented at the 
beginning of his section on “Semantical Rules”, and thus in the midst of the presentation 
of his “No Acceptable Explanation” argument, Quine offers a significantly different 
argument against analyticity.  This argument is not based on a charge of circularity or 
lack of sufficient explanation, but rather on a purported “difficulty in separating analytic 
statements from synthetic ones” (Quine 1953, 32). 
Given the brevity with which Quine treats this argument, we can present it in its 
entirety here: 
I do not know whether the statement 'Everything green is extended' is analytic. Now 
does my indecision over this example really betray an incomplete understanding, a 
incomplete grasp of the "meanings", of 'green' and 'extended'?  I think not.  The 
trouble is not with 'green' or 'extended', but with 'analytic'. (Quine 1953, 32) 
 
With this brief passage, Quine argues that since there are (apparently) cases in which we 
have difficulty applying the analytic/synthetic distinction, that the distinctio  is not 
legitimate.  Although not entirely clear, Quine appears to be claiming that it is because 
the concept of analyticity is not well enough understood that we are unable to determin  
its applicability to cases like ‘Everything green is extended’.  After all, this would seem 
to be the point of his claiming that the “trouble” is with the word ‘analytic’.  Later, we 
 81 
shall assess the merits of this argument, but for now, it seems straightforward enough that 
we may continue with the exposition of another of Quine’s more peripheral arguments in 
“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. 
 
C. Quine’s “Meanings are Unnecessary Intermediary Entities” Argument  
 
The rejection of meanings, arguably a key move in Quine’s overall argumentative 
strategy, is done in a brief, casual manner.  In one short paragraph, Quine dismisses 
meanings, and again, given its brevity, we can include this paragraph in its entirety: 
For the theory of meaning a conspicuous question is the nature of its objects: what 
sort of things are meanings?  A felt need for meant entities may derive from an 
earlier failure to appreciate that meaning and reference are distinct.  O e the 
theory of meaning is sharply separated from the theory of reference, it is a short 
step to recognizing as the primary business of the theory of meaning simply the 
synonymy of linguistic forms and the analyticity of statements; meanings 
themselves, as obscure intermediary entities, may well be abandoned. (Quine 
1953, 22) 
 
This is all that Quine has to say about this topic in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, but he 
adds a footnote at the end of this paragraph, citing passages in two other articles in From 
a Logical Point of View.   
Following one of these citations takes us to a passage in “On What There Is” in 
which Quine is arguing against the views of a philosophical protagonist he refers to by 
the name “McX”.  McX represents a form of Platonism which posits an “ontology of 
universals”.  Quine again criticizes this position as being based on a confusion of 
meaning with naming.  However, he considers a variation of this view that distinguihes 
meaning from naming and recognizes that predicates are not names of attributes, but still 
claims that predicates have meanings, and that “these m anings, whether they are named 
or not, are still universals” (Quine 1953, 11).  But, Quine rejects this position as well, 
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granting that “the only way I know to counter it is by refusing to admit meanings” (Quine 
1953, 11). 
However, Quine does not feel that rejecting meanings is giving up anything of 
significance (as inconsistent as that may sound).  For, he believes that he maystill make 
sense of all the linguistic practices and talk that ordinarily would appear to require 
references to meanings without them.  As he puts it, he claims that even though he rejects 
meanings, “I do not thereby deny that words and statements are meaningful” (Quine
1953, 11).  On the contrary, he believes that any “useful” way we appear to talk so as to 
commit us to meanings can be done without them.  This is an important move for Quine, 
since the strongest argument in favor of countenancing meanings would appear to be 
based on the claim that we cannot account for at least some of the things we want to say 
without appealing to meanings. 
Quine presents his argument that we need not rely on meanings in the following 
paragraph: 
The useful ways in which people ordinarily talk or seem to talk about meanings 
boil down to two: the having of meanings, which is significance, and sameness of 
meaning, or synonymy.  What is called giving the meaning of an utterance is 
simply the uttering of a synonym, couched, ordinarily, in clearer language than 
the original.  If we are allergic to meanings as such, we can speak directly of 
utterances as significant or insignificant, and as synonymous or heteronymous one 
with another.  The problem of explaining these adjectives ‘significant’ and 
synonymous’ with some degree of clarity and rigor – preferably, as I see it, in 
terms of behavior – is as difficult as it is important.  But the explanatory value of 
special and irreducible intermediary entities called meanings is surely illusory” 
(Quine 1953, 11- 12) 
 
Putting this argument more formally we get the following: 
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(1) There are only two ways in which we “usefully” talk about meanings: (a) 
claiming that an utterance is significant, and (b) claiming that two utteranc s are 
synonymous. 
(2) Both of these two ways of talking about meanings may be faithfully represented 
directly, without any appeal to meanings. 
(3) Therefore, meanings are unnecessary to account for the “useful” ways we talk 
about meanings. 
This argument is what makes Quine conclude that “we can view utterances as significant, 
and as synonymous or heteronymous with one another, without countenancing a realm of 
entities called meanings” (Quine 1953, 12). 
 Tracing Quine’s second citation, we find this view is echoed in the article 
“Meaning in Linguistics”, where he claims we can treat contexts in which we refer to 
meanings in the two “useful” ways delineated above “in the spirit of” two words.  For the 
context, ‘alike in meaning’, we treat the context “in the spirit of” the word ‘synoymous’, 
and for the context, ‘having meaning’, we treat the context “in the spirit of” the word 
‘significant’.  These “maneuvers” keep us from “being tempted to seek meanings as 
intermediary entities” (Quine 1953, 48) and allow us to “continue to turn our backs on the 
supposititious entities called meanings” (Quine 1953, 48). 
 
D. Quine’s Rejection of the Verification Theory of Meaning and Reductionism  
 
 
In section 5 of “Two Dogmas”, Quine takes up the verification theory of meaning 
and reductionism, as he considers these to be “intimately connected” to the 
analytic/synthetic distinction.  For Quine, the analytic/synthetic distinctio  is connected 
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to the verification theory of meaning in that the verification theory can be used to 
underwrite the notions of analyticity and synonymy.  For, since the verification theory 
states that “the meaning of a statement is the method of empirically confirming or 
infirming it” (Quine 1953, 37), two statements will be seen to have the same meaning, 
i.e., will be synonymous, “if and only if they are alike in point of method of empirical 
confirmation or information” (Quine 1953, 37).  Alternatively, we can define analyticity 
in terms of empirical confirmation:  “An analytic statement is that limiting case which is 
confirmed no matter what” (Quine 1953, 37). So, clearly for Quine, the verification 
theory is relevant to his attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction, since he b lieves that 
“if the verification theory can be accepted as an adequate account of statement 
synonymy, the notion of analyticity is saved after all” (Quine 1953, 38). 
However, as quickly becomes apparent, Quine has misgivings about the verification 
theory of meaning.  In particular, he questions the relationship “between a statement and 
the experiences which contribute to or detract from its confirmation” (Quine 1953, 38).  
Pursuing this question leads Quine to what he terms “radical reductionism”, which is the 
view that every meaningful statement can be translated (or “reduced”) into “a s atement 
(true or false) about immediate experience” (Quine uses the singular here, though many 
would also countenance as reductionist a view that held that it may also be multiple 
statements, so long as they are all about immediate experience).  In this sense, more 
abstract statements like “Jones owns a house” are “reducible” to statements about the 
Register of Deeds Office having filed a piece of paper that says “Deed” on it, with Jones’ 
name following the word “Owner” (or whatever would be considered suitably 
“immediate” – and of course that is a very difficult problem for reductionism). 
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Citing Carnap’s serious attempt to carry out such a reduction in Der Logische 
Aufbau derWelt, Quine notes not merely its sketchiness but, more importantly, its falling 
short even in principle of reducing statements about physical objects to statements in 
“Carnap's initial language of sense data and logic” (Quine 1953, 40). Carnap himself
even appears to have eventually concluded that such reductionism is untenable, since he 
abandoned the project.  For Quine, the absence of even a sketch of how a successful 
reduction could be undertaken is sufficient to deem the continued (albeit often implicit) 
acceptance of reductionism as a “dogma”.  And, in rejecting the “subtler and more 
tenuous form” of this dogma, i.e., that for every synthetic statement there is a s t of 
observations that would help to confirm or disconfirm the statement, Quine claims that it 
is not individual statements, but only entire theories that “face the tribunal of sense
experience” (Quine 1953, 41).  For Quine, it is the dogma of reductionism that supports 
the analytic/synthetic distinction, since even in its “attenuated form”, it allows for the 
confirmation and disconfirmation of individual statements, and thereby creates the logical 
space for “a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously confirmed, ipso facto, come 
what may; and such a statement is analytic” (Quine 1953, 41).  Thus, Quine rejects both 
the analytic/synthetic distinction and the notion that individual statements have the kind 
of logical connection to observations that reductionism asserts.  Instead, he claims: “The 
unit of empirical significance is the whole of science” (Quine 1953, 42). 
Finally, in section 6, “Empiricism without the Dogmas”, Quine presents his positive 
views on the relationship between observations and our beliefs.  However, these views 
have much more in common with Quine’s later arguments against analyticity involving 
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indeterminacy, semantic holism, and meaning skepticism, and so they will be treated in 
the next chapter. 
 
 
II.  Replies to Arguments  
 
We will now turn to replies to each of the arguments against analyticity presented 
thus far.  This will include Quine’s central argument in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, 
his argument that the analytic/synthetic distinction must be rejected since we have no 
acceptable explanation of the concept of analyticity.  In addition, we will also as ess two 
secondary arguments that Quine makes in passing in “Two Dogmas”, the first based on a 
supposed difficulty in applying the analytic/synthetic distinction, and the second which 
urges the rejection of entities since they are peculiar entities.  Finally, we will examine 
Quine’s view on stipulative definitions in some detail.  Even though this last section is 
not per se regarding a reply to an argument against analyticity, it should still aid us in 
both understanding Quine’s views and possible objections to those views. 
 
A. Quine’s "No Acceptable Explanation" Argument 
 
The conclusion of Quine’s "No Acceptable Explanation" argument, at least as it is 
stated at the end of section 4, seems appropriately cautious: “a boundary between analytic 
and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn” (Quine 1953, 37).  Given that his 
argument does not show there is no distinction, but merely that the concepts that are 
typically offered in explaining analyticity lack sufficient clarification, he concludes that 
we simply do not know what constitutes analyticity, and thus do not have an adequate 
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basis to ground a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.  So much for 
Quine’s conclusion, now let us turn to his argument. 
It might be helpful to actually explicitly construct Quine's argument.  For all his 
discussion of the various attempts to explain analyticity, the overall structure of Quine’s 
argument is extremely simple and straightforward: 
 (1) There is no acceptable account of analyticity. 
 (2) Absent an acceptable account/explanation of analyticity, the 
analytic/synthetic distinction should be abandoned 
 Therefore, (3) the analytic/synthetic distinction should be abandoned. 
Now, let us consider the possible replies to this argument. 
First, it should be noted that Quine really is arguing that there is no acceptable 
explanation, and not just that some explanations have failed to be acceptable.  As noted 
previously, others have called Quine’s argument his “Circularity” argument.  But, while 
it is certainly true that Quine claims that many of the accounts of analyticity offered 
presuppose notions that seem similar to the key concept of analyticity, even this is only 
“circular” in a very broad sense, and his main charge even for these sorts of explanations 
is not circularity, but rather that they presuppose notions “just as much in need of 
explanation” rather than that they presuppose analyticity itself.  Further, not all accounts 
are even rejected for this reason. In rejecting Kant's second account, which "appeals to a 
notion of containment" (Quine 1953, 21), Quine criticizes it not for any form of 
circularity, but rather for being limited to statements of a subject-predicate form and for 
being too metaphorical.  One would think Quine considers the latter criticism the more 
essential, since, even if he is right about the first limitation, if it were the only problem, 
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then, while Kant’s notion of containment might not account for all the statements that are 
typically considered to be analytic, it still would account for some, and this would seem 
to be sufficient to ground a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. 
But even if Quine has shown that none of the accounts he surveyed provide an 
adequate explanation of the concept of analyticity, how can he conclude that there isno 
acceptable explanation?  A fairly obvious response, if this is the gist of Quine’s 
argument, is that, while none of the accounts he examined were found by him to be 
satisfactory, it does not follow that there are none.  And, since there are other 
explanations that Quine did not cover, he cannot conclude that there is no acceptable 
explanation. So, one response to Quine’s argument is to challenge premise (1). 
More force can be put behind this challenge by noting actual alternative accounts 
of analyticity that Quine did not address.  In particular, consider Benson Mates’ proposal 
of “a condition of adequacy for definitions of “synonymity”” (Mates 1970, 103), or Grice 
and Strawson's account of logical impossibility (Grice and Strawson 1970), either of 
which would, if successful, refute premise (1) of Quine’s argument (since Quine gra ts
that these concepts are in the same set of closely related concepts as analyticity, nd upon 
which we could base an account of analyticity proper).  And even if Quine perhaps would 
not find these accounts acceptable, then we could argue that another account could still 
be found/constructed. 
Another response to Quine’s demand for an explanation of analyticity is to claim 
that even if we cannot provide the kind of formal account he appears to be demanding, 
we do have an informal, but still perfectly adequate account of analyticity and the other 
concepts Quine challenges.  Grice and Strawson make this point in noting that their 
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account of logical impossibility “does not yield a formal statement of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the application of the notion concerned” (Grice and Strawson 
1970, 67).  Yet they believe that the distinction they offer, “that between not believing 
something and not understanding something” (Grice and Strawson 1970, 67), while 
informal, and such that further clarification would be desirable, is still sufficient to 
establish that there is a distinction to be made.  
Mates makes a related and important point when he notes how we must have at 
least some conception of these concepts to even attempt to apply them and determine 
whether a given criterion adequately captures them: 
Yet it is important to observe that this very research could hardly be carried out 
unless we possessed in advance a sufficiently precise characterization of 
synonymity to enable us to decide under what conditions we would regard two 
expressions as synonymous for a given person. (Mates 1970, 102) 
 
This might even be thought to pose a more serious problem for Quine, since it could be 
argued that he presupposes the very concepts he calls into question when he argues that a 
given account does not accurately reflect our semantic intuitions.  For example, when 
Quine recognizes that “extensional agreement falls far short of cognitive synonymy” 
(Quine 1953, 31), and cites the extensional agreement of “creature with a heart” and 
“creature with kidneys”, he must have some idea of what cognitive synonymy is to even 
reject extensional agreement as a criterion of cognitive synonymy. 
Nevertheless, this general line of response could encourage us to agree with Grice 
and Strawson’s conclusion: 
In the face of the availability of this informal type of explanation for the notio s 
of the analyticity group, the fact that they have not received another type of 
explanation (which it is dubious whether any expressions ever receive) seems a 
wholly inadequate ground for the conclusion that the notions are pseudo-notions, 
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that the expressions which purport to express them have no sense. (Grice and 
Strawson 1970, 67) 
 
Before turning to other responses, we might pause at this point to consider how 
Quine can argue for premise (1)?  How could he show not merely that the accounts he 
has considered have been found (by him at least) to be inadequate to explain the concept 
of analyticity (or any of the closely related concepts), but that there is no such account?  
In order to do this, it would seem that he would have to argue that such an account is 
impossible.  But then, we would naturally want to know what kind of claim this would 
be?  Quine seems very much committed to adhering to a naturalistic approach, yet the 
rejection of the possibility of an adequate explanation of analyticity as impossible in 
principle has a very a priori sound to it.   
All that Quine provides for guidance on this question seems to be that, while he 
recognizes there may be other explanations of analyticity, he believes that his arguments 
against the accounts he has examined are such that “the extension to other forms is n t 
hard to see” (Quine 1953, 36).  This lends credibility to the interpretation that Quine 
thinks not merely that there happen to be no acceptable explanations of analyticity, but 
that there can be none.  This would also seem plausible given that his arguments against 
the accounts he does consider focus on the issue that (nearly) all of them appear to 
presuppose a concept that at least Quine considers to be too closely related to analyticity 
(and thus involve a form of “broadly circular” explanation) or invoke concepts that are 
“no less in need of clarification than analyticity itself” (Quine 1953, 23).  This, coupled 
with Quine’s comment about “the extension to other forms”, would lead one to believe 
that Quine is arguing that there can be no acceptable explanation of analyticity, be ause 
all even seemingly plausible accounts will always involve one of the other concepts in the 
 91 
“family-circle” of concepts.  Grice and Strawson use the phrase “family-circle, and 
although Quine does not, it is a convenient way to refer to the set of concepts Quine 
appears to have in mind, and which would enable us to understand why he would think 
the treatment of the accounts he does consider could be extended to other accounts.  So 
long as these other accounts appeal to any concept that is a member of the family-circle 
of concepts, they will, or so Quine would argue, be just as susceptible to the charge that 
they are broadly circular or rely on concepts that are just as much in need of explanation 
as analyticity (or both). 
This would allow us to construct, on Quine’s behalf, the following argument in 
support of premise (1): 
(1a) All (apparently plausible) explanations of analyticity ultimately r  on 
concepts in the family-circle of concepts. 
(1b) Any explanation of analyticity that relies on a concept in the family-circle of 
concepts is either broadly circular or relies on concepts that are just asmuch in need of 
explanation as analyticity (or both) – and is thus unacceptable. 
Therefore, (1) there is no acceptable account of analyticity. 
One could question both (1a) and (1b), and, in fact, Grice and Strawson do just that, 
claiming that their account of logical impossibility “breaks out of the family circle” 
(Grice and Strawson 1970, 67).  However, even Grice and Strawson’s account could be 
claimed to rely on a member of the family circle, since their distinction between not 
believing and not understanding is actually a distinction between not believing and not 
understanding what someone means, i.e., not understanding the meaning of the words 
someone is using.  Grice and Strawson’s description of their own example, in which an 
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individual, Y, makes the claim “My neighbor’s three-year-old child is an adult”, has us 
questioning what Y means by this claim, and eventually imagines us concluding that we 
do not understand what Y means and even “to suspect that he just does not know the 
meaning of some of the words he is using” (emphasis added).  So, it seems clear that 
their account relies on meaning, and Quine has certainly indicated that, for him, this is 
not an acceptable basis for analyticity.  In this case, Quine’s criticism of meaning as a 
basis for analyticity would not be due so much to a charge of circularity, even the broad 
kind, but rather because for him meaning is a concept that is just as much in need of 
explanation as analyticity.   
 However, in looking for an account of analyticity that does not rely on members 
of the family circle, we do not need to rely solely on Grice and Strawson’s example.  In 
fact, the attempt to ground analyticity in the notion of “containment”, limited as it is to 
statements of subject-predicate form in Kant’s treatment, and even given Quine’s qualms 
about its metaphorical nature, does not appear to rely on any members of the family-
circle of concepts.  And, lest we think analyticity as grounded in containment is merely a 
historical notion, Jerrold Katz champions it to this day.  Katz distinguishes concept-
containment from logical containment, and gives credit for it to Locke (and even earlier, 
Arnauld and Nicole), not Kant.  While arguably well worth pursuing, we shall not 
address these questions further here.  Instead, let us move on to other considerations and 
responses to Quine’s overall argument. 
Although there is reason to think the above is Quine’s argument (or at least one he 
would endorse), a plausibly more charitable interpretation views Quine as claiming that it 
is sufficient that, since (in his view) we currently lack an acceptable explanation of 
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analyticity, we are not now entitled to avail ourselves of the analytic/synthetic distinction.  
But even this more charitable reading is open to the responses cited above, i.e., that there 
are (currently) acceptable explanations of analyticity, either of the formal or less formal 
variety, and thus that even this slightly revised argument fails to establish its less 
ambitious conclusion. 
Rather than challenge premise (1) of Quine’s “No Acceptable Explanation” 
argument, we could challenge premise (2):  
(2) Absent an acceptable account/explanation of analyticity, the analytic/syn hetic 
distinction should be abandoned 
This is the tactic of one of the responses of Grice and Strawson, for they argue that, given 
what Quine apparently has in mind as criteria for a satisfactory explanation:  
“It would seem fairly clearly unreasonable to insist in general that the availability of a 
satisfactory explanation in the sense sketched above is a necessary condition f an 
expression’s making sense” (Grice and Strawson 1970, 63).  Miller joins with Grice and 
Strawson in questioning Quine’s requirement for, and criteria of, an “acceptabl ” 
explanation (Miller 2007).  Calling the assumption that “a putative concept is not fully 
intelligible unless it admits of an explicit non-circular definition” (Miller 2007, 133), 
“Quine’s Socratic Assumption” (Miller 2007, 134), Miller concludes that “Quine’s 
Socratic requirement on the legitimacy of concepts appears to be unreasonable and 
unmotivated” (Miller 2007, 136).  So, while one may question whether Quine is correct 
in claiming that there is no acceptable explanation, even granting that, one can reje t his 
argument by rejecting premise (2) and his criterion of the legitimacy of concepts. 
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Though not required to reject Quine’s premise (2), we might even investigate 
further the reasons why analyticity does not appear to be susceptible of the kind of 
explanation Quine requires.  One fairly obvious possibility is that analyticity (and what 
Quine considers its corresponding concepts: self-contradictory, sameness of meaning, 
essence, synonymy, definition, modal concepts like necessity, contrary-to-fact 
conditionals, intension, semantical rule, etc.) is a primitive concept (somewhat 
ironically, one might even give credit to Quine for suggesting this route, given the 
thoroughness of his rejection of any of the candidates in the family-circle).  Thus, while it 
cannot be explained in terms of any concept that does not belong to the same set of 
“associated notions” – which Grice and Strawson refer to as “a certain circle or family of 
expressions” (Grice and Strawson 1970, 62) – it, like other primitive concepts, does not 
require such an explanation.  Moreover, to demand such an explanation for primitive 
concepts is misplaced and shows a lack of understanding of the role of such concepts in 
our overall conceptual framework.  Further, as Grice and Strawson point out, we do not 
require such an explanation of other primitive concepts, so Quine owes us an argument 
for why such an explanation is required for analyticity, and why our failure to provide 
one thus far is sufficient grounds for rejecting the analytic/synthetic distinction.  Miller 
interprets what I have called Quine’s “Difficulty in Applying the Distinction” argument 
as an attempt by Quine to provide such an argument, i.e., that its role is to show why 
analyticity requires the kind of explanation he has argued it lacks in his “No Acceptabl  
Explanation” argument. This makes it all the more important that we examine the merits 
of the former argument, as we shall do in the next section.  However, before leaving 
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criticisms of and responses to Quine’s “No Acceptable Explanation” argument, w  will 
present two additional criticisms of this argument and his treatment of analyticity. 
A noteworthy aspect of Quine’s examination of the concept of analyticity, is that 
in his search for acceptable explanations of analyticity, Quine only considers 
“equivalence" type relations, such as synonymy and interchangeability.  Thereare other 
relations, such as meaning inclusion and antonymy, which would certainly appear to 
provide a basis for analytic claims. Thus it is quite remarkable that Quine never even 
mentions these relations.  However, Quine is not alone in this oversight, as nearly all who 
write on analyticity, including defenders of the analytic/synthetic distinctio , focus 
almost exclusively on equivalence relations.  Their discussion often centers on 
synonymy, and the debate revolves around whether there are any two expressions that are 
synonymous, i.e., whether any two expressions have meanings that are identical.  In and 
of itself, this would not be particularly problematic, except that, all parties to the debate 
implicitly assume that, if no expressions are found to have identical meanings, then there 
are no analytic claims, which clearly does not follow. 
First, and most obvious, the very fact that two expressions are not synonymous is 
itself analytic, since it presumably rests upon the meanings of the two expressions and the 
relation these meanings have to each other.  So, it is analytic that the meaning of 
“bachelor” is not synonymous with the meaning of “male”.  The non-identity of 
meanings is itself a meaning relation, just as much as the identity of meanings.  To put 
this in terms of mathematical relations, if, as many, including myself, would claim, 4 = 3 
+ 1 is analytic, so is 4 <> 4 + 1.  This point should be obvious, but it is so often 
overlooked that it is essential to note its implications for the debate on analyticity. For, if 
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we can, as Quine is clearly capable of doing, recognize that two expressions are not 
synonymous, then we have countenanced analyticity. 
I would argue this would be sufficient even if these were not “extra-logical” in 
Quine’s use of that expression (though I would also argue that, ultimately, Quine has o 
basis for distinguishing the “logical’ from the “extra-logical”), but weneed not rely on 
that further point, for it is clear that Quine (and everyone else, for that matter) grants that 
there are “extra-logical” non-synonym-pairs, such as ‘bachelor’ and ‘male’ (or ‘cat’ and 
‘dog’, ‘tall’ and ‘right-handed’, etc.).  So, Quine finds himself (and so does everyone 
else) in the position of “leaning on a notion” of non-synonymy, which is all that is needed 
to establish that there are analytic claims.  And, of course there are still synthetic claims, 
since it is a synthetic claim to say that an individual is male or is a bachelor, or that a dog 
is tall.  So, we should not confuse the point that claims of non-synonymy are analytic, 
which is obviously true, with the claim that all claims involving non-synonymous 
expressions are analytic, which is obviously false.  Thus, since there are both analy ic 
claims and synthetic claims, we (like Quine and everyone else) must grant that there is a 
legitimate analytic/synthetic distinction.  So, ironically, we can follow Quine’s advice 
and “turn our backs on the problem of synonymy” (Quine 1953, 32), for non-synonymy 
is all we need to ground a distinction between analytic and synthetic claims. 
And, non-synonymy is but one of the meaning relations that we might appeal to.  
Realizing that we need not be searching for biconditional relations, as Quine limits his 
search, we need not find cases of both necessary and sufficient conditions, but merely 
necessary, or merely sufficient will suffice.  Thus, cases of what we might call “meaning 
inclusion”, as opposed to “meaning identity” will also be sufficient to establish that there 
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are analytic claims.  This is related to Locke’s and Kant’s concepts of “containment”, but 
what matters to us is that we all recognize the distinction between claims like all tall men 
are men and claims like all tall men are rich, the former being such that the predicate is 
contained in the subject, whereas with the latter this is not the case. 
We might anticipate the reply by Quine that a sentence like “All tall men ar  
men” is a logical truth, and he has already granted these.  And, for Quine, who thinks that 
what matters are the so-called “extra-logical” relations, this would not appear to be a 
problem.  However, this response is flawed in two ways.  First, we can appeal to cases of 
meaning inclusion involving Quine’s purportedly “extra-logical” relations, such as “All 
bachelors are males”.  Notice that, with the question of synonymy not involved, how easy 
it is to recognize that such a claim is analytic.  But, secondly, and more damaging to 
Quine’s overall position, we can note that we cannot determine that statements like "All 
tall men are men" are logical truths simply by an appeal to syntax alone.  That this is the 
case can be seen by considering other cases that fit this same syntactic pa tern, but have a 
different logical status.  For example, "All toy guns are guns", “All paper tigers are 
tigers”, and “All counterfeit twenty-dollar bills are twenty-dollar bills” all have the same 
syntactic pattern as “All tall men are men”.  But, we can clearly see that the three former 
cases are not analytically true, whereas the latter is.  This is only possible because we 
know the semantics of the words “tall”, “toy”, “paper”, and “counterfeit”.  This is a point 
obscured by the emphasis on syntax, which often makes people think they get semantics 
for free.  Thus, when properly understood, Quine's so-called "logical" truths actually also 
presuppose semantic knowledge.  This same point can also be seen by considering cases 
like “Enough is enough”, which, although syntactically a trivially true claim, and even a 
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“logical” truth by a Quinean, purely syntactic analysis, is clearly not used to xpress a 
mere logical tautology. 
This is true even when we have put the statements in a symbolic notation, for the 
formula “(P & (P  Q))  Q” is only a theorem if we assume that the propositional 
variables ‘P’ and ‘Q’ represent the same proposition in each of their occurrences in the 
formula.  But, this is an assumption about the semantics of these propositional variables, 
and in fact presupposes synonymy and analyticity. More will be said about this 
presupposition in a later chapter. 
Finally, regarding this general line of response to Quine, antonymy was 
mentioned as another meaning relation that grounds analyticity.  In his article“Meaning 
Relations and the Analytic” (Sommers 1963b), Fred Sommers presents a penetrating 
analysis of both Quine’s predicament and the relations of antonymy and synonymy.  He 
asks us to consider the sentence “No bachelor is married”, in which we can see that th
proposition expressed is analytic because of the antonymous, and thus incompatible, 
relation between ‘bachelor’ and ‘married’.  Sommers concludes that “antonymy and not 
synonymy is the relation that is fundamental for the empiricist” (Sommers 1963b, 529).  
Sommers also argues that Quine has already granted “extra-logical information” even in 
countenancing the “un” of “unmarried” in his sentence “No unmarried man is married”, 
and that an assumption of univocity, which is “but a special sort of synonymy” (Sommers 
1963b, 531), vitiates Quine’s attempted distinction between his so-called “logical truths” 
and his “second class” of analytic statements. 
The last of the criticisms and responses to Quine’s “No Acceptable Explanation” 
argument is that, since Quine grants logical truths, he cannot claim there is no disti ction 
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between analytic and synthetic claims, for the logical truths are analytic, nd he 
distinguishes them from all other statements.  Thus, how can Quine argue that there is no 
acceptable explanation of analyticity while he acknowledges that the members of his 
class of “logical truths” are analytic?  So, even though Quine separates these truth  out 
for the wrong reasons, simply by distinguishing them from other statements, he 
presupposes some conception of analyticity. 
The relation between Quine’s views on logical truths in “Truth by Convention” 
and “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” would no doubt take some time to sort out, but would 
probably be a worthwhile endeavor.  For now, let us be satisfied with asking some 
questions and raising some issues worth considering.  While Quine clearly rejects
linguistic conventionalism in “Truth by Convention”, it is unclear what the implications 
are of his views of the status of logical truths and stipulative definitions in “Two Dogmas 
of Empiricism”.  Is Quine ultimately guilty of committing the same mistake as the 
linguistic conventionalists?  Where are his criticisms of linguistic conventionalism when 
he considers stipulative definitions? 
Now, one could claim the issue is different in “Two Dogmas” than in “Truth by 
Convention”, since in the latter Quine was merely arguing that not all truths of logic 
could be accounted for via conventions, whereas in the former he is arguing that there are 
no such things as analytic truths.  But, how does this help Quine?  For this would still 
have him committed to a class of logical truths that are analytic, a method of creating 
synonymy (and thus analyticity), i.e., stipulative definitions, and yet also committed to 
the claim that there are no analytic statements.  The most we could say is that, at least his 
views in the two articles need not be seen as inconsistent with each other, since in “Truth 
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by Convention” he does not claim that no truths of logic can be accounted for by 
convention, just that they cannot all be accounted for in this manner. 
Thus, we have seen that there are serious problems not only with Quine’s “No 
Acceptable Explanation” argument, but also with his overall position in light of the 
problems with that argument.  Our responses not only showed that the premises of the 
argument can be challenged, but also its underlying assumptions appear to be 
fundamentally mistaken.  With that assessment, let us now turn to the remaining 
arguments of the first five sections of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. 
 
B. Quine’s "Difficulty in Applying the Distinction" Argument 
 
Although Quine's argument appeared straightforward enough earlier, perhaps we 
would still be well served to attempt to state it explicitly.  On a first pass, we get the 
following premise and conclusion for his argument: 
(1) The analytic/synthetic distinction is difficult to apply. 
Therefore, (2) There is no distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. 
But this does not make Quine's argument entirely explicit, for there is a missing, unstated 
premise: 
(0) Any distinction that is difficult to apply does not exist. 
The conclusion is noteworthy as well, since it is not entirely clear what Quine thinks we 
should conclude from these premises. Does he believe it follows that there is no 
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements?  Or, does he think a difficulty in 
applying a distinction merely shows the concepts upon which the distinction is based are 
incompletely understood?  The stronger claim clearly seems overstated, sinc, although 
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many take Quine to have shown there is no distinction between analytic and synthetic 
statements (and the interpretation that at least he thinks he has done so has evidence to 
support it, especially given his arguments in section 6 of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism"), 
he does not draw that conclusion at the end of section 4.  As the conclusion stated there 
follows Quine’s “Difficulty in Applying the Distinction” argument, it would seem to 
represent the conclusion he believes he can draw from the reasons he has given up to that
point, or at least it would be unfair to commit Quine to a stronger conclusion than the one 
he offers there.  However, Quine is committed to rejecting the analytic/synthetic 
distinction in at least some sense, so the minimum it seems we can commit Quine to, is 
that the distinction should be abandoned.  Thus, we get the more modest, and at least 
slightly more reasonable, conclusion: 
(2') The analytic/synthetic distinction should be abandoned. 
And, therefore we need a correspondingly more modest unstated premise: 
(0') Any distinction that is difficult to apply should be abandoned. 
Thus, restating the entire argument, we get: 
(0') Any distinction that is difficult to apply should be abandoned. 
(1) The analytic/synthetic distinction is difficult to apply. 
Therefore, (2') The analytic/synthetic distinction should be abandoned. 
Now we should be in at least a slightly better position to evaluate Quine's argument.  
With this formulation of the argument, we can see two obvious responses: (1) reject 
premise (0'), and (2) reject premise (1), and we shall examine each of these responses 
next. 
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As Miller notes (Miller 2007), Grice and Strawson supply a convincing response 
to Quine’s "Difficulty in Applying the Distinction" argument.  They attack Quine’s 
argument on two fronts.  First, they provide an argument for rejecting premise (1).  For, if
Quine were correct that there is considerable “difficulty in separating analytic statements 
from synthetic ones” (Quine 1953, 32), then we should expect to find widespread 
disagreement over its application, with a large number of cases of statements which many 
individuals classify as analytic and yet many other individuals classify a  synthetic.  But, 
this just is not the case.  Instead, as Grice and Strawson point out, the notable fact is that 
there is general agreement as to which claims are analytic and which are synthetic: 
“those who use the terms “analytic” and “synthetic” do to a very considerable extent 
agree in the applications they make of them” (Grice and Strawson 1970, 58).  Moreover, 
as they also note, this agreement is not merely among philosophers, whose intuitions 
might be suspect, given their exposure to philosophical “dogmas”, but also among non-
philosophers.  For, even with ordinary expressions like “means the same as” (and, just as 
relevantly, “does not mean the same as”), there is general consensus of application.  
Finally, Grice and Strawson also note that such concepts and distinctions can be taught 
and applied to novel cases.  And, this last point they consider rather decisive in 
establishing the legitimacy of the distinctions:  “For, in general, if a pair of contrasting 
expressions are habitually and generally used in application to the same cases, wher  
these cases do not form a closed list, this is a sufficient condition for saying that there are 
kinds of cases to which the expressions apply; and nothing more is needed for them to 
mark a distinction” (Grice and Strawson 1970, 58). 
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Second, Grice and Strawson also argue that cases which might appear to be cases 
in which there is a difficulty in applying the analytic/synthetic distinction are actually not 
due to “an incomplete understanding, an incomplete grasp” of the concept of analyticity, 
but with the other concepts in the claim: 
If, as Quine says, the trouble is with “analytic”, then the trouble should doubtless 
disappear when “analytic” is removed.  So let us remove it, and replace it with a 
word which Quine himself has contrasted favorably with “analytic” in respect of 
perspicuity – the word “true”.  Does the indecision at once disappear?  We think 
not.  The indecision over “analytic” (and equally, in this case, the indecision over 
“true”) arises, of course, from a further indecision: viz., that which we feel wh n 
confronted with such questions as “Should we count a point of green light as 
extended or not?”  As is frequent enough in such cases, the hesitation arises from 
the fact that boundaries of application of words are not determined by usage in all 
possible directions.  But the example Quine has chosen is particularly unfortunate 
for his thesis, in that it is only too evident that our hesitations are not here 
attributable to obscurities in “analytic”. … the hesitation would be sufficiently 
accounted for by the same or similar kind of indeterminacy in the relations 
between the words occurring within the statement” (Grice and Strawson 1970, 69) 
 
We might interpret this argument as implicitly recasting Quine’s argument as follows:  
(0'’) Any distinction that is difficult to apply is due to a concept within the 
distinction that is incompletely understood. 
(1) The analytic/synthetic distinction is difficult to apply. 
Therefore, (1.1) The analytic/synthetic distinction is based on a concept that is 
incompletely understood. 
(1.2) Any distinction that is based on a concept that is incompletely understood 
should be abandoned. 
Therefore, (2') The analytic/synthetic distinction should be abandoned. 
And, with this recasting, Grice and Strawson can then be seen as rejecting premise (0’’), 
since, as they point out, the problem in applying the analytic/synthetic distinction in the 
case of ‘Everything green is extended’ is not due to a lack of understanding of the 
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concept of analyticity, but rather with the relation between the meanings of “reen” and 
“extended”. 
This latter argument might be interpreted as also implicitly challenging premise 
(0’), since, it at least appears that “true” is just as difficult to apply as “analytic”, and 
even Quine would not wish to reject the true/false distinction, so we can reject the 
premise that any distinction that is difficult to apply should be abandoned.  And, absent 
any reason why the analytic/synthetic distinction is to be singled out, we have no more 
justification for abandoning it than the distinction between true and false statements. 
 
I would add one more criticism of Quine’s argument.  For, even if there were 
widespread difficulty in applying a distinction, it would not follow that there was no 
distinction.  It might be very difficult to gather the requisite information to deermine 
whether a given case met the criteria for one side of a distinction or the other, but that 
would not mean there was no distinction, or even that the criteria were somehow 
deficient.  Such epistemological concerns should not be confused with issues that 
ultimately reside with matters of fact, metaphysics, or, in the case of th  
analytic/synthetic distinction, the relations between meanings.  With these con iderations 
and the challenges to the premises of his argument, we can conclude that Quine’s 
"Difficulty in Applying the Distinction" Argument is far from successful in providing a 
sufficient ground for rejecting the analytic/synthetic distinction. 
 
C. Quine’s “Meanings are Unnecessary Intermediary Entities” Argument 
 
The straightforward response to Quine’s “Meanings are Unnecessary 
Intermediary Entities” argument is to challenge the premises of his argument and the 
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charge he makes that the appeal to meanings is based on a confusion between meaning 
and naming.  Let us examine the latter charge first, since it can be dismissed rather easily.  
First, it is unclear even why Quine would make any such claim, since he acknowledges 
that there is no necessary connection between claiming there are meanings and confusing 
meaning with naming or claiming that all meaning is essentially a form of naming.  For, 
in his discussion in “On What There Is”, Quine even presents the possibility of his McX 
claiming there are meanings even while recognizing that words can have mening 
without functioning as names.  Further, as this would seem to be a much more common 
view than one that claims that all meaning is naming, Quine would appear to be attacking 
a straw man by continuing to criticize the position that there are meanings as being based 
on a “failure to appreciate that meaning and reference are distinct” (Quine 1953, 22), as 
this just is not the case. 
Now, let us consider Quine’s more substantial argument that meanings are 
unnecessary to account for the “useful” ways we talk about meanings.  Recall that we 
cast Quine’s argument as follows: 
(1) There are only two ways in which we “usefully” talk about meanings: (a) 
claiming that an utterance is significant, and (b) claiming that two 
utterances are synonymous. 
(2) Both of these two ways of talking about meanings may be faithfully 
represented directly, without any appeal to meanings. 
(3) Therefore, meanings are unnecessary to account for the “useful” ways we 
talk about meanings.  
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Fortunately for us, making Quine’s argument explicit makes it clear that we can readily 
challenge the premises of this argument.  For, both premise (1) and premise (2) are quite 
questionable, as we shall soon see. 
Premise (1) can be challenged as Quine overlooks several meaning relations that 
we typically countenance as “useful”.  First, there is a predication relation, in which we 
predicate one meaning of another.  Second, we can assess whether one meaning may be 
meaningfully predicated of another meaning – what Sommers calls the “predictability” 
relation.  Though similar to Quine’s notion of “significance”, it would seem that Quine 
understands this adjective to apply to individual “utterances”, and not as a relation 
between “utterances” (I use “utterances” in quotes to indicate that it is only applicable to 
utterances in an extended sense, being primarily a relation between meanings).  Thirdly, 
there is the relation of antonymy, in which we judge that two meanings are incompatible.  
But lastly (which is only to say it is the last one we will consider, not that we have 
exhausted the “useful” ways we ordinarily talk about meanings that Quine has omitted), 
and arguably most damaging for Quine, on one interpretation, he has omitted the key 
notion of having a meaning.  It should be clear that the notion of mere "significance" is 
insufficient to account for explaining our ordinary notion of the meaning of an 
expression.  For, we could know that a term is significant without knowing hich 
meaning it has.  And, there is certainly much more to the meaning of an expression than 
merely that it is significant, as merely failing to be meaningless does not acc unt for the 
full meaning of an expression.  If simply being meaningful (as opposed to being 
meaningless) were sufficient for delineating the meaning of an expression, then all 
meaningful expressions would have the same meaning.  But, many expressions are 
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meaningful, but have different meanings.  So, the question arise what distinguishes their 
meanings?  And, it is clear that it must be something other than merely being significant.  
So, Quine has either miscast one of the "useful ways" we speak of meaning too narrowly 
by his notion of “significance”, or he has omitted a most important way of talking about 
meanings.  For, while we do say: (1) an expression is meaningful, we also refer t  (2) the 
meaning of an expression, and it is typically (2) that people refer to when saying that an 
expression "has" a meaning, so "the having of meanings" is usually not confined to (1).  
Thus, there must be more to our talk of meaning than the two useful ways Quine 
countenances, for, if we knew all there was to know about “significance” (i.e., 
meaningfulness) and synonymy, it would fail to even get us started, since we would not 
know what any individual expression actually means.  Suppose we know that "green" is 
meaningful and we know all the synonyms of "green".  Does that tell us all there is to 
know in order to know what "green" means?  Clearly not, for we also have to know: (3) 
what "green" may be meaningfully predicated of, and (4) what conditions must obtain for 
it to be true that something is green.  So, Quine is clearly mistaken when he claims th t 
talk of an expression "having a meaning" is nothing more than saying that the expression 
is meaningful or "significant", as this does not capture all that is meant by saying that an 
expression has a meaning.  Knowing that an expression is significant or meaningful does 
not tell us which meaning it has, but only that it has  meaning. 
And, we can also challenge premise (2) of Quine’s argument, since it is far from 
clear that we can even dispense with meanings and yet make sense of the two “usful” 
ways of talking about meaning that Quine does accept.  While one could argue that, 
ultimately, we cannot make sense of “significance”/meaningfulness without relying on 
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the notion of meaning, let us set that question aside, as it will be sufficient to challenge 
Quine’s other “useful” way of talking: synonymy.  First, Quine has spent a great deal of 
effort arguing that synonymy is not well enough understood to serve as a ground for 
analyticity, and so, if he is right, then it hardly seems he can use it as a primitive concept 
upon which to base talk of meaning.  And, this problem is not avoided by Quine’s vague 
reference to "[t]he problem of explaining these adjectives” (Quine 1953, 12), even if this 
is supposedly possible “in terms of behavior” (Quine 1953, 12).  It is unclear how Quine 
thinks it is possible to “view utterances … as synonymous or heteronymous with one 
another” (Quine 1953, 12) without an appeal to meanings.  For, this will surely require 
the notion of sameness of meaning, and thus the notion of meaning itself.  Much more 
can be said on this topic, but as this is closely related to issues that arise in Quine’s later 
arguments (in Word & Object), it will suffice for now to note that Quine would need to 
supply us with an account of synonymy that did not rely on sameness of meaning rather 
than simply assume one is possible.  And, it does not help his case that he rejected all 
accounts of synonymy that he considered on the grounds that they presuppose one of the 
members of the family-circle of concepts. 
 
D. Quine’s Rejection of the Verification Theory of Meaning and Reductionism  
 
As should be clear, Quine’s rejection of the verification theory and reductionism 
does not constitute an argument against analyticity per se.  This should be clear, but sadly 
it has not proven to be so, for the conflation of the analytic/synthetic distinction and these 
other “dogmas” of empiricism (although Quine actually only refers to reductionism as a 
“dogma”, the verification theory of meaning is distinct from reductionism, and most
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philosophers came to see it as a dogma to be rejected as well) has been of considerable 
influence in the widespread rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction.  And, Quine 
certainly shoulders much of the blame for this conflation, since he claims that the 
analytic/synthetic distinction and reductionism “are, indeed, at root identical”.  Stil , he 
nowhere shows this to be the case, and, in fact, all he even argues for is that both the 
verification theory of meaning and reductionism, if true, would provide support for the 
analytic/synthetic distinction.  But, from this it obviously does not follow that if we reject 
either or even both of these theories that we must reject the analytic/synthetic distinction.  
As a matter of logic, the only way that such a rejection is even relevant is if the e theories 
were the only plausible reason for holding to the distinction, and thus our rejection of 
them would remove that reason, leaving the distinction with no support.  And, even in 
that case, we would not have an argument that the distinction was nonsense or that there 
are no analytic propositions, but we would merely have no positive reason for thinking 
there are. 
 
E. Quine on Stipulative Definitions  
 
 Before turning to criticisms of Quine’s view on stipulative definitions, let us first 
attempt to explicate them.  In the brief passage (only one paragraph) in which Quine 
discusses stipulative definitions, Quine does not even refer to them by that name.  But I 
shall use that title rather than his phrase, “the explicitly conventional introduci n of 
novel notations” (Quine 1953, 26), which he nearly repeats verbatim in the only other 
reference to them outside of the initial paragraph in which the topic is introduced, the 
summary of the section on “Definitions”.   Quine claims that stipulative definitions create 
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synonymy rather than relying on it, and thus he see no problem with them serving as 
grounds for synonymy.  Unfortunately, although Quine calls this “a really transparent 
case of synonymy created by definition” (Quine 1953, 26), it is far from clear precisely 
how he thinks synonymies are created by stipulative definitions.  And, perhaps more 
importantly, it is less clear how he thinks this is possible, while thinking an ordinary 
conventional definition always “rests on synonymy rather than explaining it” (Quine 
1953, 26).  We will turn to attempting to explicate Quine’s views on this difference now. 
 Why does Quine think a stipulative definition creates synonymy? Or, as Grice and 
Strawson put it, we would like to ask Quine “what state of affairs he thinks is brought 
about by explicit definition, what relation between expressions is established by this 
procedure” (Grice and Strawson 1970, 68)?  All that he offers as a reason for this view is 
that he thinks that in such cases “the definiendum becomes synonymous with the 
definiens simply because it has been created expressly for the purpose of being 
synonymous with the definiens” (Quine 1953, 26).  But, although this may answer the 
“why”, it does not answer the “how”.  How does Quine think such creative acts of 
definition create synonymies?  To answer this question, which should also shed more 
light on our first question, we might do better to seek an answer to the following: what 
does Quine think is different about the case of stipulative definitions? 
 To answer this question, we would be well served to return to Quine’s comments 
on ordinary conventional definitions.  There, he considers synonymy a rather mysterious 
notion, but he does find some ground for it in the linguistic practices of a community of 
language users:  
Just what it means to affirm synonymy, just what the interconnections may be 
which are necessary and sufficient in order that two linguistic forms be prop rly 
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described as synonymous, is far from clear; but, whatever these interconnections 
may be, ordinarily they are grounded in usage. (Quine 1953, 24 – 25) 
 
Regarding this passage, we may first note the apparently epistemological aspect to 
Quine’s concerns about the synonymy of “two linguistic forms” (that he is focused on the 
linguistic forms at all will be dealt with later), as he considers what it would take for them 
to be “properly described” as synonymous.  Second, and more obviously, Quine 
considers usage to be key to synonymy, and so he apparently thinks that if two words 
have the same usage, i.e., if they are used the same by a community of language users, 
then the two words are synonymous.  Thus, taking usage as the criterion of synonymy, 
and considering the epistemological issue of determining usage, it would seem at l ast
initially plausible to interpret Quine as believing the difference between stipulative and 
conventional definitions is that we can determine the usage of the former but not the 
latter.  Quine’s argument for this difference could be put as follows: 
(1) Synonymy is “grounded in usage” 
(2) The usage of stipulated definitions (unlike ordinary linguistic conventions by 
groups of language users) can be determined 
Therefore: 
(3) Stipulated definitions can serve as a basis for synonymy (and conventional 
definitions cannot) 
But, this argument rests on at least one problematic premise.  For now we shall st aside 
concerns about premise (1), and focus our attention on premise (2). 
 Premise (2) has two components: (2.1) the usage of stipulative definitions can be 
determined and (2.2) the usage of conventional definitions cannot be determined.  Let us 
examine the issues related to (2.2) first.  (2.2) involves knowing the meanings of two 
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expressions and also knowing that these two meanings are the same.  For Quine, since the
meanings are apparently simply the actual usage of the two expressions, this amounts to 
knowing the usage of each expression and being able to determine that these expressions 
are used the same way. 
 Given this, it seems Quine has two options.  First, he can merely make the 
epistemological claim that we can never know whether two expressions have the same 
usage in a given language community.  And this would explain why Quine distinguishes 
between stipulative definitions and conventional ones, since the former at least appear to 
only require some kind of first-person awareness of one’s own intentions.  Thus, this 
option would boil down to granting stipulative definitions as a basis for synonymy since 
we (or at least the one individual who makes the stipulation) can determine that the 
definiendum has the same meaning as the definiens, since this amounts to determining no 
more than that the definiendum is used the same as the definiens, and this is what is being 
stipulated, i.e., that it is being used the same.  
 Second, we might interpret Quine as claiming not that we simply cannot know 
whether two expressions have the same usage, but rather, that, as a matter of empirical 
fact, no two expressions actually have the same usage.  This, also, would provide a means 
for Quine to distinguish stipulative definitions from conventional definitions, since 
stipulative definitions would only involve one usage, and thus they could serve as a 
ground for synonymy while conventional definitions, which involve the usage of two 
expressions, and these, according to this hypothesis, are never the same, could not.  Now, 
of course, there would be a problem for Quine to claim both of these, since we would 
have to know what the usages are to determine that no two are the same, and this would 
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undermine the claim that it is impossible to have the appropriate epistemological access 
to determine that two expressions have the same usage. 
 Evidence that the first option (the epistemic one) might well be the one Quine 
intends can be found in Quine’s references to “pre-existing synonymies” (Quine 1953, 
25), for why would Quine refer to such synonymies if he thought there in fact were none 
(or, even stronger, that there could not be any)?  Also, Quine’s initial response to the 
proposal that conventional definitions might be the basis of synonymy, is to ask “Who 
defined it thus, and when?” (Quine 1953, 24), suggesting that an inability to settle such 
questions would prevent such definitions from being a legitimate ground of synonymy, 
and hence to make such epistemological concerns part of the criterion of synonymy. 
 Now let us take a moment to examine these two options and evaluate them for 
their merits.  For the first option, one problem is that since it is merely that we cannot 
know that two expressions have the same usage, it leaves open the possibility that two 
expressions do have the same usage.  And in that case, the two expressions would be 
synonymous, and thus a statement equating these two expressions would be analytically 
true; we just would not know that it was.  This would hardly seem sufficient to support 
Quine’s rejection of analyticity, unless he were to make the further argument that 
analyticity is an inherently epistemological concept, and that, if we never ha  sufficient 
evidence for a claim’s analyticity, we must reject the analytic/synthetic distinction. 
 However, a second question that arises with this option may present even more 
difficulties for Quine, and that is the question of why we should think we can never know 
that two expressions have the same usage?  Perhaps a consideration of the possibilities 
for a claim of the form “X means the same as Y” will prove helpful in examining this 
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question.  It would seem that there are only 4 possibilities (and only 3 if we ignore the 
case where X has a prior meaning, but Y does not, which is a bit of an odd case): 
(1) X and Y both have no prior meaning 
(2) X has no prior meaning, but Y does 
(3) X has a prior meaning, but Y does not 
(4) X and Y both have a prior meaning 
Cases (2) and (3) are essentially the same, since we would then take it that the stipulation 
in case (3) is the same as in case (2), but merely with the order reversed, i.e., that Y is
now to be taken as having the same meaning as X.  And, if that is not the intention, but 
rather that X is being stipulated to have the same meaning as Y, when Y has no meaning, 
then X's prior meaning can be ignored (since we are stipulating a new meaning for the 
expression "X"), and then case (3) would devolve into case (1). 
 Now, we will consider these cases.  Let us start with case (4).  This is either a case 
of ordinary definition, such as ""Bachelor" means the same as "unmarried man"" (and 
Quine clearly thinks this relies on antecedent synonymies, rather than creati g one, since 
it is a report on usage).  Or, it is a case where we are stipulating that, even though an 
expression has a prior meaning, we are stipulating a new meaning for it, and this will fall 
under the next category of cases, since it is irrelevant that the expression had a prior 
meaning as the new stipulation is replacing that meaning. 
 For cases (2) and (3) (the categories of cases in which one expression has a prior 
meaning, and another expression is being stipulated to now have that same meaning), we 
are clearly relying on prior usage, since we cannot say that X has the same meaning as 
Y's prior meaning, unless we have at least some idea what Y's prior meaning is.  For 
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example, if I stipulate that "frachelor" means the same as "female bach lor" (i.e., the 
same as "bachelor", but with "female" replacing the "male" component of "bachelor" - 
which, for anyone but Quine, would just be "unmarried female"), I have to know the prior 
meaning of "bachelor".  And, if I do not, then this case will just devolve into case (1), 
which we will deal with next.   
 But first, make sure the point about this kind of case is not overlooked, since it is 
arguably the one Quine most likely has in mind in his references to the "explicitly 
conventional introduction of novel notations".  "Frachelor" would be a novel notation, 
and it could be introduced simply to avoid having to say either "unmarried female" or 
"female bachelor".  The latter is perhaps to be avoided since it has an initial air of 
inconsistency, an air that dissipates when one recognizes the intent to replacethe 
inconsistent "male" aspect of "bachelor" but retain all other aspects - i.e., the requirement 
of being unmarried.  This is actually a relatively common speech pattern.  Fo  example, 
consider "manwhore" or other slang terms that are introduced, often to make parallel
comments about the gender opposite to a term's conventional application. 
 But, how is it that Quine can think that such a case as "frachelor" can be taken as 
the ground of synonymy whereas the ordinary definition of "bachelor" cannot?  For both 
rely on prior meanings, which, for Quine, must be based on antecedent facts of linguistic 
usage.  In both cases, we have to already previously know what the meaning of an 
expression is, either "unmarried male" or "unmarried female".  Thus there would appear 
to be no relevant difference between the two cases in terms of the epistemological 
requirements.  And, as noted previously, if Quine thinks that we need not have 
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knowledge of the prior usage of the expression, then this case would devolve into case 
(1), which I shall address now. 
 Now we will consider case (1), in which neither expression has a prior meaning.  
To aid in our discussion, consider the example ""gloop" means the same as "gleep"", 
where we are supposing that we have no prior meaning associated with either "gloop" or 
"gleep".  But, in just stating the case, we can see the problem: nothing has been 
stipulated!  There is no meaning for us to stipulate that a new term has, and thus this is 
just an empty phrase.  No one, including ourselves, would understand anything to have 
been stipulated of either "gloop" or "gleep", except possibly the extremely minimally 
informative claim that, whatever the meaning of "gleep" is, consider "gloop" t  have that 
same meaning.  But, absent any prior knowledge of that meaning, we cannot say any 
more about what "gloop" (or "gleep" for that matter) means.  And, thus, this can also not 
be the ground of synonymy. 
 Recall that we have been exploring the first option for Quine, given that he rejects 
conventional definitions, but accepts stipulative definitions as a ground of synonymy, 
which is that we can never know that expressions have the same usage.  However, thus 
far, we have not found an epistemic difference in the two kinds of definitions, since both 
appear to require knowledge of prior meanings of expressions.  The only case of 
stipulative definitions that seemed a viable option still required knowledge of theprior 
meaning of one expression, and while standard definitions require us to know the 
meanings of two expressions, merely needing to know two rather than just one meaning 
hardly seems sufficient to warrant Quine’s claims for these two kinds of definitions. 
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 However, it should be noted that Quine does have a potential response to this 
challenge.  For, although it does seem like there is no difference between stipulative 
definitions and ordinary definitions, in that both require knowing a prior meaning, for 
ordinary definitions there is an additional element.  Let us use the following notatio  to 
aid our examination of this difference: 
Let X and Y be the expressions 
Let [X] and [Y] be the meanings associated with X and Y respectively 
And we should note that this need not be taken to indicate a reliance upon meanings as 
entities, for even if one thinks (as Quine does) that there are no such entities, there till is 
something that the words are associated with, even if it is just the linguistic behaviors of 
speakers of the language containing X and Y.  With this notation, we can distinguish the 
cases of stipulative and ordinary definitions.  For stipulative definitions, where we are 
stipulating that X has the same meaning as Y, we are relying upon a prior meaning for Y, 
i.e., [Y].  For ordinary definitions, where X and Y both have prior meanings, we have the 
following: 
(1) We must know the meaning of X, [X] 
(2) We must know the meaning of Y, [Y] 
(3) We must know that [X] = [Y] 
 So, though it would seem a very meager difference upon which to make such a 
major distinction between ordinary and stipulative definitions to say that ordinary 
definitions require one to know two meanings rather than just one, it seems at least
initially more promising to cite (3) as a difference between the two kinds of definitions.  
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For, Quine might grant that we can satisfy both conditions (1) and (2), but deny that we 
can ever satisfy condition (3). 
 Still, it is difficult to understand how we could know [X] and [Y] and not be able 
to determine whether or not [X] = [Y].  This is similar to a point made by Grice and 
Strawson in their article "In Defense of a Dogma" (Grice and Strawson, 1970). There, 
they argue that meaningful talk of sentences having meanings would seem to make it 
meaningful to ask whether these meanings could be the same and thus talk of synonymy 
is also meaningful: 
For if it made sense to talk of a sentence having a meaning, or meaning something, 
then presumably it would make sense to ask “What does it mean?” of a sentence, then 
sentence-synonymy could be roughly defined as follows: Two sentences are 
synonymous if and only if any true answer to the question “What does it mean?” 
asked of one of them, is a true answer to the same question, asked of the other. (Grice 
and Strawson 1970, 61-62) 
 
Here, the point would be that if one can know two meanings, one should also be in a 
position to determine whether those two meanings are the same.  At the least, Quine owes 
us an explanation as to how we can know [X] and [Y] but cannot ever know that [X] = 
[Y] or an argument why this is not possible.  For, if meaning is grounded in linguistic 
usage, and we can determine the meanings of two expressions by determining the usage 
of those two expressions, why should we not also be able to determine that the usage is 
the same for those two expressions? 
 But this brings up yet another option for Quine.  Perhaps he wants to make the 
distinction between stipulative and ordinary definitions not because we can determin  the 
usage for the former and not the latter, but rather because, while he believes ordinary 
definitions are grounded in usage, somehow stipulative definitions are not.  This would 
allow him to claim that usage can never be determined, which, in turn, would bar 
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conventional definitions from serving as a basis for synonymy, and yet allow him to 
claim that stipulative definitions can provide such a basis.   
Again, however, we can question the plausibility of this option.  To be clear, this 
option would require Quine to claim both: (1) ordinary definitions are grounded in usages 
which can never be sufficiently determined to serve as a basis for synonymy, and (2) 
stipulative definitions are not grounded in usage and also are such as to provide a basis 
for synonymy.  At the very least, such an interpretation of Quine’s position would explain 
his rejection of linguistic conventionalism, as it views ordinary definitions as 
fundamentally the same as stipulative definitions, with both being grounded in linguistic 
practices that may be sufficiently determined to provide a foundation for synonymy and 
thus, analyticity. 
While we will not be able to give more than a brief examination of the issues 
involved in these claims, we can at least note the challenge for Quine to establish (1), 
once he has granted that stipulative definitions can create synonymies.  For, even if no 
one recorded the linguistic history of the word “bachelor”, so that the answer to Quine’s 
question who defined it to have the same meaning as “unmarried man” is lost in the sands 
of time, it is still not implausible that it did have such an origin.  And we might ask Quine 
why it is relevant to the question of whether we can know the usage of the term now 
whether we can identify the particular individual who first defined it.  Next, suppose that 
we can supply that individual and can cite the event at which a word’s usage was defined.  
Would Quine concede that if we can provide the actual linguistic history of the usage of  
word from its inception into the language, that then, although it now has an established 
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usage, and thus its definition would now not be considered stipulative, its definition can 
serve as a basis for synonymy? 
Could we not imagine a scenario in which some one individual stipulates that an 
expression will have a certain meaning (i.e., stipulates that an expression has the s me 
meaning as another expression), and then another individual adopts that same definition 
for the new term.  For example, suppose I introduce the term "frachelor" as meaning the 
same as "unmarried female", and then someone else adopts the same convention.  Is this 
somehow inherently impossible?  It would hardly seem so.  And, if one person can do it, 
why not another?  And then, still another?  Until, one by one, an entire linguistic 
community has adopted my original convention.  At that point, it would be a 
conventional definition, and yet how could Quine say that there was no way to determine 
its usage? 
And yet Quine is not alone in thinking that stipulative definitions are special.  
Others have also considered them to be “epistemologically special” (Gupta 2008) and we
appear to have privileged first-person epistemic access to them that is not possible f r 
conventional definitions.  It at least seems that I can know my own stipulated definitions 
for words, i.e., I can know how I will use the words I have stipulated definitions for 
without appealing to anything outside of my own mental states.  In fact, we might even 
want to characterize these stipulations as intentions.  By my stipulating a definition, I am 
expressing an intention of mine to use a word a certain way.  If so, these would seem to 
be knowable a priori, since it seems I can know these just be having access to my own 
intentions.  This apparent special epistemic status might be what motivates Quin  to 
distinguish stipulative definitions from conventional ones.  And, if the point had been to 
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find a ground for a priori knowledge, then if we have special epistemic access to 
stipulative definitions, this might serve as a ground for synonymy (and thus analyticity), 
and explain how we have a priori knowledge of these synonymies.  However, there are 
difficulties with this view. 
First of all, since the purported privileged epistemic access only applies to the
first-person perspective, it is only those stipulated definitions of one’s own that would
have this status.  The stipulated definitions of others, even if I am a witness to the initial 
stipulation would still only be knowable a posteriori, and of course could not be certain, 
since I do not have any privileged epistemic access to anyone else’s intentions.  Another 
person may say that they intend to use a word or expression a certain way, but they could 
be lying and thus not really have that intention. 
Second, it hardly seems to be an analytic claim to say that I have a particular 
intention, regardless of the epistemic access I may have to my own intentions.  So, if 
stipulative definitions are forms of intentions, then, like all intentions to perform actions, 
they would be contingent synthetic claims that depend for their truth upon a person 
actually having the relevant mental state that constitutes having the intentio .  And, given 
this connection with intentions, one could even question whether stipulated definitions 
are truth-claims.  For, taking a cue from the prescriptivist analysis of moral language, 
they may be properly analyzed as expressions of intention, and not reports about 
intentions, where it is only the latter that are clearly truth-claims.    
Third, while it may seem that we can have a priori knowledge of our own 
stipulated definitions, recall our previous discussion of the nature of such definitions.  
For, unless we are just stipulating that two expressions will be used the same, neither of 
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which has a prior meaning, then we still must know the meaning of one of the 
expressions.  And, according to Quine, this amounts to knowing the usage of the 
expression, and this can only be known a posteriori through observation of the linguistic 
behavior of speakers of the language.  So, even if we do have special epistemic accss to 
our own intentions regarding how we will use words, if these intentions are to use a new 
word the same way as another expression is already being used by speakers of the 
language, then we cannot know the significance of our own intention without knowing 
certain contingent facts about the world, in particular, how other people in fact use the 
expression, and we certainly cannot know this a priori.  Fortunately, we need not resolve 
these questions here, and can satisfy ourselves with merely presenting some of the 
challenges faced by Quine’s position on stipulative definitions. 
 Besides the concerns that have been raised in attempting to explicate Quine’s 
position, two additional criticisms can be raised regarding Quine’s view that stipulative 
definitions create synonymy (and thus would serve as the basis for at least some analytic 
statements): (1) the problems with linguistic conventionalism we noted previously (which 
Quine also notes in “Truth By Convention”) would seem to apply to stipulative 
definitions as well as any other linguistic conventions, specifically the problem that no 
definition, no mere convention of word usage creates synonymy, rather all rely on a 
logically prior synonymy, (2) if Quine allows stipulative definitions, then without a 
principled distinction between stipulative definitions and conventional definitions, he 
opens the door for all conventional definitions to serve as the basis for synonymy.  We 
will briefly elaborate these criticisms next, beginning with the second criticism. 
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 As noted previously, Quine exempts stipulative definitions from his criticisms of 
the other attempts to explain analyticity.  He claims that stipulative definitions create 
synonymy rather than relying on it, and that there is thus no problem with stipulative 
definitions.  Yet Quine fails to recognize that this one case is enough to show that there 
can be a distinction of kind between analytic and synthetic statements.  Stipulative 
definitions, even if they were the only analytic statements, would be different in kind 
from ordinary observation statements.   
Quine takes himself to be furthering the work of C. I. Lewis, but it seems that we 
can use Lewis' view to criticize Quine.  Quine rejects analyticity, but allows stipulative 
definitions.  However, Lewis claims that all analytic truths have the status of stipulative 
definitions, and so it seems that we could rescue our ordinary account of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction from Quine’s criticisms.  Lewis argues that the analytic is 
"independent of experience" (Lewis, 221) in that it represents an attitude towards 
experience.  A stipulative definition represents the attitude of an individual towards 
experience.  For example, if I stipulate that a "gleep" is anything with four legs, then I 
have adopted as a rule that I shall call anything with four legs a gleep.  For Lewis, this is 
not a synthetic claim, and I do not have to check experience to see whether it always 
holds true.  Lewis claims that ordinary analytic truths are those in which the linguistic 
conventions, adopted as rules by a group of language-users, create analyticity.  So, f 
Quine allows individually stipulative definitions, then, via a Lewis-style argument (in 
which all definitions are seen as having the same status of attitudinal stances adopted for 
pragmatic purposes, whether done by a single individual or a group of language users), 
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we can argue that he must also grant conventional definitions, and thereby analyticity in 
general. 
While the second criticism argues that, in order to be consistent, Quine must also 
grant conventional definitions as a basis for synonymy, the first criticism would instead 
argue that Quine should not allow any form of definition as a foundation for synonymy. 
Instead, as this criticism goes, synonymy is a relation between meanings ad not merely 
an empirical claim about how people, whether as individuals or as groups of language 
users, use words.  Stipulative definitions of even the most extreme sort rely on the 
identity of meanings, since this is what makes them true.  “All gleeps are gloops” is true 
not just because I may have decided to use “gleep” to mean the same thing as “gloop”,
but also because the proposition expressed by the sentence is true, and its truth is a matter 
of the relation of meanings, in this case, the relation of identity, which holds that all 
meanings are identical to themselves.  And this is why the proposition is true, and thus 
why any sentence that expresses that proposition is true. 
 Though this will be addressed in more detail later, the real problem here is a 
failure to distinguish sentences and propositions (or perhaps on Quine’s part, to 
acknowledge propositions).  For, when we are clear about this distinction, we see that it is 
actually still an empirical question whether two words are being used the same, whether 
it is stipulated to be so by a single individual or a convention established by the linguistic 
practices of a group of language users.  That “gleep” is associated with the same meaning 
as “gloop” is an empirical matter. And, even if I am the individual who has stipulated tha 
I shall associate them with the same meaning, this act (mental or otherwise, since I might 
write it down, but we at least are inclined to think this is preceded by my decision to do 
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so) is a matter of fact like others.  Though we might find it hard to imagine circumstance  
in which I could be mistaken about my own stipulations, the claim that a word has the 
same meaning associated with it as another word, whether made by the same individual 
who initiated the word/meaning associations or not, has the status of an empirical fact.  
There is a time at which the association took place, and prior to that it was not in effect. 
Though, like other mental acts, it might be difficult to be observed by others, and might 
lend itself to an air of first-person infallibility (always a notoriously tend ntious area), the 
nature of the kind of claim being made is still that of a claim about the way the world is, 
and not merely a matter of the relations of meanings.  To sum it up, I shall argue at least, 
that how words happen to be used is always contingent, synthetic, and only knowable a 
posteriori.  But, less arguably, and perhaps more importantly for our present discussion, 
stipulative definitions cannot be the basis of synonymy or analyticity since they 
presuppose it.  I presuppose the notion of sameness of meaning to even describe such 
stipulations.  In an act of stipulative definition, one decides to associate two expressions 
with the same meaning, but this clearly presupposes the notion of sameness of meaning, 
i.e., synonymy.  Once we see that analyticity is a property of propositions, and not of 
sentences, this sort of confusion is easier to avoid.  So, albeit somewhat ironically, we 
can take Quine’s advice: “Recognizing then that the notion of definition does not hold the 
key to synonymy and analyticity, let us look further into synonymy and say no more of 
definition” (Quine 1953, 27).
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I. Quine’s Problems with Meaning: Part 2 – Epistemological Holism, Indeterminacy 
of Translation, and Semantic Eliminativism 
 
 
A. “Empiricism without the Dogmas” - Epistemological Holism 
 
In section 6 of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, “Empiricism without the Dogmas” 
(Quine 1953), Quine presents what Grice and Strawson refer to as “Quine’s positive 
theory of the relations between the statements we accept as true or reject as false on the 
one hand and the “experiences” in the light of which we do this accepting and rejecting 
on the other” (Grice and Strawson 1970, 69).  While Grice and Strawson are correct in 
noting that Quine’s sketch of this positive theory begins in section 5, we will focus our 
attention on Quine’s comments in section 6, as these flesh out the implications of the 
theory for the analytic/synthetic distinction more fully. 
It will, however, be worth our while to glance back at section 5, as it is there that 
Quine offers the clearest statement (in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, at leas ) of what 
has come to be known as his “epistemological holism”.  Also known as “confirmation 
holism”, Quine’s view is that no single statement can be tested against experience in 
isolation, but rather “our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense 
experience not individually but only as a corporate body” (Quine 1953, 41).  This view is 
in contrast with reductionism, which holds that all statements can be translated 
(“reduced”) into statements that can be tested for truth or falsity directly with 
observations.  For Quine, it is not individual statements, but rather entire theories, that are 
confirmed or infirmed by experience.  Having stated his position in section 5, Quine 
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draws out the implications of his epistemological holism for the analytic/synthetic 
distinction in section 6.  To see these implications more clearly, let us flesh out the 
positivists’ view of the relationship between individual statements and experience.  
With their acceptance of both reductionism and the verification theory of 
meaning, the positivists believed they could distinguish statements that could be shown 
(albeit via the process of reduction) to have connections to observations and those that 
had no such connections.  The former, given their connections to experience, were 
thought to make claims about how the world is, and could not be held true if observations 
were made that conflicted with these connections.  That is, if we made observations that 
implied the world were not as such a statement claimed, then we would have to reject the 
statement as false. These statements were classified as synthetic.  Alt rnatively, or so the 
positivists held, some statements were not connected to experience in that they made no 
claim about how things are in the world, and so these statements could be held true 
“come what may”.  Also, since they did not make a claim that was connected to any 
possible experience, these statements were immune to revision in that no observation 
could possibly be made that would require us to reject a statement of this kind as false. 
These statements were classified as analytic.  In this manner, the positivists’ distinction 
between analytic and synthetic statements was closely connected to their doctrines of 
reductionism and the verification theory of meaning. 
Quine recognized this connection in the positivists’ views, and in particular saw 
the implications of his epistemological holism for their view of the analytic/s nthetic 
distinction.  Where they saw this distinction as one between statements that could be hel  
true come what may and those that cannot (or conversely, between those that are immun
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to revision and those that are not), Quine denies there can be such a distinction.  For, 
according to his epistemological holism and its holistic relationship between stat ments 
and experience: 
it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold 
contingently on experience, and analytic statements, which hold come what may.  
Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough 
adjustments elsewhere in the system.  Even a statement very close to the 
periphery can be held true in the face of recalcitrant experience by pleading 
hallucination or by amending certain statements of the kind called logical laws.  
Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision. (Quine 1953, 
43) 
 
Thus, Quine’s positive doctrine presents another challenge to analyticity, or a least to the 
positivists’ version of the analytic/synthetic distinction. 
 




In chapter II of Word and Object, “Translation and Meaning”, Quine presents his 
thesis of the indeterminacy of translation: “manuals for translating one language into 
another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech 
dispositions, yet incompatible with one another” (Quine 1960, 27).  Using the 
methodology of what he calls “radical translation”, “i.e., translation of the language of a 
hitherto untouched people” (Quine 1960, 28), Quine argues that all of the available 
behavioral data, both linguistic and otherwise, will be insufficient to determine whether 
we have correctly translated words in the natives’ language into our own.  And, Quine 
claims, this is not merely an epistemological problem.  For it is not just that we cannot 
know whether our translation manual is correct but rather Quine claims that there is 
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nothing to be correct about, i.e., as it is often put, there is no fact of the matter whether 
our translation manual is correct. 
But this is just the beginning of the significance of the thesis of the indeterminacy 
of translation.  For, if there is no fact of the matter whether our translation manual is 
correct, then there can be no fact of the matter whether two expressions have the sme 
meaning, and this would finally imply that there is no fact of the matter as to what a 
given expression means.  While some might call this “meaning skepticism” (Miller 2007, 
141), I will follow Soames and refer to this as “semantic eliminativism” (Soames 2005), 
since Quine’s goal is to eliminate talk of meanings altogether.  And, of course, if we were 
to do so, we would clearly need to abandon any conception of analyticity involving 
statements being true in virtue of meanings alone, which would require us to rejec  th  
analytic/synthetic distinction.  So, Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translatio  
presents yet another challenge to the analytic/synthetic distinction. 
 
 
II.  Replies to Arguments 
 
A. Epistemological Holism 
 
In this assessment of Quine’s epistemological holism, we will focus our attention 
on the following two claims of Quine: (1) any statement can be held true come what may, 
and (2) no statement is immune to revision.  These claims represent a direct challenge to 
the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, since, for the positivists and 
others who accept the distinction, only analytic statements can be held to be true "come 
what may", and are thus immune to revision, whereas synthetic statements are not 
immune to revision, since they must be rejected as false if there is sufficient ev dence 
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contrary to their observable implications.  So, in defending this distinction, it willbe 
worth our while to examine these two claims more closely. 
Let us take (1) first.  By claiming that "Any statement can be held true come what 
may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system" (Quine 1953, 43), 
Quine implies that synthetic claims are no different than analytic ones, since both are 
such that they can be held true "in the face of" "recalcitrant" experience.  However, there 
are several problems for Quine’s claim. 
First, the “what” that “may come” is presumably an experience that confli ts with 
the statement.  But what can it possibly mean for Quine for an experience to "conflict" 
with a claim, given Quine's rejection of the notion of contradiction as failing to have a 
clear definition?  In rejecting analyticity (and all the other members of the family-circle), 
Quine can no longer consistently avail himself of any notions of contradiction or 
"conflict" between experience and a claim.  But, if there is no notion of conflict whi h 
Quine can use, then he cannot even make his claim.  And we can only make sense of 
Quine’s claim if we presuppose the very notions he has been arguing against. 
Second, how are we even able to identify which statement the experience 
conflicts with?  For Quine, it is our entire "web of beliefs" that must face the "tribunal of 
experience" (and, again, what sense can Quine give to such a "tribunal", absent any 
notion of contradiction), but his claim that any statement may be held true come what 
may presupposes that we can identify individual statements that a particular experience 
conflicts with.  And, this would only seem to be possible if individual statements have the 
kind of logical connection to experiences that the positivists claim but that Quine denies. 
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Third, the qualifying phrase “if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in 
the system” (Quine 1953, 43) appears to be critical.  So, one possible response to Quine 
is to simply amend the criterion of analyticity from being a statement that can be held 
true come what may to being a statement that can be held true come what may wi h no 
adjustments needed elsewhere in the system.  That would give us a criterion by which 
to distinguish analytic and synthetic statements, since synthetic statements can only be 
held true "come what may" so long as some adjustment is made in the system, while 
analytic statements can be held true with no adjustments in the system at all. 
Fourth, it is entirely unclear how Quine thinks any experience can even be in 
conflict with an analytic statement.  So, why not just classify as analytic those statements 
that have no conflict with experience?  In fact, this is why they can be held true “com  
what may”.  It is not because we are always able to resolve the conflicts that do arise that 
we are able to hold analytic statements to be true, but rather because whatever 
experiences we encounter can never be in conflict with them in the first place.  This point 
will be echoed later in our discussion of the second of Quine’s claims.  So, with these 
problems noted for Quine’s first claim, let us now turn to his second claim. 
Recall that Quine’s second claim is that “no statement is immune to revision”. 
Where defenders of the distinction would claim that analytic statements ar immune to 
revision (and synthetic statements are not), and this would serve to distinguish analytic 
statements from synthetic statements, Quine denies this.  Thus, Quine’s second claim also 
challenges the analytic/synthetic distinction, by once again claiming that analytic and 
synthetic statements are on equal footing, in this case, that both are susceptible to 
revision. 
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Obviously, a key notion in both the defenders’ claim and Quine’s is the notion of 
“revision”.  For Quine to be disagreeing with the defenders of the analytic/synhetic 
distinction, he must be using the same notion of revision that they are using when they 
say that analytic statements are immune to revision.  So, then, what do defenders of the 
distinction mean by “revision”?  There seem to be two candidates for this concept of 
“revision”: (1) rejection of the statement as false, or (2) revising the meaning of the 
statement (presumably by revising the meaning of at least one of the expressions of 
which the statement is composed).  Clearly, defenders of the distinction cannot mea (2) 
by “revision”, since both analytic and synthetic statements can be “revised” in this way.  
But, they could make a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements based on the 
notion of revision as rejection as in (1), since they could claim that while synthetic 
statements may be rejected as false, analytic ones can never be rejected as false.  So, now 
let us see if Quine is using “revision” in this same sense. 
Quine made his claim regarding immunity from revision in the context of 
presenting his view of the relationship between beliefs and experience, and so a clo er 
examination of his account of this relationship should prove helpful in understanding 
what Quine means by “revision”.  Quine first describes the “totality of our so-called 
knowledge or beliefs” as “a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only al g 
the edges” (Quine 1953, 42), but then shifts his description to that of a "field of force 
whose boundary conditions are experience" (Quine 1953, 42). According to Quine, all 
statements are located within this field, although we are to picture logical truths as being 
closer to the center of the field than ordinary observation statements. 
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In continuing his account of the relationship between our beliefs (which, for 
Quine, are taken as a whole in this relationship, and not individually), Quine claims that a 
“conflict with experience” “occasions readjustments”, but what he means by “conflict” is 
far from clear, given his rejection of the notion of contradiction and his denial that 
individual statements have logical connections to experiences.  Further, his use of the 
word “occasions” leaves the situation less than clearly described.  Does he mean that 
“readjustments” just happen?  Is Quine simply describing the situation from a natur listic 
perspective in terms of what happens to occur?  Are these readjustments simply 
phenomena that he has noticed, or, are they requirements of logical consistency?  And, 
without attempting to settle those questions, but turning to others more directly connected 
to our present concern, what does Quine mean by “readjustments”? 
Our best hope of an answer seems to lie in the next few sentences where Quine 
claims: 
Truth values have to be redistributed over some of our statements.  Reevaluation 
of some statements entails reevaluation of others, because of their logical 
interconnections … Having reevaluated one statement we must reevaluate some 
others, which may be statements logically connected with the first or may be the
statements of logical connections themselves. (Quine 1953, 42) 
 
In saying that truth values have to be “redistributed”, it would seem most plausible to 
interpret Quine as saying that a statement that had the truth value “true” wold have to be 
changed (“redistributed”) to have the truth value “false”.  And, correspondingly, 
“reevaluation” would apparently mean reevaluation of the truth value of the statement, 
since it is the truth value of the statement that would be “logically connected” to the ru h 
value of other statements.  And, we could also note that in this passage Quine uses the 
normative phrases “have to be” and “must”, rather than the descriptive-sounding phrase
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“occasions”, the former fitting the kind of logical compulsion he appears to be depicting.  
Thus, the account Quine presents is that we “must”, on pain of otherwise being 
inconsistent, “adjust” the truth-values of some of the statements in our set of beliefs, in 
the face of “contrary” experience.  This suggests that, although Quine uses the words 
“readjustments”, “redistributed”, and “reevaluation”, he simply means finding statements 
to be false. 
 More evidence for this interpretation comes in the next paragraph, where Quine 
makes the two claims under consideration, and in fact, the statement of the first claim is 
itself a significant clue to Quine’s meaning of the word “revision” in the second laim.  
In the first claim he refers to a statement’s being “held true”, and, the second claim is 
prefaced with the phrase, “Conversely, by the same token”.   Thus, it would seem that the
kind of “revision” Quine must mean is that of no longer holding a statement to be true, 
i.e., rejecting it as false.  
Additionally, in the paragraph that follows Quine’s claim that no statement is 
immune to revision, he refers to “revision in the event of recalcitrant experience” (Quine 
1953, 43) and “reevaluating” statements, and this, too, is consistent with the 
interpretation that he means finding the statements to be false (where the statemen s had 
previously been held to be true).  He cites as examples, “reevaluating” “the sta ement that 
there are brick houses on Elm street” (presumably after finding out the houses are not
actually made of brick, or the brick houses we had in mind are not on Elm street), and 
“reevaluating” “the statement that there are no centaurs” (presumably after h ving 
sufficient “recalcitrant experiences” to warrant concluding that there are centaurs).  Both 
of these examples would seem to be appropriately described (albeit in less florid 
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language than Quine’s) as rejecting a statement as false that was previously held to be 
true.  Thus, this would seem to be the best hypothesis as to what Quine means by 
“revision”.  But the mere fact that we even had to engage in such an interpretive endeavor 
should make us at least slightly wary as to Quine’s use of the word.  However, let us now 
proceed with our assessment of Quine’s claim that no statement is immune to revision. 
We should note first that the only occasion for revision that Quine considers is a 
“revision in the event of recalcitrant experience” (Quine 1953, 43).  We could again 
question what Quine, with his rejection of contradiction (for, since he rejects self-
contradiction, and we can always simply conjoin two contradictory statements to form a
self-contradictory statement, and he would seem to have no logical space with which to 
countenance contradiction, as it would allow all the other members of the family-circle in 
its wake), can mean by an experience being “recalcitrant”.  But the more iportant 
question is what experience he thinks could even possibly conflict with a statement such 
as "2 + 2 = 4"?  Recall the discussion (in chapter 3) of C. I. Lewis’s response to Mill, 
which makes a compelling case that no experience can conflict with this claim.   
But what of Quine's claim that no statement is immune to revision?  It would 
seem if Lewis is correct, that we can never reject an analytic claim.  But does this not 
happen quite often?  Think, for example, of the definition of "fish".  It may have been 
true at one time that a whale is a fish, according to the classification scheme for fish then 
in use2.  We no longer accept that a whale is a fish, and we now classify whales as 
                                                      
2 The history of the classification of whales and other aquatic mammals such as dolphins is illustrative of 
both the interplay and the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic.  Although Aristotle classified 
whales as mammals and not as fish, his classification was not widely adopted, and it was not until 
Linneaus’ taxonomy was published  in the 18th century that it was more widely accepted. And, Melvill ’s 
references to whales as “fish” in Moby Dick suggest the re-classification was stubbornly resist d in some 
quarters for many years. 
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mammals.  This would seem to support Quine's claim, but we need to make a distinction 
here.  We do not use the same meaning for the word "fish" in both cases.   
When we say that whales are mammals and not fish, we are using a different 
definition of "fish" than when people used to say that whales are fish.  The old 
classification scheme that grouped whales with other creatures of the sea focused n the 
features whales have in common with other fish (the general fusiform, fish-like shap , 
having fins, living in the water, etc.).  And, it is not the case that everyone who preferred 
this classification scheme was simply unaware of the features that Aristotle (and later 
Linneaus) focused on in their alternative classification scheme. Although we no longer 
use the old classification scheme, this does not mean that we have found it to be false, but 
rather simply less useful for our purposes.  A distinction needs to be made: it is one thing 
to alter the meanings of terms and adopt a new classification scheme, and it is aother
thing to find a statement to be false (with the same meanings for all of its term ).   
With the old classification scheme, "A whale is a fish" would have once been a 
true sentence (better put, it would have expressed a true proposition - that a whalehas a 
certain fusiform - aka "fishlike" - appearance, and that a whale lives in the water).  But, 
with our current classification scheme, this proposition, while still true, is not as 
significant for our purposes, and we consider it more important to note the similarites of 
whales to other animals that suckle their young, etc., so that now a whale is classified  a 
mammal and not a fish.  But the important point is that our "revision" in such a 
circumstance does not entail the denial of the proposition expressed by the use of the 
sentence "A whale is a fish" under the old classification scheme.  This is a change of 
meaning, not a change of belief.  And, even if new facts helped prompt our adoption of 
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this new classification scheme (though, in historical fact, those facts were well known for 
many years, and the adoption of the new system was much more involved than the fable 
of a supposedly ignorant people finally finding out the "true" nature of whales - such a 
slight to the ancients is sadly all too typical of those overly immersed in their own time 
and overly impressed by modern technological advances), we can still sort out the
changes that are conceptual from those that involve a change of belief regarding matters 
of fact. 
 It is only by implicitly rejecting this distinction (which amounts to begging a very 
important question) that we can make plausible either Quine’s claim that no statement is 
immune to revision or his other claim that we can hold any statement to be true no matter 
what.  True, Quine does qualify his claim with the phrase "if we make drastic enough 
adjustments elsewhere in the system" (Quine 1953, 43).  However, these "adjustments” 
cannot take the form of changing the definitions of terms in the statement in question, or 
else it cannot be said that we have held one and the same statement to be true (or, 
conversely, that we have “revised” one and the same statement).  Moreover, it seems that 
if we will make "drastic" enough changes, then we may quite possibly end up turning 
what was a synthetic statement into an analytic statement.  According to defenders of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, analytic statements are those we can never call false 
(keeping in mind that we may, for reasons of utility, use the terms differently, bu  that it 
is never the same statement found to be false) and hence no experience can count against 
its truth.  It seems clear that there is a difference between finding evidence that convinces 
one that a claim is false and deciding that a particular definition for a word is no longer 
useful.  And, this difference is prima facie evidence for a distinction for which Quine’s 
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position can give no straightforward account.  And, while Quine might reject this 
response, he cannot simply assume that there is no such distinction, since this would be to 
just beg the question on this issue, and leave Quine with no argument for his position. 
 It would seem our only alternative is to view Quine as equivocating between the 
two meanings of “revision” that we identified initially.  To appear to be making a 
significant claim, and the one that would be the denial of the claim made by the defenders 
of the analytic/synthetic distinction, he must be using “revision” in the sense that analy ic 
(for Quine, purportedly analytic) statements are not immune to revision in that they may 
be rejected as false.  But, in order to make a claim that has any plausibility to it, Quine 
must switch to the weaker meaning of “revision” as changing the meaning of the 
statement (and then finding the different proposition that the statement would then 
express to be false).  Although perhaps a case could be made for a third alternative, that 
of simply no longer using a classification scheme, that too will not suffice for Quine as 
the discussion of the “whale”/”fish” example illustrates. 
So, we are only able to make Quine’s claim plausible if we treat “revision” as 
involving a change of meaning, which reduces Quine’s claim to the trivial one that we 
can always choose to use words differently. And, clearly, this trivial claim does not 
contradict the claim made by the defenders of the analytic/synthetic distinction, so it can 
simply be ignored.  This is the same point that Grice and Strawson are making whe  they 
argue that: 
Acceptance of this doctrine is quite consistent with adherence to the distinction 
between analytic and synthetic statements.  Only, the adherent of this distinction must 
also insist on another; on the distinction between that kind of giving up which 
consists in merely admitting falsity, and that kind of giving up which involves 
changing or dropping a concept or set of concepts.  Any form of words at one time 
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held to express something true may, no doubt, at another time, come to be held to 
express something false.  But it is not only philosophers who would distinguish 
between the case where this happens as the result of a change of opinion solely as to 
matters of fact, and the case where this happens at least partly as a result of a hift in 
the sense of the words. (Grice and Strawson 1970, 72) 
 
This concludes our assessment of Quine’s two claims, neither of which ultimately 
presents a significant challenge to the analytic/synthetic distinction.  However, before 
leaving this section, I would like to further elaborate and press home one point that arose 
in this assessment because I believe it strikes at a central problem for Quine’s overall 
depiction of the relationship between beliefs and experiences. 
Remember that Quine claims that our beliefs are organized in a “web” pattern, with 
statements more directly connected to observations at the outer edges of the web, and 
truths of logic at the center, and, in general with more abstract statements closer to the 
center.  For Quine, this is still all mutable, as there is no absolute distinction between 
these statements.  But, the question arises, how can we accept this organizational pic ure 
and still make sense of the notion of “conflicting evidence”?  And, it should be noted, 
such evidence, or “recalcitrant experiences” are a key component of Quine’s overall view 
of the relationship between the web of beliefs and experience.  He, rightly, takes it s a 
given that our beliefs will often fail to square with our experiences, and “readjustments” 
will have to be made. 
Why is the notion of “contrary experience” so problematic for Quine?  Because, in 
order to make sense of this notion, we must presuppose the notion of logical 
inconsistency.  If not, then we could not even identify any experiences as contrary r 
conflicting with our beliefs, and thus there would not even be a hint that anything was 
amiss in our beliefs and that any statement might need revised or reevaluated.  But this
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means that the basic principles of logic are interwoven into the very fabric of the system 
of beliefs, and thus they are not, as Quine claims, merely some relatively mor cent ally 
located beliefs in the system.  Rather, logical truths are presupposed as fixed and 
immutable, one should even say “necessary”, truths that are presupposed by any possible 
web of beliefs we might construct. 
The very notion of a “web” of beliefs, with some beliefs more directly “answerabl ” 
to sensory experiences presupposes the truths of logic.  For, what is it for a belief to be 
“answerable” to evidence except in some logical relation it has to this evidence?  Thus, 
Quine’s positions, both the specific one that no statement is immune to revision, and the 
more general claim that beliefs form a web with logical truths varying only by degree 
from more peripheral beliefs, are ultimately self-refuting, since they pr suppose the truths 
of logic in the relationship between beliefs and experiences. 
Further, Quine’s claim that no statement is immune to revision leads to absurd 
consequences.  For example, suppose, as Quine is committed to allowing, we reject the 
law of non-contradiction.  Then, we can no longer even have a functioning web of belief.  
For, any belief could be added to our web, no matter its inconsistency with other beliefs 
in the web (or even the new belief’s own internal inconsistency, for that matter).  And, 
we could no longer even organize our beliefs into a “web” pattern (i.e., with some beliefs
closer to the outer edge of the web than others), since this presupposes that some beliefs 
are more likely to be rejected in the face of (conflicting) sensory observations.  And, 
again, we should note that these must be conflicting observations, since we make no 
sense of rejecting a belief in the light of confirming or even unrelated observations.  But, 
again, the notion of “conflict” here presupposes the logical principle of non-contradiction 
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that we are, according to Quine, allowed to reject.  Thus, the very concept of a web of 
belief itself requires the law of non-contradiction, and so, Quine’s conception of a holistic 
web of beliefs that all only vary by degree of likelihood of revision, with pragmatic 
considerations playing a central role, is self-refuting.  And, as I shall argue shortly, a 
similar problem vitiates Quine’s conception of radical translation as well. 
 
B. Indeterminacy of Translation and Semantic Eliminativism 
 
Rather than provide a detailed, point-by-point assessment of Quine’s thesis of the 
indeterminacy of translation and the merits of the arguments he provides for his thesis,
we will instead connect the charges made in the previous section to Quine’s conception 
of the methodology of radical translation.  We will argue that the same problem of 
presupposing the very notions he intends to undermine and reject undercuts Quine’s 
entire project of semantic eliminativism. 
At the very outset of describing the process of radical translation, Quine relies on 
the concepts of assent and dissent.  He apparently simply takes these concepts as basic, as 
all that he considers worth questioning is how we are to determine whether an individual 
assents or dissents, asking of the linguist, “how is he to recognize native assent and 
dissent when he sees or hears them?” (Quine 1960, 29).  Further, Quine takes this to be 
only a minor problem, which can be dealt with by making preliminary hypotheses, and 
then testing these against actual observations. 
However, the problem that is completely overlooked by Quine in this 
methodological approach of radical translation is how he can even avail himself of the 
concepts of assent and dissent in the first place.  For, these concepts are clearly connected 
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to the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle, since Quine takes it for 
granted that the native cannot both assent and dissent to the same statement at the same 
time.  By assuming assent and dissent to be mutually exclusive responses, Quine has 
presupposed the laws of logic.  Now, why is this problematic for Quine?  Because he has 
argued that the laws of logic are on the same epistemological footing as anyother 
statement.  But, they cannot be if they are presuppositions of the very process of radical 
translation.  If we must presuppose the laws of logic at the outset, then no evidence we 
can obtain through the process of radical translation can ever lead to revising these laws.  
In general, the activity of interpreting the behavior (linguistic and otherwise) of 
individuals presupposes they are bound by the law of non-contradiction if only to the 
extent that they cannot intend to assent and dissent to one and the same statement at a 
single instant. 
To continue with this problem from another perspective, consider how we could 
engage in radical translation without such presuppositions.  What strictly behavioral 
evidence could possibly warrant the hypotheses necessary to even get the process of 
radical translation off the ground?  How could we ever know that a speaker of a language 
was consistent in either her beliefs or her use of words?  Quine merely offers the xample 
of a linguist interrogating a native and getting the responses ‘Evet’ and ‘Yok’ in varying 
circumstances.  He then surmises that these correspond to ‘Yes’ and “No’ in English.  
But, without the presupposition of conformity to the law of non-contradiction (presumed 
by the use of the notion of assent and dissent), how could the translator rule out the 
possibility of a native saying both ‘Evet’ and ‘Yok’?  Or, though this is a slightly 
different point, using ‘Evet’ and ‘Yok’ to mean different things at different times?  We 
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are clearly forced to assume other explanatory hypotheses (e.g., about the natives’
adherence to rules of logic) to even begin the process of translation. 
But what permits the linguist to assume that the native even has the concept of 
assent and dissent, and that the native, like us, cannot both assent and dissent to the same 
statement?  This is what the whole process takes for granted, and for which no behavioral 
evidence would ever be sufficient to establish.  And, this presupposition is not like the 
other “analytical hypotheses” (Quine 1960, 68) that the translator may utilize for testing 
the synonymy of particular utterances, for it is an inherent presupposition of the activity 
of translation itself. 
The problem for Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation may be 
summarized as follows: (1) the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation relies upon the 
methodological processes of translation, (2) the methodological processes of tran lation 
presuppose the laws of logic, and (3) the laws of logic presuppose the 
semantic/intensional concepts that Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy of transla io  is 
intended to argue against.  Thus, Quine’s project of semantic eliminativism cannot get off 
the ground as it presupposes the very semantic/intensional concepts it intends to 
eliminate.  I take it that, in this chain of reasoning, (1) is more or less obvious, and (2) has 
been argued for in this section.  And, finally, (3), which has been hinted at previously, 
shall be argued for more fully in the next chapter.  In fact, it is a cornersto  of the 
positive argument for analyticity.  But, that will have to wait, as next we will address 





III.  Prevailing Attitudes Against Analyticity – and Responses to Those Attitudes 
 
 
Although the radical meaning skepticism of Quine (upon which his rejection of 
analyticity was based) has been widely rejected, his rejection of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction has somehow been widely accepted.  So, it will be worthwhile to attempt to 
delineate what actual arguments are doing the work of sustaining this rejection of 
analyticity in the absence of meaning skepticism.  These often do not even take the form 
of arguments, but are what I call “Prevailing Attitudes Against Analyticit ”.  These 
include the general view that philosophy has failed to give definitive, reductive analyses 
of key philosophical concepts and this failure is taken as evidence that there are no 
analytic propositions.  Following Margolis and Laurence, I will call this “The Retreat 
From Definitions” (Margolis and Laurence 1999, 14).  It also seems clear that the 
analytic/synthetic distinction suffers from a form of “Guilt by Association” in that less 
discriminating individuals, eager to show their rejection of all things positivist c, throw 
out the analytic baby with the verificationist bath water.  Finally, those not inclined to 
slog through the actual arguments and evaluate the merits (or lack thereof) in Quine’s 
copious writing have apparently settled for the accepted wisdom that “Quine showd that 
the analytic/synthetic distinction was illegitimate, didn’t he?” 
 
 
A. “The Retreat From Definitions” 
 
The first commonly-held negative attitude we will address will be referred to as 
“the Retreat from Definitions”, as it involves a rejection of the analytic/snthetic 
distinction on the ground that uncontroversial definitions of concepts seem to be hard to 
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find.  Such definitions would involve both necessary and sufficient conditions, and, 
ideally, also provide a form of decomposition of a more complex concept into a set of 
simpler concepts.  One of the most commonly cited examples is the definition of 
“bachelor” as an unmarried male.  But, even as seemingly straightforward and simple a 
definition as this has been challenged.  What about male infants?  Many would find it odd 
to classify them as bachelors.  To see why this case and others like it appear to some to 
threaten the analytic/synthetic distinction, it may help to have a little morbackground on 
the role of definitions in what Margolis and Laurence refer to as the “Classical Theory of 
Concepts”. 
In Chapter 1, “Concepts and Cognitive Science”, of Concepts, Margolis and 
Laurence present what they refer to as the “Classical Theory of Concepts”, and a key 
element of this theory is that “most concepts … have definitional structure” in that they 
“encode necessary and sufficient conditions for their own application” (Margolis and 
Laurence 1999, 9).  Margolis and Laurence point out that this theory has been incredibly 
influential and that “most theories of concepts can be seen as reactions to, or 
developments of” (Margolis and Laurence 1999, 8) the Classical Theory.  And although 
the Classical Theory is strictly a theory about concepts, it has been closely as ociated 
with the concept of analyticity and the analytic/synthetic distinction (recall how the issue 
of definitions played such a significant role in Quine’s account of analyticity).  Thus, it 
should not be too surprising that criticisms of this theory are often taken as critici ms of 
the analytic/synthetic distinction. 
Hopefully, with those brief comments we can better understand how apparent 
problems with definitions of terms like “bachelor” could lead some to reject the 
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analytic/synthetic distinction. For, arguably the most damaging criticism of the Classical 
Theory is that “for most concepts, there simply aren’t any definitions” (Margolis and 
Laurence 1999, 14), or at least “there are few, if any, examples of definitions that are 
uncontroversial” (Margolis and Laurence 1999, 15).  This has certainly been the case 
with philosophical concepts, as proposed definitions of epistemic concepts like 
knowledge and truth, and moral concepts like good and ought have all been subject to 
criticism, and there seems to be precious little general agreement on the definitions of 
such concepts even after repeated attempts to define them.  Margolis and Laurence not  
that “Ordinary concepts have resisted attempts at definition as well" (Margolis and 
Laurence 1999, 15), and they cite Wittgenstein's argument that the everyday concept of a 
game resists definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
That many have been influenced by these problems with definitions to reject the 
analytic/synthetic distinction is fairly clear.  But, what is far less clear, is exactly what 
form they take the argument from the “Retreat from Definitions” to have, sinceit is 
almost never made explicit.  Thus, let us see if we can construct a version of this 
argument that would do justice to the intuitions at work in the argument.  To be valid, the 
argument would have to assume that the failure of definitions is total, since if there were 
even one successful definition, that would be sufficient to establish that there was an
analytic truth.  Also, the argument must assume that only definitions can provide analytic 
truths, or else the lack of adequate definitions would not be problematic for the 
analytic/synthetic distinction.  Thus, the following seems to be at least a plausible version 
of what those who accept the “Retreat from Definitions” argument are committed to: 
(1) There are no successful definitions of concepts. 
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(2) Only definitions can provide analytic truths. (or, alternatively, the only way of 
representing an analytic truth is in the form of a definition). 
Therefore, (3) there are no analytic truths. 
We could supplement this argument with an inductive argument for premise (1), which 
would be based on the past failures to define concepts (and the citing of cases of faild 
definitions of words like “bachelor” does lend this argument an inductive character).  
And, actually, premise (1) would really need to be the stronger claim that there cannot be 
any successful definitions, as the weaker claim that there are not any might just show our 
failure up to now to construct one (though, a critic of the analytic/synthetic distinction 
might be satisfied with saying that so long as we have not constructed a successful 
definition, then we have no reason to claim there are analytic truths). 
To be fair to Margolis and Laurence, their criticisms of the Classicl Theory of 
Concepts do not commit them to this argument, as they are merely pointing out problems 
with it as a theory of concepts and in their discussion they make no clear indication of 
accepting the rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction as an implication of rejecting 
the Classical Theory.  They do, however, note the necessary connection that “Without 
analyticity, there is no Classical Theory” (Margolis and Laurence 1999, 18).  But, 
regardless of Margolis’s and Laurence’s view on the matter, as others often cite the 
failure of definitions in the context of their rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, 
this argument needs to be addressed. 
Like so many arguments, once the “Retreat from Definitions” argument has been 
made explicit, its weakness as an argument is all too apparent.  And, the response to the 
argument is obvious: not all analyticities are definitional in form.  So, even conceding 
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the controversial premise (1), and granting that there are (and even can be) no successful 
definitions (merely for the sake of argument, as there is actually good reason to think 
there are many successful definitions – and one could cite stipulative definitions, as there 
is no reason to preclude them from this argument), premise (2) is blatantly false.  Even if 
there were no definitions, no conditions that were both necessary and sufficient for the 
application of a concept, there clearly are conditions that are necessary and there are also 
other conditions that are sufficient.   
For example, even if one quibbles with the definition of “bachelor” as “unmarried 
male”, it is still clear that in order to be a bachelor, one must be unmarried, and this trut  
is analytic.  And, should one balk at that example, take the case of the sentence “All 
unmarried males are male”.  Surely, this, though obviously not a definition, is analytic.  
For, while being male is not both necessary and sufficient for being an unmarried mal , it 
is certainly necessary.  So, even if there were no analytic definitions, there would still be 
analyticities, and thus the “Retreat from Definitions” argument fails.  That it s ever 
been taken seriously can only be due to an undue emphasis on definitions (and 
synonyms) in considerations involving the legitimacy of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction. 
 
B. “Guilt by Association” 
 
As flawed as the “Retreat from Definitions” argument is, the “Guilt by 
Association” argument is even worse.  Still, no matter how weak this argument is when 
seen in the light of day, it has been (unfortunately, and embarrassingly) influential.  The 
associations can be presented in a more or less nuanced fashion, and teasing out all the 
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threads can be difficult (and a bit tiresome), but the gist of the argument is tha analyticity 
has been tied to the positivist program, and we all know what evil ne'er-do-wells they 
were.  So, it is concluded, the analytic/synthetic distinction must be rejected along with 
anything else associated with positivism. 
The easy response to this argument is that we can clearly accept the 
analytic/synthetic distinction without adopting the rest of the positivist program.  More 
specifically, there is no implication from accepting analyticities to being committed to 
other positivist claims.  This may be, at least in part, a confusion of necessary and 
sufficient conditions, for, while a distinction between analytic and synthetic sta ements is 
necessary for the positivists’ attempt to ground all of a priori knowledge in analyticities 
conceived of as mere linguistic conventions, it certainly is not the case that such a 
distinction is sufficient for achieving this goal.  One can even reject the conventionalist 
account of analyticity that is at the heart of the positivists’ program to eliminate the need 
for appeals to rational insight to explain our apparent a priori knowledge of logic and 
mathematical truths, and still retain a robust sense of analyticity.  Thus, wile some 
positivist claims require the analytic/synthetic distinction, it does not require them. As 
Margolis and Laurence put the situation:  
So the positivist program falls flat.  But the notion of analyticity needn’t be tied to 
this explanatory burden.  Analyticity simply understood as true in virtue of 
meaning alone might continue to be a viable and useful notion in describing the 
way that natural language and the human conceptual system works. (Margolis and 
Laurence 1999, 20) 
And, as we will see in the next chapter, my account of analyticities clearly r jects the 
positivist account of analyticity and its role in a priori knowledge, while maintaining a 
significant role for the analytic/synthetic distinction. 
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C. Quine Showed that the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction was Illegitimate, 
Didn’t He? 
 
Lastly, there appears to still be a great deal of confusion about not only the merits 
of Quine’s arguments, but even what those arguments are, and what they establish, if 
successful.  Unfortunately, there is the vague notion that whatever his actual arg ments 
were, if Quine did anything, he showed that the analytic/synthetic distinction was 
illegitimate.  And, this attitude is based primarily on perceptions formed regardin  “Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism”, and not as much on Quine’s later works (especially since many 
reject Quine’s more radical semantic holism and semantic skepticism/eliminativism). As 
I hope to have established by a fairly rigorous delineation and assessment of Quine’s 
arguments in “Two Dogmas”, this view is clearly unsupported by a critical reading of 
those arguments. 
Thankfully, the tide is turning, and more and more commentators have recognized 
the shortcomings of Quine’s assault on the analytic/synthetic distinction.  As Grice and 
Strawson noted almost from the outset: “Quine’s case against the existence of the 
analytic-synthetic distinction is not made out” (Grice and Strawson 1970, 74).  And, as 
Scott Soames more recently concludes:  
From our present perspective, Quine doesn’t attempt, let alone succeed, in giving 
a general argument against analyticity.  At most he succeeds in undermining a 
particular conception of analyticity, and a particular set of theses that the 
positivists, and others, held regarding it. (Soames 2003, 361) 
 
In an even slightly later assessment, Alexander Miller concurs with these estimations of 
Quine’s arguments: “Quine’s general line of argument in the first four sections of “Two 
Dogmas” fails to show that analyticity and its cognate concepts are unintellig bl ” (Miller 
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2007, 136).  And, as we have argued above, his arguments in sections 5 and 6 fare no 
better. 
This concludes our examination and assessment of the arguments against 
analyticity.  Having found none of these arguments successful in providing sufficient 
grounds for rejecting the analytic/synthetic distinction per se (though granting that there 
are quite compelling reasons for rejecting the conventionalist accounts of analyticity that 
prior versions of the distinction were based on), we can now turn to an alternative 
account of analyticity and the arguments in favor of a distinction between analytic and 
synthetic propositions based on that account.
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In this chapter I present an alternative account of analyticity that (1) ccounts for 
many of our pre-theoretic intuitions about meaning, (2) avoids the problems of previous 
accounts of analyticity (most notably the problems with conventionalist accounts), a d 
(3) allows for a philosophically significant role for analyticity.  Having responded to the 
arguments most commonly proffered against analyticity and providing an account that 
avoids the problems with conventionalist accounts would make a strong p ima facie case 
for the analytic/synthetic distinction.  However, I also present additional positive 
arguments for the distinction based on the account of analyticity presented in this chapter. 
Gilbert Harman claims that the conventionalist account is “the only serious 
attempt” to explain analyticity and how the analytic status of a claim makes the claim 
knowable “by virtue of knowledge of meaning” (Harman 1999, 120).  And thus, 
believing it to be the only account of analyticity worth considering, and having noted the 
problems with the conventionalist account, Harman rejects analyticity.  Laurence 
BonJour is also very critical of conventionalist accounts, and shares Harman’s skeptici m 
of what Harman calls “a full-blooded theory of analytic truth” (BonJour 1998, 73), which 
includes the claim that analytic truths are true “in virtue of meaning”.  However, it should 
be noted that although Harman and BonJour both reject the conventionalist account of 
analyticity, while Harman concludes that we should reject the analytic/synthetic 
distinction entirely, BonJour is merely arguing that one cannot explain our a priori 
knowledge of analytic statements by an appeal to linguistic conventions.  Thus, BonJour, 
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contrary to Harman, leaves open the possibility of a legitimate account of analyticity, 
even favorably citing the Fregean conception of analyticity “as reducibility to logical 
truth via substitution of synonyms”, and ultimately based on the concept of sameness of 
meaning (BonJour 1998, 72).  In this chapter I offer an alternative account of analyticity 
that does not rely on conventionalism, but is also not based on logical truth as the 
Fregean conception of analyticity is.  I will argue that this account of analyticity is “full-
blooded” in that it makes it possible for us to know a claim to be true in virtue of the 
meanings involved in the claim, and that the analytic/synthetic distinction can be made 
and can be grounded in our rational insight into the relations between meanings (which 
also accounts for our a priori knowledge). 
 
Following a presentation of analyticity along the lines sketched above, I will then 
argue that this account is in no way susceptible to the criticisms of the conventionalist 
accounts of analyticity.  BonJour, a harsh critic of the conventionalism of what he calls 
the “moderate empiricist” position regarding analyticity, points out its failure to provide 
“an unproblematic explanation of a priori justification” (BonJour 1998, 28).  But, this is 
not an essential feature of analyticity, and BonJour himself allows that it is possible to 
provide an adequate account of analyticity.  As he states in his reply to Quine’s challenge 
to find “a viable entry into the “circle of terms”” (BonJour 1998, 71) (and, as BonJour 
notes, Quine’s argument can only be made plausible by following Quine’s “casual 
dismissal of the idea of meaning” (BonJour 1998, 71)), “the Fregean conception [of 
analyticity] in particular seems to survive unscathed” (BonJour 1998, 73).  BonJour even 
outlines the key steps in arriving at this conception of analyticity:  “the most natural and 
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obvious course of explanation is to explain synonmy as sameness of meaning and then 
explain analyticity in terms of synonmy in the Fregean way” (BonJour 1998, 71).   
Although this explanation of analyticity seems quite appropriate in responding to 
Quine’s challenge for a way to break into the "circle of terms", as noted earlier, sameness 
of meaning is just one of the relations that can make a proposition analytic (which is not 
to suggest that either Frege or BonJour would disagree with this point).  It is nonetheless 
worth noting as many critics of analyticity often focus solely on cases of purported 
sameness of meaning (cf. all the attention paid to whether "bachelor" means th  same as 
"unmarried male").  However, much more problematic for this Fregean account is that, as 
commonly understood, it attempts to derive analyticity from logical truth.  And this is 
problematic since, as will be argued later in this chapter, logical truth presupposes 
analyticity.  So, while similar to the account offered here in that it recognizes the role of 
synonymy and its grounding in sameness of meaning, the Fregean account ultimately 
appears to suffer from the same mistaken syntactic conception of logic that Quine and the 
positivists held, and the belief that we can somehow distinguish the so-called “logical 
truths” from other analytic claims and derive all analytic claims from a syntactically 
sanctioned set of propositions with no reliance on semantic concepts like meaning. 
After demonstrating that the account of analyticity offered here avoids the 
problems of the conventionalist accounts, I will then discuss the proper relationships 
between analyticity and necessity, and analyticity and a priori knowledge.  I will argue 
that, although not providing the kind of account the positivists had hoped for, an 
understanding of the true nature of analyticity does provide a ground for the intuition of a 
close tie between these concepts.  Further, I will examine how the account of analyticity 
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offered here provides a means by which to clarify the relation between the aalytic and 
the a priori. 
 
II.  Statement of the Account 
 
 
A. Propositions, Meanings, and Relations of Meanings 
 
 
 Let us begin with a statement of analyticity: a sentence (or, more accurately, a 
proposition) is analytic iff its truth or falsity is due solely to the logical relations of the 
expressions (again, more accurately, the meanings) of which it is composed, along with 
the relations the sentence (proposition) claims to obtain between these expressions 
(meanings).  It is in this sense that the proposition is true “in virtue of the meanings”, for 
it is not dependent for its truth value upon any state of affairs in the world.  Or, if one 
considers meanings to be part of the furniture of the world, then they can feel free to alter
this to “any state of affairs in the world other than the meanings and their logical 
relations”.  But, contra Harman, I find it more useful to distinguish knowledge of 
meanings and their logical relations from knowledge about the world, which is why, to 
answer Harman’s question3, it does not involve knowing something about the world to 
know that copper is copper).  Given the emphasis on meanings and their relations, it 
seems appropriate to call this account a “Semantic Account” of analyticity.  This may 
                                                      
3 Harman groups “Copper is a metal” and “Copper is copper” in the same class of (for him, purportedly) 
analytic statements, and asks how the truth of these claims can be independent of the way the world is 
(Harman 1999, 120).   Some might think the first sta ement is synthetic, but setting that concern aside, the 
main point here is that the relations between meanings are fundamentally different than the physical 
relations that obtain between physical objects, and the claims made regarding these different kinds of 
relations are also fundamentally different, as are the kinds of knowledge we may have of these relations.  
So, it seems quite appropriate to distinguish these kinds of claims by saying that one is “about the world” 
while the other is not.  
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also serve to distinguish it from an “Epistemological” or “Epistemic” account f 
analyticity, such as that offered by Boghossian (Boghossian 1996). 
 A little background might help clarify this account.  Many take sentences to 
express propositions and further note that a proposition is what is in common to two (or 
more) different sentences that say the same thing  (and this “thing” that they expr ss is 
what is called a “proposition”).  For example, "Snow is white" and "Schnee ist we s" are 
taken to express the same proposition.  And, my claim is that just as sentences expres  
propositions, constituents of sentences, i.e., expressions, express something as well, and
that something is meanings.  That is, the initially intuitive description of meanings is that 
we use words (or expressions) to express meanings.  And, just as with sentences and 
propositions, different expressions can express the same meaning.  In fact, to take the
words from our two sentences, "Snow" and "Schnee" both express the same meaning. 
This last point highlights another important point about meanings (and another 
aspect to the analogy between meanings/expressions and propositions/sentences):  
propositions are composed of meanings.  This should not be surprising since sentences 
are composed of expressions, sentences express propositions, and expressions express 
meanings.  And, this suggests another significant point about meanings and propositions.  
Propositions are not merely "composed" of meanings if by this all one means is that there 
is a list of meanings strung together and the only relation between the meanings in the 
proposition is one of juxtaposition.  No, meanings are related in propositions in much 
more significant ways.  By far the most common way (or is it ultimately the only way?) 
in which meanings are related to each other in propositions is via the predication relation 
in which one meaning is predicated of another.  For example, in the proposition 
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expressed by "Snow is white", the meaning expressed by "white" is predicated (not in the 
more common linguistic sense of “predicate”, but in a more fundamental, even 
Aristotelian, sense) of the meaning expressed by "Snow". 
 Now, given that propositions involve predicating meanings of meanings (note that 
it is not necessary that this is true of all propositions, but merely of all analytic ones, 
though it is hard to conceive of a proposition that does not involve such a relation of 
meanings), the analytic propositions are those for which the logical relation of the
meanings determines its truth-value.  This is perhaps easiest to see in cases of identity, 
when the same meaning is predicated of itself (e.g., bachelors are bachelors - note: 
again, I will use italics to indicate propositions and meanings rather than the words used 
to express these), but the same principle applies for other logical relations between 
meanings (e.g., meaning-inclusion, as in tall dogs are dogs).  And, conversely, when the 
logical relations of the meanings are not sufficient to determine the proposition’s truth-
value, the proposition is synthetic (e.g., dogs are tall).  Finally, note that some 
propositions are analytically false (e.g., unmarried males are married). 
 
B. Relation to Previous Accounts 
 
This statement of analyticity might initially appear very familiar and others have 
certainly embraced the notion of statements that are true “in virtue of the meanings”, and 
this is no accident, since I firmly believe it is this very notion of analyticit  that many 
other philosophers were grasping, even if incompletely understanding its true natur  and 
full implications.  Thus, while recognizing the importance of the analytic/snthetic 
distinction, and even seeing its essential feature as involving the relations of meanings, a 
 158
failure to understand the precise manner in which a proposition is true in virtue of 
meanings, and mistakenly seeing the only viable option as the conventional associations 
of meanings with the words used in sentences, previous accounts could not avoid the 
pitfalls of conventionalism. Being clear on the distinction between sentences and 
propositions, and keeping in mind that analyticity is a property of propositions, and not 
sentences, makes it easier to avoid these pitfalls.  More will be said about this distinction 
in the next section. 
Thus, the difference between this account and the most commonly championed 
accounts is quite radical, and here, as in so many cases in philosophy, little things mean a 
lot.  For, what might seem like a slight shift from this statement to one emphasizing the 
meanings of words and the linguistic conventions that imbue these words with meanings, 
can make a very large difference indeed.  This is not a conventionalist account, and no 
appeal is made to linguistic practices to create the truth-value of analytic propositions. 
Further, no attempt is made to explain our a priori knowledge of these truths by a mere 
awareness of linguistic conventions or pragmatic stipulations and to thereby avoid any 
appeal to the mind’s ability to grasp the logical relations of meanings.  But, since these 
logical relations are grasped by our reasoning faculty, they are properly called by Hume’s 
designation, “truths of reason”, and, to give Hume even more credit, if we replace his 
psychologistic notion of “ideas” with that of meanings, although all propositions involve 
relations of “ideas”/meanings, analytic propositions are those in which there are special 
“relations of ideas”. 
Special recognition must be granted to the relationship between this Semantic 
Account and the views of C. I. Lewis.  Although Lewis’s pragmatic conventionalism has 
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been severely criticized, and it shares many of the problems of linguistic 
conventionalism, Lewis had a much deeper understanding of the issues related to 
analyticity than any of his contemporaries.  And, in his later work he made many 
statements that would fit nicely with the Semantic Account offered here.  Without going 
into detail, here are a few passages from An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation 
(Lewis 1946) that illustrate the similarities regarding his view of the nature of analyticity, 
our knowledge of analytic propositions, and its fundamental relation to meanings: 
“what is analytically true is a question of direct insight” (Lewis 1946, 111) 
“this appeal to discernment of a meaning as something essential for determination 
of analytic truth in general” (Lewis 1946, 112) 
“it is either true or false according as the meanings in question do or do not have 
the relation which it asserts” (Lewis 1946, 112) 
“the determination of analytic truth in general which depends upon recourse to 
meanings” (Lewis 1946, 112) 
 
 
C. Propositions, Not Sentences 
 
A key element in this semantic account of analyticity is that analyticity is a 
property of propositions, not sentences.  Strictly speaking, since propositions are the
primary bearers of truth values, it is only propositions that can be true or false, much less 
analytically true or false.  There is no harm in speaking of sentences as trueor false, so 
long as we are clear that this is true only indirectly and derivatively, and that ultimately it 
is the proposition expressed by a sentence that is true or false.  However, there are 
problems that arise if we mistakenly think that it is the sentences themselv s that have 
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these semantic properties.  Although we shall have more to say later regarding the 
shortcomings of a nominalistic approach which places undue faith in syntax as a ground 
for logic (and as a stand-in for semantics in general), and it is a short step from an 
emphasis on sentences to embracing such an approach (as illustrated so starkly by 
Quine), for now we can merely make the cautionary note that it is hard to see how 
sentences themselves could ever be thought to contain the whole story of semantics.  We 
will also simply note for now (and address more fully in the next section) that treating 
analyticity as a property of sentences rather than propositions would seem to have
significant implications regarding the status of analyticity. 
Thus the claim made by this whole-heartedly semantic account of analyticity is 
that one cannot capture analyticity with just sentences, and that we ultimately need to 
appeal to propositions.  One can try to follow Quine’s attempt to find a substitute for 
propositions (cf. his "eternal sentences" (Quine 1960)), or one can try to lean on pure 
syntax, but these will not work (which, I would argue is evident from his failure to find a 
place for so basic a concept as analyticity in his philosophical system).  To account for 
analyticity, we need semantic concepts, which is to say we need propositions and we 
need meanings.  Oddly enough, there are those who have no trouble granting 
propositions, but balk at accepting meanings, as if there were any significant difference 
between the statuses of these entities.  Further, it would seem that any argument that can 
be made for granting propositions can readily be employed to grant meanings, with only 
the most minor of modifications.  Finally, we might add that, granting propositions, and 
granting the principle of semantic compositionality, would also seem to commit one to 
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granting semantic sub-components of propositions.  And, what are these sub-components 




III.  Status of Analyticity 
 
 
A. Not an Empirical Question 
 
Having provided a statement of the Semantic Account of analyticity, we shall 
next examine the status of analyticity according to this account of analyticity.  The first 
thing to note is that it is not an empirical question whether or not a proposition is analytic 
(or synthetic, for that matter).  In fact, on this semantic account of analyticity, it is 
analytic whether a proposition is analytic or synthetic, for whether a propositi n i  
analytic or synthetic is purely a matter of the relations between the meanings of which the 
proposition is composed and the predication relations claimed for these meanings in the 
proposition. 
For example, a green chair is a chair is analytic because it predicates the meaning 
chair of the meaning reen chair and the relation between these two meanings is such 
that the proposition must be true.  Similarly, a bachelor is married is analytic because it 
predicates the meaning married of the meaning bachelor and the relation between these 
two meanings is such that the proposition must be false (which shows how antonyms are 
sufficient to establish analyticity, and illustrates an analytically f se claim).  Finally, a 
chair is green is synthetic because it predicates the meaning green of the meaning chair 
and the relation between these two meanings is such that the truth value of the 
proposition is not fully determined by the relations between these meanings.   
 162
The main point is of course not the status of these particular propositions, but 
rather that the analytic/synthetic status of any proposition is itself a matter of the relations 
of meanings of which the proposition is composed along with the relations the 
proposition claims to obtain between these meanings, and that makes the proposition that 
a proposition is analytic (or synthetic) itself an analytic proposition.  However, as will 
become clear shortly, this does not make this proposition (i.e., that the original 
proposition is analytic), or the original proposition, obvious.  But, before leaving this 
section, it will be worth noting the connection between the status of analyticity and the 
issue of whether it is a property of sentences or propositions, as the full implications of 
this important distinction are rather significant. 
Many of the misunderstandings regarding analyticity can be cleared up if this is
kept clearly in mind, and much of what is said about analyticity when it is thought that it 
is a property of sentences is not true of this account of analyticity.  Moreover, many 
worries regarding analyticity are no longer of concern when it is understood to be a 
property of propositions and not sentences.  For our purposes in this section, it is most 
important to note that while it is not an empirical question whether a proposition is 
analytic, it is an empirical question whether a sentence is analytic.  For, even if the 
analytic/synthetic status of the proposition expressed by the sentence is not an empirical 
question, it is an empirical question whether a given sentence expresses a particular 
proposition, and one that is determined by consulting linguistic usage. 
 Both proponents and critics of the analytic/synthetic distinction have held that 
analyticity is a property of sentences, and also held that it was an empirical question 
whether a given sentence was analytic.  Morton White provides one of the clearest 
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statements of this position in a key passage of his essay “The Analytic and the Syn tic: 
An Untenable Dualism”: 
it is obvious that if the problem is set in the manner outlined, then the statement "'All 
men are rational animals' is analytic" is itself empirical.  For to decide that the 
statement is analytic we will have to find out whether "man" is in fact synonym us 
with "rational animal" and this will require the empirical examination of lingu stic 
usage. (White 1970, 81) 
 
And, as noted previously, this view (that sentences, and not propositions, are to be the 
focus for deciding the analytic/synthetic distinction, and that this is an empirical 
question) is held by those who defend the distinction as well.  Benson Mates, a supporter 
of the analytic/synthetic distinction, claims in his article, "Synonymit ", that "We need 
empirical research regarding ordinary language in order to determine which expressions 
are in fact synonymous" (Mates 1970, 102). 
Since both sides of the debate had either expressly stated or implicitly assumed 
that analyticity is a property of sentences, and since the status of sentences certainly 
seems to be an empirical question (which highlights again Quine’s interest in stipulative 
definitions, and would explain his concern over their status), the conclusion they drew 
was that the analytic/synthetic distinction is an empirical issue.  For, what any sentence 
means, and thus, whether any sentence is analytic or synthetic, is an empirical issue.  This 
is another reason why it is such an insidious mistake to treat analyticity as a property of 
sentences.  For, it is only a short step from claiming that analyticity is an empirical 
question to claiming that it is one that cannot be determined, and thereby to challenge the 
analytic/synthetic distinction.  Granted, it is a much bigger step - nay, even a leap - to 
follow Quine and claim that there is no fact of the matter whether a sentence is analytic, 
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but even this view appears to be grounded on the initial assumption that analyticity is a 
property of sentences, and not propositions.   
Additionally, since the meanings of sentences are determined by convention, it is 
easy to see the roots of linguistic conventionalism in this view.  So, the flaws in the 
positions of both proponents and critics of analyticity can plausibly be seen to originate n 
the mistaken view that analyticity is a property of sentences.  By recognizin  that 
analyticity is properly understood as a property of propositions, we can avoid these 
confusions and the dire consequences of either attempting to ground the 
analytic/synthetic distinction in conventions or of rejecting the distinction entirely. 
 
 
B. Not Psychologically Obvious 
 
 
Another mistaken conception about analytic claims is that they must be 
psychologically obvious.  Given this Semantic Account of analyticity, there is no 
necessary connection between the analyticity of a proposition and its being obvious to us.  
In fact, many analytic claims are not psychologically obvious, and, we may need to work 
through a complex demonstration involving a series of calculations, computations, or 
proofs to see that a claim is analytic.  And, as with the notion that analyticity is a property 
of sentences and is therefore an empirical issue, the mistaken intuition that analytic 
claims must be obvious appears to lie behind many false claims about analyticity, and 
even doubting that there are analyticities seems to be often driven by this intuit on.  For 
example, the argument that because no definitions are "uncontroversial" or "obvious", 
there are no analyticities, is clearly based on this mistaken belief. 
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To be fair, there is some reason behind the intuition that analytic claims should be 
psychologically obvious.  For, if analyticity is a matter of the relations of meanings, and 
we have access to meanings (in a kind of internalistic way), then it would seem that we 
should be able to intuit or “just see” that a proposition is analytic.  Further, this certainly 
is the case with many analytic propositions.  For example, the proposition no bachelors 
are married is analytically true and is readily recognized to be true.  But, not all analytic 
propositions have truth values that are so obvious to us.  For example, for many it is not 
obvious whether the proposition there is a barber who shaves all and only those who do 
not shave themselves is true or false.  We could cite additional examples of propositions 
with a complicated logical structure whose truth values require a careful analysis of the 
components and their logical relations, and anyone who has taught a beginning logic 
class will attest that there are those who do not find even relatively simple pro ositions to 
be initially (or even eventually) obvious. 
This should be sufficient to establish that not all analytic propositions are 
psychologically obvious and that doubtfulness is not a sign of a lack of analyticity. For, 
the complete logical implications of the relations between meanings are often far from 
obvious.  Even Quine’s own example of the statement 'Everything green is extended' 
might be used to serve our purposes.  For, as most people understand the example, any 
puzzle about its status has to do with the relation between the meanings involved, and the 
fact that individuals attempt to come up with counterexamples, rather than showing that 
the proposition is synthetic, instead shows they are attempting to delineate the logical 
implications and logical “boundaries” of these meanings.  One last historical note worth 
mentioning is that in the intuitions on the topic of psychological obviousness we might 
 166
find evidence of the influence of Leibniz’s views regarding our ability to demonstrate or 
show that analytic propositions are true. 
 
C. Not Necessarily Uninformative 
 
Next, given the nature of analytic propositions, many think they cannot be 
informative.  This was even a point of emphasis in the positivist’s position, since they 
wanted to distinguish between synthetic truths which were “about the world” and analytic 
truths which were not about the world and hence considered to be uninformative, merely 
expressing our linguistic conventions.  However, as Ayer and others were keen to point 
out, any complete account of analyticity, especially as it pertains to theru s of 
mathematics, “must explain how a proposition which is empty of all factual content can 
be true and useful and surprising” (Ayer 1952, 73).  And so, even those embracing the 
linguistic conventionalism account of analyticity offered an explanation of how analytic 
propositions could be informative. 
The positivists were right to acknowledge the informative aspect of analytic 
propositions, but on this Semantic Account of analyticity, the information contained in 
analytic propositions is not about our linguistic conventions, but rather it is about the 
logical implications of the relations between meanings.  On this account, we may ven 
need to discover analytic truths.  For example, a logic student may need to learn the 
logical implications of the meanings and and or and thereby discover DeMorgan’s Laws 
to be true.  We will have more to say regarding logic (and mathematics) and analytic 
propositions in the next section on the implications of the Semantic Account of 
analyticity. 
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IV.  Implications of the Semantic Account of Analyticity 
 
 
A. Not Just Synonyms are Analytic 
 
One clear implication of this Semantic Account of analyticity is that analytic 
propositions are not restricted to statements of synonymy.  For, as noted previously, there 
are relations between meanings other than identity, notably meaning-inclusion and 
antonymy.  This may seem a minor point, but it is one that is often overlooked, with 
unfortunate consequences.  Some critics of analyticity focus on synonymy as if it were 
the only way in which there could be analyticities, when it should be clear that something 
can be analytic without it including both a necessary and a sufficient condition.  A merely 
necessary or a merely sufficient condition will do.  For example, a tall man is a man, a 
green door is green are analytic, as is only dogs are poodles. 
Various forms of meaning-inclusion might come to mind more readily, but 
antonymy is a key relation between meanings, and one that can ground analytic 
propositions.  Fred Sommers makes the case for antonymy in his article, “Meaning 
Relations and the Analytic" (Sommers, 1963b).  In that article, Sommers argues that 
antonymy is actually a more central relation between meanings than synonymy for 
establishing the analytic/synthetic relation, and it is unfortunate that this classic article 
has not received more recognition in the discussion of analyticity. 
So, even if Fodor and others so desperately opposed to analyticities can claim that 
"bachelors" and "unmarried males" are not really synonyms, since, e.g., a baby boy is an 
unmarried male, but few would feel comfortable calling him a "bachelor", this is far from 
sufficient for proving their point that there are no analyticities.  And, in particular, it does 
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not show that the claim that there are no married bachelors is not analytic.  Thus, 
Sommers' point about antonymy is especially germane, and would require critics of 
analyticity to come up with an alternative response.  
 
B. Math and Logic are Analytic 
 
With this Semantic Account of analyticity, all the propositions of mathematics 
and logic are analytic, since they are all claims regarding the relations of meanings.  In 
fact, there is no fundamental difference between the so-called "truths of logic" and any 
other analytic propositions.  The propositions of mathematics may be distinguished from 
other analytic truths by their subject matter, but they are not different in kind, sharing the 
same essential characteristic of all analytic truths, having their truth-value determined by 
the relations between the meanings in the proposition and the relations the proposition 
claims obtains between those meanings. 
Looking at the truths of logic first, we have already noted that De Morgan’s laws 
are analytic.  These should be understood as stating the meaning relations that hold 
between the meanings conjunction, disjunction, and negation.  Other rules of logic codify 
the meaning relations between other meanings of particular interest to logicians, like all 
and some.  Though espousing a form of pragmatic conventionalism, C. I. Lewis always 
seemed to understand the relationship between analyticity and logic.  This is mo t clearly 
stated in his classic work, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (Lewis 1946), where 
he devotes considerable attention to the subject.  Much of what he says applies to this 
Semantic Account of analyticity (which should not be surprising, given Lewis’s focus on 
meanings/intensions).  First, Lewis agrees with the general analytic nature of the 
propositions of logic: “The principles of logic are analytic in this sense: their truth is 
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certifiable by reference to intensional meanings involved in the statement of them” 
(Lewis 1946, 38).  Next, he agrees with the relationship between the propositions of logic 
and other analytic propositions, even offering a pragmatic criterion for distinguishing the 
principles of logic from the rest:  
There is, however, no way of distinguishing fundamentally between principles of 
logic and other analytic truths.  Such distinction is conventional, in the sense that 
it turns upon relative importance for the critique of inference, and upon 
comparative generality. (Lewis 1946, 38).   
 
This pragmatic criterion is echoed again later:  
Statements belonging to logic are marked off as a class from other analytic 
statements only by having a certain kind of generality making them specially 
useful for the critique of inference (Lewis 1946, 97). 
 
Given the importance that has been placed on the propositions of mathematics 
historically and their role in the debate over analyticity, they deserve additional 
discussion apart from the propositions of logic, even though their status as analytic 
propositions is grounded in precisely the same manner.  For example, consider the 
meaning of an expression like "53", and then think of the relation between that meaning 
and the meaning of the expression "(5 * 10) + 3".  Certainly 53 = (5 * 10) + 3.  And, this 
certainty is due to the analytic nature of this proposition.  That the fact that the 
propositions of mathematics are all analytic has ever been doubted would seem to be due 
to one or more of the mistaken conceptions of analyticity that have already been 
discussed.  Prime candidates are the notion that analytic truths are created by convention 
(and thus how could all the infinity of mathematical truths be analytic, since there is no 
explicit convention for each of them?) and the mistaken conception that analytic 
propositions must be psychologically obvious.  This latter misconception might seem too 
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insignificant to do such damage, but it has lingered on from Leibniz and Kant to the 
present day.  For there are those who would suppose that some truths of mathematics are 
analytic because they require no calculation and their truth can be seen at a glance, but 
that others, like 1024 = 2**10, are somehow synthetic since many individuals would 
have to perform calculations and would need to discover the truth of the equation.  But, 
can there be any doubt that there is no fundamental difference between 53 = (5*10) + 3 




C. Avoids the Problems of Conventionalist Accounts 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, and as can be seen from the statement of the Semantic 
Account, it clearly avoids the problems with the conventionalist accounts of analyticity.  
This should be obvious, since the primary problem with these accounts is that they take 
for granted the very a priori knowledge of principles of logic that their account of 
analyticity was intended to dispense with.  Their goal was to show that conventions could 
create analytic truths that we could come to know with no reliance on rational insight, but 
were based merely on our knowledge of the conventions themselves.  Since this Semantic 
Account does not even intend to dispense with rational insight into a priori truths, it in no 
way risks the inconsistency of relying on the very a priori insight it is intended to 
dismiss, as in the conventionalist accounts of analyticity.   
Additionally, there is no problem with an infinity of analytic truths in this account 
as there is in the conventionalist account, since these are clearly granted in this Semantic 
Account, given the infinity of meanings and thus the infinity of the relations these
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meanings have to each other (which is not say there is an infinity of types of relati ns, but 
merely that there is an infinity of values of the relations between meanings). The full 
implication of the difference between this Semantic Account and the conventionalis 
accounts on the relation between analyticity and  priori knowledge should become 
clearer in the next section, as it addresses the relationship of this account of analyticity to 
a priority and necessity. 
 
D. Relationship Between Analyticity, A Priority, and Necessity 
 
 Given that this Semantic Account of analyticity avoids the problems of 
conventionalist accounts and fully accepts the role of rational insight in establishing a 
priori  knowledge, it would seem that BonJour would have no essential complaint with 
this account of analyticity.  However, we have still not addressed his concern about the 
relation between analyticity and the a priori.  I address that concern by simply making no 
claim for this account to ground all  priori knowledge.  For, like BonJour, I find it 
difficult to account for how we could know that a proposition is analytic without appeal 
at some point to what he calls “rational insight”.  The most obvious question about this 
account is by virtue of what mental capacity do we come to “grasp” (and our use of such 
metaphorical language is often a clue that we lack anything approaching an adequate 
explanatory model of the concepts and processes involved) meanings?  Further, how do 
we recognize the logical relations between meanings?  However, BonJour argues rather 
forcefully that the purported mysteriousness of rational insight is exaggerated (BonJour 
1998) and that everyone, even the most ardent empiricist, must ultimately rely on such 
insight.  If he is correct, then although it would still be desirable to have a more complete 
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account of rational insight, a failure to provide such an account need not be viewed as a 
serious defect in a conception of analyticity. 
BonJour (BonJour 1998) makes a sustained critique of the failure of moderate 
empiricists to recognize their implicit reliance on principles of logic in their accounts of 
analyticity.  He argues that this reliance commits them to some other foundation for the 
epistemological role of analytic claims, since “the a priori status of these logical relations 
… cannot itself be accounted for by those same conventions, on pain of obvious 
circularity” (BonJour 1998, 57).  And, although, BonJour has made his point in this 
passage with regard to the conventionalist account of analyticity, it would apply equally 
to the account offered here.  But, this concern is not applicable so long as there is no 
claim that this account of analyticity somehow provides a means for explaining ll a 
priori  knowledge without appeal to any rational insight.  Rather, the account relies on 
something very much like BonJour’s conception of rational insight to even explain how 
we can know that a proposition is analytic.  But, and this might be of no small 
significance, the account of analyticity offered here does provide a means by which to 
clarify the relation between the analytic and the a priori. 
Recall that a proposition is analytic simply in virtue of the logical relations of the 
meanings included in the proposition and the logical relations the proposition claims for 
these meanings (i.e., it is not just that the meanings have the logical relations they have to 
each other, but also the logical relation that the proposition is claiming that they have to 
each other, that determines the proposition’s truth-value).  A key thing to note about this 
conception of analyticity is that it makes the analytic/synthetic distinction dependent 
solely upon meanings and not upon our understanding of meanings or any other 
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epistemological notions.  It is not because the propositions are “obvious” or that we 
“cannot conceive” their truth-value to be other than it is that makes the propositions 
analytic.  It is, in this sense, a non-epistemological account of analyticity.  It thus allows 
us to make a clear distinction between the analyticity of a proposition and whether or not 
we can know it a priori.  But, granted this essential separation between these two 
concepts, the account suggests that, although the analytic/synthetic status of a proposition 
is independent of our knowledge (or even awareness) of the proposition, this status is 
knowable a priori, since the only plausible explanation for how we come to know this 
status is via rational insight.  So, when we, through rational insight, grasp the meanings  
in a proposition, and the logical relations claimed of them, and we thereby come to know 
the claim’s truth-value, we both know that the claim is analytic, and we know its truth-
value a priori (note that for synthetic claims, we also come to know a priori that they are 
synthetic, but we are unable to know their truth-value  priori, which is, ironically 
enough, to say that we know a priori that we cannot know their truth-value a priori).  
Ultimately, analyticity is at least in one sense more basic than our a priori 
knowledge, since the logical relations of meanings that make a proposition analytic are 
independent of our knowing the proposition a priori.  And, even though no claim is made 
here that these are the only propositions that can be known a priori, one can see how the 
relationship between the analytic and the a priori, though incompletely understood in the 
past, made it tempting for philosophers to think that this is the case.  And, one might 
venture to suppose that the only thing we can know a priori is the logical relations of 
meanings, but these are the essence of the analytic.  Thus, this account might provide 
support for the first thesis BonJour attributes to moderate empiricism, “that genuine a 
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priori  justification is restricted to analytic propositions” (BonJour 1998, 29).   But, this in 
no way satisfies the moderate empiricist’s second goal of providing an account of the a 
priori  (or the analytic, for that matter) that “can be understood epistemologically in  way 
that does not require the sort of allegedly mysterious intuitive capacity advocated by 
rationalism and thus is epistemologically unproblematic from an empiricist poin of 
view” (BonJour 1998, 29). 
Chapter 2 presented Kant’s account of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and one 
additional comment regarding Kant’s conception of the distinction is in order here.  A 
clarification that the Semantic Account of analyticity offered here provides s the 
separation between the non-epistemological status of the analytic/synthetic distinction 
and the epistemological status of the a priori / a posteriori distinction.  And, given this 
separation, we can now see how Kant’s examples and his account of them confused 
epistemological issues with issues more properly understood in terms of the logical 
relations of meanings.  This is perhaps most clear in his positive account of synthetic 
judgments as ones that extend our knowledge, which makes the distinction relative to our 
epistemological state.  And, even worse, this could make the distinction relative to a 
given individual's epistemic state, since a judgment might extend one person's knowledge 
but not another.  Consider the case of mathematics, where one person might be able to 
"just see" that 7*9=63, whereas another, perhaps a child just learning the multiplication 
tables, might have to do a calculation.  And so, it would seem that for the more 
knowledgeable mathematician, the judgment does not extend their knowledge, and hence 
is analytic, but for the child it does extend their knowledge, and so is synthetic for them.  
Hence the distinction would be relative to the individual who makes the judgment.  We 
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might also think of cases of additions that one just has never considered before, but that 
are obvious once one has considered them (e.g., 3,124,567,892 + 1). 
Returning to Kant’s claim that 7 + 5 = 12 is synthetic, we can now see that the 
proposition is analytic because of the relations between the meanings which are the 
component parts of the proposition.  And the same is true for much larger numbers, since 
the epistemological issue that it might be more difficult for us to tell or that we might 
have to do some calculations to prove to ourselves that it is true has no bearing on its 
underlying analytic nature.  The proposition's truth is determined by the logical relations 
of the meanings, and whether we can recognize its truth by a single flash of rational 
insight (as opposed to a series of logical/mathematical calculations - each of which is 
itself based on rational insight - see BonJour's comments on the nature of logical proofs 
w.r.t. this point (BonJour 1998, 131-133)) is irrelevant to the proposition’s analytic 
status. 
 So, although this account of analyticity does not even attempt to have it play the 
role of explaining all our a priori knowledge in a manner amenable to the philosophical 
goals of the logical positivists, it does not follow that it cannot further our understanding 
of the nature of analytic propositions and how we are able to know their truth-values.  
Thus, while not playing the same explanatory role as was once thought, it is my position 
that a proper understanding of the nature of analyticity is closely connected to any 
explanation of how we can have a priori knowledge of analytic truths and why they are 






V. Arguments for the Account 
 
 
A. A Prima Facie Case for Analyticity 
 
In this section I will conclude by briefly laying out some of the arguments tha 
can be offered in support of analyticity given this account of it.  One of these arguments 
derives from being able to provide satisfactory responses to the arguments agai st 
analyticity that have been noted in the previous chapters.  This cause is aided 
considerably by offering an account of analyticity that does not rely on linguistic 
conventions as the ground of analyticity, as we avoid the most damaging criticisms of 
previous accounts of analyticity (certainly those presented by Quine in “Truth by 
Convention”).  Also, we have provided responses to what are considered the most serious 
objections to the notion of analyticity, those offered by Quine in “Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism” (Quine 1953).  And so, by responding to all the notable objections and by 
(presumably) exhibiting the basic intuitive plausibility of the notion in the form of an 
alternative account of analyticity that relies solely on the logical reltions of meanings, 
we now have a prima facie case for analyticity that at least should shift the burden of 
proof to those who reject the notion. 
 
B. Another Prima Facie Case for Analyticity 
 
 
As noted previously, one reason the analytic/synthetic distinction is significant is 
that it would provide an explanation of our pre-theoretic intuitions.  Thus, another prima 
facie case for analyticity can be found in the fact that we at least appear to be able to 
make the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions and to teach this 
distinction to others.  That we even tend to be able to recognize the same propositions as 
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analytic is a fact that requires an explanation and shifts the burden onto those who reject 
the analytic/synthetic distinction to provide a suitable explanation.  If therew r  nothing 
to the distinction at all, then why would we all seem to come up with the same exampls, 
and why would these examples even tempt us into thinking they were analytic?  Georges 
Rey calls this convergence (i.e., “the patterns and projections in people’s judgments”) 
“the analytic data” (Rey 1993, 83), and he argues that it provides a prima facie case for 
analyticity.  In addition to these appeals to our ordinary intuitions of analyticity, there are 
more formal, linguistic studies that also provide evidence of such convergence.  Katz 
(Katz 1972) points out that these studies show subjects to be in significant agreement 
about analytic relations. 
 
C. The Argument from Presupposition: General Form 
 
While the ability to explain the analytic data is one argument in favor of the 
notion of analyticity, another, stronger argument can be found in the fact that we 
presuppose analyticity in so much of our mental life.  I will call this argument th  
“Argument from Presupposition”.  In ordinary, daily conversations, whenever we talk 
about topics with other individuals, we presuppose that we can talk about the same thing.  
And, when we disagree with another person, we take it for granted that our disagreement 
is substantive, but, this is only possible if we are capable of meaning the same thing by 
the words we use to express our thoughts.   
For example, if two people disagree about which team will win an upcoming 
basketball game, the very ability of them to have a substantive disagreement about this 
presupposes that they are able to express the same meaning by their words.  But thi  is 
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sufficient to establish that there are analyticities, since, if two expressions have the same 
meaning, then the proposition that predicated one of these meanings of the other would 
be analytically true (as identity of meaning is one of the logical relations hat make a 
proposition true).  Hence by such mundane daily acts of communication, we presuppose 
the concept of analyticity.   I shall call this the “General Form” of the argument from 
presupposition.  We cannot even be said to agree or disagree about something unless we 
can make sense of talking about the same thing, which presupposes sameness of meaning 
and thus analyticity. 
 
D. The Argument from Presupposition: Special Case of Logic 
 
Although perhaps not ultimately amounting to a different argument, there does 
seem to be a finer point to be made by focusing on the presuppositions of logic, 
argumentation and other more technical forms of reasoning rather than the less formal 
day-to-day communication.  However, the case here is the same with regard to the 
presupposition of analyticities.  We presuppose in our formal, logical arguments that 
terms in our arguments have the same meaning.  The act of symbolizing two expressions 
with the same propositional variable presupposes we can make sense of the expressions’ 
having the same meaning.  Categorical syllogisms require there to be three and only three 
terms that are each used twice in the syllogism, and it is assumed by this tha  these terms 
have the same meaning in their separate occurrences. 
For example, consider the classic syllogism: 
All men are mortal 
Socrates is a man 
.: Socrates is mortal 
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which is standardly symbolized in Aristotelian logic notation as: 
 A all (men) some (mortal) 
 A all (Socrates) some (men) 
 .: A all (Socrates) some (mortal) 
However, to arrive at this symbolization, one must assume that the two occurrences of 
“mortal” should be represented by the same term, which is to say that they have the same 
meaning.  Similarly for “Socrates”, and things get slightly messier for the last term, since 
we have to take the occurrence of “men” in the first sentence and equate it with the 
occurrence of “man” in the second sentence.  But, what licences equating these?  Only 
our understanding of the meanings, for there are clearly cases in which simple syntactic 
similarity (or even syntactic equality) is not sufficient to guarantee that two syntactic 
units represent the same meaning and thus should be symbolized in logical form as the 
same predicate or the same variable or name (e.g., "Enough is enough" is not a logical 
truth, but more likely a statement of exasperation) - and anyone who has attempted 
natural language processing is keenly aware of the challenges presented by lexical 
ambiguity. 
 This highlights a point that was noted earlier about Quine’s attempted distinction 
between two classes of statements, the “logically true” statements and he (for him, 
purportedly) analytic, but not logically true, statements.  Some (cf. Miller 2007) have 
noted problems with this attempted distinction of Quine’s, but even if viewed as an 
inconsistency of Quine’s, it is seen as a minor problem.  I would argue that it is indicative 
of a much more fundamental misconception than most realize.  That misconception is the 
belief that logic is purely syntactic, and that in logic (and in other areas) we can get all 
the benefits of semantics without any commitment to meanings. 
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 Taking Quine’s own example, Quine is not rigorous enough in his restriction of 
"logical truths".  He countenances “No unmarried man is married”, but "unmarried" is not 
purely syntactically related to "not married", and we require an understanding of the 
semantics of "unmarried" to see that it is synonymous with "not married".  This cannot be 
purely syntactic, since it is not strictly of the form "~P".  Although thisis a small point, 
and Quine could simply be more careful to avoid it, it does show just how little we can do 
with pure syntax.   
And this leads to the larger point: syntax alone does not get us any of the logical 
truths.  We need to invoke the semantics of the so-called "logical particles" (and I
emphasize the "so-called", since there is nothing truly distinctive about these words from 
any others).  We have to know what "not", "or", "and", "if", "then" mean to know that 
they warrant the various analytic claims we accept.  Another way to put this point is that 
there ultimately is no distinction between the supposedly syntactic truths and the non-
syntactic ones.  All analytic truths rest on the notion of meaning equally, even the 
"narrow syntactic notion of self-contradiction" (Miller 2007, 128).  So, instead of 
somehow being based on pure syntax, logic, when properly understood, provides one of 
the strongest arguments for a commitment to meanings and analyticity, in that it 
presupposes both. 
 
E. The Argument from Presupposition: Special Case of Action Theory 
 
 Ironically, Fodor, a passionate critic of analyticity, provides another circumstance 
in which we presuppose analyticity.  In discussing propositional attitudes and their 
logical form, Fodor presents an argument based on the role propositional attitudes play in 
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the theory of action/decision theory, more specifically, in our explanatory models of the 
relations between an individual’s mental states and their actions.  After arguing  
(a) that any decision theory we can now contemplate will surely look like this one 
in that (b) it will entail generalizations about the causal relations among content-
related beliefs, utilities and intentions; and (c) such generalizations will be 




we can't state the theory-relevant generalization that is instantiated by the 
relations among John's mental states unless we allow reference to beliefs of the 
form if X then Y, desires of the form that Y; intentions of the form that X should 
come about; and so forth. (Fodor 2002, 545) 
 
But the key point in this passage comes when Fodor (rightly) recognizes that "[v]iewed 
one way (material mode) the recurrent schematic letters require identities of content 
among propositional attitudes" (Fodor 2002, 545, emphasis added). 
Although put in terms of content, this argument could easily be put in terms of 
meaning, and would work just as well to show that in providing an account of a person's 
actions, we presuppose that there are relations of identity between the meanings 
associated with the components of their beliefs, desires, and intentions.  Thus, in order to
make sense of someone's behavior, we presuppose that components of their propositional 
attitudes have the same meaning and thus presuppose analyticity. 
 
 
F. Not Just Synonymy Implies Analyticity 
 
So that there is no confusion, and also to make clear the full extent of the implicit 
reliance on analyticity, although the cases cited above were all about presuppositions f 
sameness of meaning, it is not just synonymy or sameness of meaning, but every relation 
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between meanings that presupposes analyticity.  Discourse and argumentation that rely 
on the logical relations of inclusion between meanings or antonymy also presuppose 
analyticity.  For example, if in their claims about the upcoming basketball game, one 
individual claims one team will win and another individual claims that same team will 
lose, they (and we) still acknowledge their disagreement, and in doing so presuppose the 
analyticity of the relation between the meanings of “lose” and “win”.  And, if one person 
refers to a film star as an attractive actress, and another person infers that the film star is 
an actress and that she is a woman, this also presupposes the analyticity of the relation 
between the meanings of the expressions “attractive actress”, “actress”, and “woman”. 
G. Concluding Remark 
 
In conclusion, I would like to draw a connection between an argument of 
BonJour’s in his In Defense of Pure Reason (BonJour 1998) and my own.  BonJour 
forcefully argues that our use of logic presupposes a reliance upon a riori justification, 
and I would argue that ultimately, this form of a priori justification is founded upon our 
rational insight into the logical relations of meanings, which is to say, our ability to 
recognize analyticities.  Just as BonJour argues that the empiricists who deny a priori 
justification must rely on it in their very arguments against it, the same is true of those 
who attempt to deny analyticity.  And so, I would agree with BonJour’s assessment that 
“the repudiation of all a priori justification” (and, I would argue, this includes 
analyticity) “is apparently tantamount to the repudiation of argument or reasoning 
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